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Glossary of key Terms  
Asylum seeker (s) or boat people—unless otherwise specified in this document, these 
refer to persons who have either arrived in to Australian mainland or excised 
territories by boat, including those who have been returned at sea while seeking to 
enter Australia or its territories. These persons are taken in to the context of asylum 
seekers as defined or classified by the United Nations Refugee Convention. 
The Department—refers to the Australia’s Government Department for Immigration. 
Applicant(s)—any person(s), usually arriving in Australia by boat who has sought or 
has applied for protection in Australia as either an asylum seeker or refugee. These 
may be further classified by the department as Unaccompanied Minors (UAMs), 
Irregular Maritime Arrivals (IMAs) or Unauthorised Maritime Arrivals (UMAs). 
The Convention—refers to the 1951 UN Convention and its 1967 Protocol relating to 
the status of Refugees. 
The Act/Migration Act—refers to the Migration Act 1958. 
The Panel—the report by the Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers (the Expert Panel) 
2012. 
Deterrence—is used to refer to any part or whole of Australia’s government policy 
that is or has been intended at keeping boat arriving asylum seekers from entering 
Australia. These include polices of off shore processing, turning away of asylum 
seeker boats at sea and also refusal of protection visa grants other than temporary 
protection for those living in the Australian mainland. 
The Minister—refers to the Minister for Immigration in Australia. 
The ICCPR (the Covenant)—the Second Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
The CRC—the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
The CAT—the Convention Against Torture and other cruel, inhumane and degrading 
treatment or punishment. 
TP/TPVs—Temporary Protection Visas. 
WTP approach —refers to Bacchi’s “What’s the problem represented to be?” approach 
to policy analysis. 
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Abstract  
Australia’s asylum seeker policy in recent years has been contentious in nature. It is 
arguably designed to send asylum seekers back to wherever they came from and if 
not detain them in a third country. How and why deterrence has become the hallmark 
of Australia’s asylum seeker policy while Australia had a well-deserved reputation as 
a country accepting of refugees, is something that needs to be explored. In exploring 
deterrence as a central aspect of Australia’s asylum seeker policy, I have employed an 
analytic framework comprising Bacchi’s “What’s the problem represented to be” and 
Lakoff”s account of the role of metaphors. For research data the thesis draws on 
seventeen asylum seeker bills presented to the Australian Federal Parliament 
between 2007 and 2015, as well as speeches, press releases and media events 
involving Prime Ministers and a range of Ministers for the period 2007 and early 
2015.  
This research builds on existing research on asylum seekers in two ways. It builds on 
work already done analysing successive government’s policies since 1992. It also 
analyses these policies using a new framework and emphasis on political discourse. 
I have identified the representation of asylum seekers as a security problem. There 
are also five key metaphors that explicate what successive Australian governments 
have treated as the key problems and the course of action it took based on its 
problematisations. The first metaphor is the “country as home” metaphor that 
represents the problem of “illegal” boat arrivals by constructing Australia as a 
house/home under threat from asylum seekers. The second metaphor is the “queue” 
metaphor where the asylum seeker system is depicted as though it is a queue, which 
has formed out the front of the “Australian home”. The third metaphor constitutes the 
arrival of asylum seeker boats as a “natural disaster” that leads us to believe that like 
any disaster, they pose a serious threat, but in the form of insecurity, and also issues 
of identity. The fourth metaphor justifies the government’s chosen course of action. 
The fifth and final metaphor is the “war” metaphor with the depiction of boat arrivals 
as an “invading army”. 
While these metaphors are not isolated but are well bounded, they originate from the 
Australian/western understanding of a home and privacy. Each metaphor relies on 
the existence of the other metaphors for support and reinforcement for representing 
what the problem is and what action is required. The first three metaphors serve to 
represent Australia as a home, a home that is under threat and what it is under threat 
from.  
The findings from this analysis are that there are specific ideologically (mis)informed 
representations of asylum seekers in the context of metaphors. This research has 
busted these representations and findings should guide policy makers and advocates 
to rethink the current approaches to asylum seekers.  
Key words: Asylum seekers, policy, deterrence, metaphors, Australian Federal 
Parliament, mandatory detention, offshore processing. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
It was on Tuesday 29 March 2011 that I first came to Australia. It was something I had 
been looking forward to with intense pleasure and not a little anxiety. It was my first 
venture into what back in Uganda I was used to referring to as the “developed world”. 
I really did not know what life would be like for me in Australia. It certainly helped 
that I was going to be reunited with my wife who had been awarded an academic 
scholarship and had come to take up her post-graduate studies in Australia earlier in 
that January. I was going to be here for two years and would have to look for a job.  
A few weeks passed by and I was now actively engaged in the process of making some 
job applications. I was looking for a job in youth services, having previously worked 
with young people in Uganda. I sent out a number of job applications but many got 
negative responses, perhaps because most of my previous work experience had been 
in the HIV and AIDS health sector. Eventually one of my applications to work with 
asylum seeking young men with a not-for-profit agency in Melbourne was successful. 
I was invited for an interview and I got the job.  
This process of preparing for the interview brought back some memories from my 
journey to Australia. In my flight from Dubai to Melbourne, Australia, my inflight 
entertainment involved watching movies and then checking international news clips. 
One news item that dominated that time inflight was about an asylum seeker who had 
taken his own life in an Australian detention centre.1 The dead man had been detained 
for some period and his claim for asylum in Australia had been rejected. There was a 
narrative about asylum seekers protesting in detention centres.2 There were stories 
about refugee advocates marching in protest.3  
I owed my new job to the fact that the Australian Labor government (under Prime 
Minister Julia Gillard) had made some changes to Australia’s mandatory detention 
policy at the end of 2010. The policy removed children and vulnerable families from 
                                                          
1 http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-03-28/detention-death-puts-centre-on-edge/2637766- 
accessed 09/05/2015  
2 http://www.refugeeaction.org.au/?p=750- accessed 09/05/2015 
3 http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-opinion/for-forgotten-asylum-seekers-riot-
is-the-only-way-to-be-heard-20110328-1cdel.html- accessed 09/05/2015 
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detention and released them to the community in the care of community agencies4 - 
a move that had been welcomed by many refugee agencies, advocates and activists5. I 
now had a frontline job working with asylum seekers classified as Unaccompanied 
Minors (UAMs) who had come to Australia by boat. Those asylum seekers had been 
passed over into the custodianship of selected non-profit agencies, while the 
Australian Federal Government minister remained their guardian under the then-
Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC), (and later the Department of 
Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP) now under the Australian Border Force 
(ABF)6.  
It proved an exciting job working with young people from culturally diverse 
backgrounds. It was time to learn another language and culture. These were amazing 
young men. They were very friendly and they told a lot of stories -some of the stories 
were funny, some were horrifying. They told of terrifying moments at sea, or while on 
their journey by boat to Australia. Some of these young people were also very gifted. 
They were eager to engage, and be engaged with people and activities in the wider 
Australian society, especially, in sports and other youth social activities.  
Apart from the extraordinary, sometimes horrifying stories told me by these young 
people, I could not help but be aware that their presence in Australia has been and 
was still central to one of the most significant and longest-running political 
controversies in Australia’s recent history. Both the experiences of these people and 
the controversies attached to Australia’s asylum seeker policy have joined up to 
provide the intellectual motivation that led to this thesis, namely a sense that here 
was something that needed some kind of deep understanding. 
The choice of the title of my study is based on an award winning Australian Television 
documentary series “Go back to where you came from”, broadcast in 2011 (Season 
One), Season Two in 2012 (Douglas and Graham 2013) and Season Three in July 2015. 
These television series document the experiences of some selected Australians with 
                                                          
4 http://www.chrisbowen.net/media-centre/media-releases.do?newsId=3793- accessed 
9/05/2015 
5 
http://unhcr.org.au/unhcr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=187%3Adetention-
media-release&Itemid=76- accessed 09/05/2015 
6 http://www.border.gov.au/- accessed 22/08/15 
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varying views on refugees/asylum seekers who are taken through the experience of 
life in a reverse journey through the path that people seeking asylum/refuge in 
Australia have come from7. It is some of the differencing and strongly anti-asylum 
seeker (boat arrivals) views presented by some participants in this award winning 
documentary that I will argue, are in resonance with the core of Australia’s asylum 
seeker policy in recent years. In each series, the participants were taken to some 
countries reputed to be the most dangerous places on in the 21st century such as 
Somalia, Pakistan and Afghanistan, countries which the Australian Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade often puts on high alerts based on the prevailing security 
situations and advises its citizens not to travel there8.  
Australia and Refugee Intake 
Australia has a long history of offering protection to refugees. In the second half of the 
twentieth century, it emerged as one of the many destinations for people seeking 
refuge in the world. It is reported that Australia received more than half a million 
refugees and asylum seekers between 1945 and 1990 (Ackleson 2005). Other 
scholars argue that in the post-second world war, it assisted in international efforts 
in the resettlement of 600,000 refugees (Hugo 2002a). Other figures also suggest that 
Australia has resettled 750,000 refugees since world war two (Bowen 2011). In 1954, 
Australia like many other countries ratified the 1951 United Nations Convention on 
the status of Refugees and in 1973 also ratified its 1961 Protocol (UN 2007). This 
convention was a legal and binding instrument of the United Nations that defined who 
a refugee is; spelling out their rights and the legal obligation of states to protect those 
rights (UNHCR 2007). This act of ratification set up certain obligations for the 
Australia to respect and abide by its guidelines to protect refugees/asylum seekers 
such as the rights to enter a country or a territory to seek asylum and the right not to 
be forcibly returned or non-refoulement (UNHCR, 2007).  
Within the broader classification and context of refugees is a component of people 
referred to as asylum seekers. The distinction between a refugee and an asylum 
                                                          
7 SBS One- http://www.sbs.com.au/goback/- accessed 20/06/15 
8 See Travel Advice on the Smart Traveller- http://www.smartraveller.gov.au/zw-
cgi/view/Advice/Index- accessed 20/06/15 
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seeker is not markedly different. The 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the 
status of Refugees defines a refugee as any person who has left their country of origin 
or habitual residence because they claim to have suffered (or fear) persecution on 
account of race, nationality, religion, political opinion or because they are a member 
of a persecuted social group. Refugees are people who have applied and are assessed 
to be in need of protection while they are still outside of a resettling country or 
territory usually through an international agency like the United Nations High 
Commissioner for the Refugees (UN 2007). Asylum seekers on the other hand apply 
for protection after reaching the territorial borders of a country or territory they seek 
to gain protection, usually without valid documentation. Yet the precise nature of 
those obligations has proved one of the many complicating factors in Australia. 
Australian governments still continue to resettle refugees and asylum seekers, 
although their intake is quite minimal in terms of numbers compared to other 
countries like the United States and Canada9. According to the UNHCR 2011 report10, 
Australia was at the bottom of the ladder in terms of per capita for the numbers of 
asylum seekers. However this is not the whole story nor does it quite catch the 
controversial character of that aspect of Australia’s refugee policy dealing with 
asylum seekers. It wasn’t that way in the years after the cessation of the Second World 
War. For a decade or so while the issue of asylum seekers occupied successive 
Australian governments the initial spate of people seeking asylum after the 1976 US-
Vietnam War, was carried out under UN guidelines with asylum seekers simply placed 
in the community while their claims for asylum were processed.  
Beginning in 1989 the Australian government decided that people seeking asylum 
have to be detained and established detention centres (Costello 2012; Edwards 
2005). It is hardly a secret that the development of Australia’s recent and current 
asylum seeker policy has become one of the most bitterly divisive, discursive and 
discussed issues in the history of modern Australia (Douglas and Graham 2013; 
Fletcher 2014; Fozdar and Torezani 2008; Freeman 2004; Gavrielatos 2011; Gerard 
and Vecchio 2012; Murphy 2009, 2011).  
                                                          
9http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library
/pubs/rp/rp1415/RefugeeResettlement- accessed 09/05/2015.  
10 See http://www.unhcr.org/4fd6f87f9.pdf accessed 14/04/15 
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It is the duty of the Australian government under its Department of Immigration to 
assess the validity of each asylum seeker’s claims in line with the obligations under 
the 1951 UN Convention (UNHCR 2007) once they have logged their applications for 
protection- as people in need of protection and seeking asylum in Australia. The 
current Australian government continues to accept approximately 13,750 people11 
from refugee backgrounds12 annually through its humanitarian program and other 
programs13 although this was revised back from 20,000 in the 2012-201314, a single 
increment that was resulted from the report of the recommendation of the Expert 
Panel on asylum seekers15.  
People in need of protection are resettled through the Special Humanitarian Program 
which covers both onshore protection and offshore resettlement 16 . The onshore 
component is established for people who enter Australia and subsequently apply for 
protection of the Australian government in line with the provisions of relevant United 
Nations (UN) conventions to which Australia is a party (UN 2007). This means that on 
arrival or interception in Australian territory, Australia, like some other countries of 
the developed world detains individuals and families claiming asylum seeker status 
while their claims to refugee status are assessed. The Australian Department of 
Immigration and Border Protection classifies these people as “Irregular Maritime 
Arrivals”. Mandatory Detention has been defended on the grounds that it is part of the 
process of having health and security checks done by the Department of Immigration 
and Border Protection (DIBP) as their (people arriving by boats) claims for asylum 
seeking are being verified before IMAs are either granted visas or returned to 
wherever they came from (usually country of origin). 
However the issue of asylum seekers became increasingly contentious in the late 
1980s fuelled by evidence of popular anxiety about the numbers of arrivals by boat of 
                                                          
11 http://bhutanesesa.org.au/uploads/2014/04/SPH-Handout.pdf- accessed 09/05/2015 
12 http://www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/refugee/ref-hum-issues/pdf/humanitarian-
program-information-paper-14-15.pdf- accessed 09/05/2015 
13 https://www.immi.gov.au/media/fact-sheets/60refugee.htm- accessed 09/05/2015 
14 https://www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/pdf/shp-client-info-sheet.pdf- accessed 
09/05/2015 
15http://artsonline.monash.edu.au/thebordercrossingobservatory/files/2015/03/expert_panel_
on_asylum_seekers_full_report.pdf- accessed 09/05/2015 
16 For more information https://www.immi.gov.au/visas/humanitarian/offshore/shp.htm - 
accessed 14/04/2015 
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people seeking asylum/protection (Hudson-Rodd 2009). This anxiety occurred in 
spite of the fact that Australia’s intake especially when compared to other host 
countries is negligible as previously mentioned. The Fraser coalition government 
(1975-1983) treated refugees with exemplary generosity without mandatory 
detention or temporary protection (Colebatch 2010). In the late 1980s the Hawke-
Keating governments began a process to tighten up its asylum seeker policy with 
specific elements as will later be detailed in this thesis. There are two controversial 
aspects of this policy namely; the policy of mandatory detention and that of offshore 
processing. 
The Policy of Mandatory Detention  
Whilst the guidelines of the 1951 UN Convention and its 1967 Protocol, do not 
conceive of the possibility of illegal entry as a problem, people arriving in Australia as 
asylum seekers have been subjected to mandatory administrative detention since 
1992. This was a policy that was created by the Keating Labor Government in 1992. 
It was introduced to deal will the spate of Indochinese boat arrivals after the Viet Nam 
war. These increased boat arrivals were a concern for the government(s) which had 
initially been receptive to those fleeing the war.  
However when the numbers of boat arrivals increased, the Australian government 
began to detain all new arrivals to distinguish between those who have submitted 
themselves for offshore processing prior to entry to Australia and those who had not. 
This was intended “to support the integrity of Australia’s Migration Program” and to 
allow the government to effectively control the composition of, and overall numbers 
in Australia’s immigration program” as explained in the explanatory memorandum of 
the Migration Reform Bill 1992 17  of “Australia’s borders”. This policy was 
strengthened by the Migration Reform Bill 199218 which received bipartisan support 
from both sides of Australia’s major political parties. This legislation made some 
major changes to the Migration Act 1958. Mandatory detention was to ensure that 
                                                          
17 http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/bill_em/mrb1992197/memo_0.html- accessed 
13/06/2015 
18 
https://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/library/pubs/explanmem/docs/1992migrationreformbillem.pdf- 
accessed 25/04/15 
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anyone who arrived in to Australia with no valid documentation especially by boat 
would be detained indefinitely till their claim for asylum had been assessed.  
Detention of any illegal entrants to Australia was justified for assessment processes, 
including security and health checks to establish their legitimacy to stay and be 
resettled in Australia. Those detained were given the opportunity to opt to depart 
Australia for their country of origin at any time. Over time, and with the change in 
Australian governments and that in themselves brought a number of policy changes 
in the Australian asylum seeker policy trajectory, some categories of asylum seekers 
eventually get referred to the community detention program. These live in the 
community under the custodianship of certain contracted agencies who provide the 
necessary casework support to ensure that asylum seekers” needs and vulnerabilities 
are appropriately identified and addressed whilst the DIBP do background and or 
health check through the different mechanisms.  
Off-Shore Processing Policy 
Off-shore processing is the other even more controversial aspect of the policy that 
started during the Howard Coalition government in the early 2000s in what was 
termed as the Pacific Solution. The “Pacific Solution” was Australia’s asylum seeker 
policy response that was born from the August 2001 crisis of the TAMPA event, a 
Norwegian vessel that rescued a large number of asylum seekers destined to 
mainland Australia from an ill-fated and sinking boat (Beeson 2002; Billings 2011). 
The government under Prime Minister John Howard was determined to stop the 
TAMPA from entering Australian waters when it became an international issue 
(Beeson 2002). Determined not to let the asylum seekers in its territory, and while 
enjoying some electoral advantage with the masses, the government had to swiftly 
come up with new legislation in this regard. This marked the beginning of the “Pacific 
Solution” as a change to the Australian asylum seeker policy, largely meant to process 
all entrants by boat outside of the Australian legal territory (Mathew 2002).  
Because of the popularity that the Howard Liberal Coalition government enjoyed with 
the Australian electorate, they radically changed the policy as the Coalition parties 
made dealing with the asylum seeker problem the top priority in their campaign 
which subsequently saw the Howard Coalition government re-elected in 2001. In the 
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wake of that election triumph many islands were excised from Australia’s 
immigration zone and asylum seekers were removed off-shore to third countries like 
the tiny island nation of Nauru and Papua New Guinea’s Manus Island in order to 
determine their refugee status (Billings 2011; Hugo 2002b).  
The Howard coalition government also introduced a system of granting temporary 
protection visas to asylum seekers and initiated a policy of turning back boats where 
possible. This was followed up a range of legislation providing the Australian 
government with the powers to remove any ship in its territorial waters and 
guaranteed that no applications for asylum could be made by people on board these 
boats (Billings 2011). Other legislation reinforced the practice of mandatory 
detention, providing for the indefinite detention of those seeking asylum in Australia. 
Immigration detainees were held in the many immigration detention facilities in 
Australia or on Manus Island or Nauru as part of the “Pacific solution” (Hugo 2002b; 
McAllister 2003).  
Asylum Seeker Policies, 2007-2015 
The years between 2010 and 2015 have proved to be a tumultuous period in the 
Australian asylum seeker policy environment as successive governments have either 
introduced new policies or reverted to the old ones. While the Rudd Labor 
government (3 December 2007- 24 June 2010) was hailed for having officially 
disbanded the Howard era (March 11, 1996- December 3, 2007) “Pacific Solution” 
policy, the Gillard Labor government (24 June 2010- 27 June 2013) soon reverted 
back to what looked a lot like Howard era policies, by attempting to send asylum 
seekers to other countries like Malaysia in what was referred to as the “Malaysian 
Solution” 19 . 
 What is even more intriguing for many is that upon his return as Prime Minister of 
Australia, Kevin Rudd (June 27, 2013- September 18, 2013), who had disbanded the 
                                                          
19 See - http://www.smh.com.au/national/gillard-announces-malaysian-solution-20110507-
1ed0h.html-  
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Pacific Solution “re-invented” it in his Regional Resettlement Agreement20 with the 
governments of Papua New Guinea and Nauru not only to process asylum seekers but 
to resettle them there. Finally we saw the Abbott Coalition government introduce 
what is called the Operation Sovereign Borders21 policy since winning the Australian 
Federal election in September 2013. It is government policy to intercept and turn back 
at sea any vessel with persons destined to Australia back to where it came from-
usually Indonesia. This also means that detention now takes place in a number of 
offshore facilities in other countries outside Australia’s legal territorial boundaries.  
In this study I want to “put a spotlight” on Australia’s response to asylum seekers and 
in particular to illuminate the motivations driving these policy responses over the last 
few years as well as clarify why there seems to be such a gap between Australia’s 
international obligations to asylum seekers and its actual treatment of them. This 
forms the central nature and context of my thesis. Let me spell out my key research 
questions.  
  
                                                          
20 Details at http://dfat.gov.au/geo/papua-new-guinea/Pages/memorandum-of-understanding-
between-the-government-of-the-independent-state-of-papua-new-guinea-and-the-government-of-
austr.aspx- accessed 20/06/15 
21 See http://www.customs.gov.au/site/operation-sovereign-borders.asp- for details accessed 
20/06/15 
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Key Research Questions 
In analytic terms the large central question central to this thesis is this: 
How and why has asylum seeker policy in Australia since 2007 been effectively 
oriented first to Mandatory Detention and Off-Shore processing and now to complete 
total deterrence of asylum seekers from coming to Australia?  
This central question is then broken down into a series of smaller questions. These 
include:  
1. What kinds of problems are there in the recent and current scholarship 
dealing with Australia’s asylum seeker policy?  
2. In particular how do scholars explain the current preoccupation with 
deterrence and the absence of any policy commitment to meet Australia’s 
human rights obligations in international law?  
3. In what ways if any, do Lakoff”s (1980) analytic on metaphors Bacchi’s 
(2009) “What is the problem represented to be” approach and to studying 
policy making, help to explain the preoccupation with deterrence?  
Justification for This Research 
My research project is designed to help explain how and why Australia’s asylum 
seeker policy objective has moved away from compliance with international law and 
has become much more oriented towards deterrence or seeking to prevent asylum 
seekers making claims for asylum. We need to understand what possibly helps best 
explain why successive governments, at least from 2010 reverted to the policy of 
deterrence of those seeking asylum in Australia when policies of mandatory 
detention, temporary protection and offshore processing came to play. It is my 
conviction that choosing “What’s the problem represented to be” approach and 
mixing its use with the analysis of metaphors will to enable us better understand the 
underpinnings or unperceived situations that arise from problem representations in 
policies or policy proposals on asylum seekers.  
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Recent and current research on asylum seekers 
The number of bibliographies addressing the issue of Australian asylum seekers 
points to a large body of research work (as well as commentary and polemic) that 
touches directly on the issue of asylum seekers and refugee policy in Australia. 
Academic research on this theme has been conducted by a large number of scholars 
from fields such as sociology, law and legal studies, psychology, human rights and 
political science. And while this body of work pursues different themes and issues, 
much of this literature shares a common assumption namely that immigration in 
general and asylum seekers in particular is inherently a controversial topic (Boulus 
et al. 2013) (Crock and Ghezelbash 2010).  
A good deal of academic research has concluded for example, that recent or current 
asylum seeker policies in Australia emphasising either deterrence or detention do not 
meet international human rights standards (Schloenhardt 2002). In examining 
developments in Australian border policing policy since the election of a Labor 
government in November 2007. Grewcock (Grewcock 2013) argues for example that 
despite the formal cessation of the “Pacific Solution”, there are fundamental 
continuities in policy that ensure systemic human rights abuses by the Australian 
state against unauthorised refugees. This is because of the many cases of physical 
injury, trauma and re-traumatisation, self-harm, suicide and death that have been 
caused to asylum seekers by Australia’s border policing and mandatory detention 
strategies. Grewcock wonders why successive Australian governments refuse to take 
responsibility or are not held accountable for the many violations of asylum seekers’ 
human rights. Some of this research has documented human rights abuses (Fleay and 
Briskman 2013) Asylum seekers in Australia’s Curtin detention centre have narrated 
the different human rights violations from indefinite detention, rejection of asylum 
claims to complexities and inconsistencies in the refuge processing system (Fleay and 
Briskman 2013). Other research has addressed issues like separation from family, 
dependence on anti-depressants and long waits for security clearance even in the 
instances where one was found to be a genuine asylum seeker. 
One observation about this work is that much of the current body of academic work 
in relation to asylum seekers policy seems to be more reactive than diagnostic. That 
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is, while addressing asylum seeker policy in Australia, much of the literature has 
tended to limit the scope of inquiry to fixing the problems arising from the policy 
rather than addressing the policy itself. Equally this is not to deny of course that there 
is a large body of research work which has addressed the political process especially 
to do with public opinion and the role of the media in shaping public opinion towards 
the arrival of asylum seekers as will be later covered in the subsequent chapters (Aly 
2007; Bartlett 2012; Brown ; Burney 2009; Louis et al. 2007). However this existing 
literature needs to be complemented by establishing what is at the motivational core 
of Australian policy on asylum seekers over the years, especially from the years 2007 
onwards.  
What cannot be doubted as much recent commentary, for example (Bartlett 2012; 
Billings 2011; Davies 2013; Douglas and Graham 2013; Mares 2011) have insisted is 
that Australia’s asylum seeker policy has come to emphasise deterring the arrival by 
sea of asylum seekers by any means available to the Australian government. This 
research tells us that asylum seeker policy in Australia especially since 2007 is: a) 
More about creating a policy designed to deter potential asylum seekers from seeking 
entry into Australia and b) that once the key elements of that policy like the use of 
aggressive naval patrols to detect, apprehend and divert boats carrying asylum 
seekers, or processing asylum seekers claims in off-shore detention centres in Nauru 
or Manus Island) has been applied, its effects on the lives of people seeking asylum 
are detrimental (Bartlett 2012; Davies 2013; Douglas and Graham 2013). However 
what is less clear is what this research tells us about the why of this policy.  
Scholars like Ahlawat (Ahlawat 2012) for example have tried to explain the 
development of Australia’s population policy since the origins of British settlement. 
Beginning with an all-white Australia policy in 1901 after federation, Ahlawat points 
out that Australia, while located in Asia, has always worked to establish its “British” 
identity and attachments. This was exemplified in its 1901 policy of “white Australia” 
where an English dictation test was required to be undertaken by anyone other than 
white arriving in Australia. Ahlawat argues that this policy was adopted to address 
the challenge posed by threat of possible migration from the surrounding Asian 
countries. He further goes on to discuss the transitions that occurred after the Second 
World War that saw the resettlement of south European immigrants mainly from Italy 
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and Greece. And then there was a shift from white Australia to the policy of 
multiculturalism in the 1970s. The Whitlam government formally declared the white 
Australia policy to be “dead and buried” and asserted that it was necessary to 
recognise and accept the culture that migrants carried with them rather than 
dismissing their distinctiveness22 while his predecessors extensively implemented 
the policy of multiculturalism. He identifies the circumstances and the antecedents 
that resulted in a policy of multi-culturalism in Australia in the 1970s shaped by ideas 
about social cohesion, cultural identity and equal opportunity and access for all.  
What Ahlawat’s work suggests is that Australia moved away from an all-white policy 
and reinvented its identity as an inclusive Australia. Yet this account does not help to 
explain why successive governments, from 1992 on adopted a policy that moved away 
from compliance with international law and ended up in a policy of deterring those 
seeking asylum in Australia.  
My research is based on the need to address a central problem, namely why has 
Australia adopted a policy of deterring asylum seekers from coming to Australia since 
2007? The objective of my research is to bridge the gap, in scholarly terms, that 
currently exists in relation to the subject of recent and current asylum seeker policy 
in Australia. Whereas there is some body of work examining the motivational core of 
the asylum seeker policy, my work comes as a modest addition and expansion of this 
body of work, from another theoretical lens. This research builds on existing research 
on asylum seekers in two ways. It builds on work already done analysing successive 
government’s policies since 1992. It also analyses these policies using the framework 
of “What’s the problem represented to be” analytic postulated by Carol Bacchi (Bacchi 
2009) together with the analytic work on metaphors as presented by Lakoff and 
Johnston (1980). 
A problem with conventional policy studies  
There is a conventional account of policy making which stresses that it is a “rational”, 
evidence-driven process often involving technical experts (found in the policy making 
                                                          
22 http://www.whitlam.org/gough_whitlam/achievements/foreignaffairsandimmigration- 
accessed 20/09/14 
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community like the officials employed by a government) aided by the external experts 
drawn for example from the media, consulting firms and the social sciences.  
This is sometimes referred to as the comprehensively rational model of policy decision 
making. The model presupposes an actor, for example the decision maker, which may 
be a policy community or agency searching for “utility maximizing (hence, optimizing) 
solutions”. Further this model assumes or presupposes: 
 A well-defined problem; 
 A full array of alternatives to consider; 
 Full baseline information; 
 Full information about the consequences of each alternative; 
 Full information about the values and preferences of citizens; and, 
 Fully adequate time, resources, and infinite cognitive capacity (Forester 
1984). 
In this model of policy-making it almost seems as if there is in fact no decision to be 
made. Once the analysis is complete, the “optimal decision” is chosen, as it is 
apparently the only rational course of action. On this account, states or governments 
are assumed to be exemplars of rationality whose personnel engage persistently in a 
kind of empirical or objective process of policy-making often deploying a utilitarian 
rational calculus is operating. In a major survey of state repression Davenport 
(2007:4) for example, notes in typical fashion that:  
Political leaders carefully weigh the costs and benefits of coercive action … when 
benefits exceed cost, alternatives are not viewed favourably, and there is a high 
probability of success, repressive action is anticipated. When costs exceed 
benefits, alternatives exist, and the probability of success is low, no repression is 
expected.  
This approach to policy making means for example, that “data” is transformed into 
“technically defined ends to be pursued through administrative means” (Fischer, 
1998, p. 133-134). While such accounts of policy making have been subjected to steady 
criticism by writers like Rittel and Webber (Rittel 1974), these assumptions about the 
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relationship between social reality and social science methods used to describe and 
measure it are still largely operative in policy analysis.  
This is so in spite of several decade of important criticism by Lindblom Simon and 
others for example Lindblom (1959 p.80) argued that the policy-making process is 
inherently more complex. Lindblom observed in terms that seem to need being 
recalled more often than it is that the comprehensively rational model: 
… assumes intellectual capacities and sources of information that men simply 
do not possess, and it is even more absurd as an approach to policy when time 
and money that can be allocated to a policy problem is limited, as is always the 
case.  
Simon too argued for what he called a boundedly rational model. Here, Herbert 
Simon(Simon 1959) argued that decision makers were cognitively bounded, and were 
faced with the following conditions:  
 Ambiguous and poorly defined problems; 
 Incomplete information about alternatives;  
 Incomplete baseline information, the background of the “problem”; 
 Incomplete information about the consequences of supposed 
alternatives;  
 Incomplete information about the range and content of values, 
preferences and interests; and 
 Limited time, limited skills, and limited resources.  
Additionally Simon argued that far from seeking maximizing solutions, policy and 
decision makers simply tried to satisfy whatever criteria they have set for themselves 
in advance (this became known as the “satisficing” heuristic). Hence, once a solution 
is found which meets the minimum criteria set by the decision maker, the search 
process is stopped, and a decision is taken. Kingdon’s model of the policy making 
process likewise rejects a rational, linear view of the policy process, in which actors 
first identify problems and then elaborate solutions for them. Kingdon is clear on this 
point: “Agendas are not first set and then alternatives generated: instead, alternatives 
must be advocated for a long period before a short-run opportunity presents itself on 
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an agenda” (Kingdon 1984: 215). Kingdon says problem recognition is crucial to 
agenda-setting. Socio-economic “conditions” or events for example come to be 
defined as problems only when political actors believe that something should be done 
to change them. Interpretation is critical in classifying an event into one category or 
another. He also claims that independently of problem recognition, political events 
have their own dynamics: elections, interest group behaviour, ideological conflict set 
up specific developments in the political sphere, thus modifying existing agendas, or 
structuring completely new agendas.  
 Much of this critique, while it is acknowledged has failed to change the conventional 
and mainstream academic approach. Lindblom (1959: 80) proved prescient when he 
remarked that the teaching of public administration was so devoid of reality that it 
left decision makers “in the position of practicing what few people preach.”  
Davis, Wanna, Warhurst and Weller (1993), Bardach (2000), and Althaus, Bridgman 
and Davis (2007) all offer accounts of the policy-making process couched in terms that 
stress the broadly rational framework. Policy analysis texts such as these treat the 
policy-making process in ways that give little weight to how people make sense of the 
“facts” that inform a particular policy approach, why certain issues are constituted as 
“problems” and not others, and why certain kinds of issues are privileged over others 
(Mintrom 2007), pp. 153 – 154).  
Policy making studies of the conventional kind focuses on the “objective” description 
or measurement of social issues. Part of this relates to the artificial divisions made 
between “facts” and “values”, or “objectivity” and “subjectivity”. People necessarily 
construct these distinctions because knowledge cannot be divorced from personal 
experience (Ryan, 2006, p. 16).  
As I have already argued there is a good case made over a long time by a tradition that 
talks about the “social construction of reality” for bypassing this approach (Berger and 
Luckmann 1966; Hacking 1999; Gergen 2009). If reality is a social construction, policy 
makers need to focus more on “the discursive processes which shape the construction 
of policy” (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003, p. 217). Put simply, we need to take into account 
the constitutive processes involved in policy making and the role that language plays 
in shaping the way we make sense of reality.  
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Arguably the most fundamental element in the policy-making process involves 
discourse. Without it, policy could simply not be made (Bessant et al. 2006)p. 301). 
Whether in formal or informal settings, language, and particularly metaphor, shapes 
the way we think, indeed we think using language. Language is thus a key ingredient 
in the construction of a “problem” that policies address. As Bessant et al (2006, p. 305) 
contend, “thinking about the role of talk (especially metaphors) can heighten 
awareness that the knowledge of the social world is constituted and shaped through 
talk about “it”. This is also the same thing that (Lakoff 2002)echoed that “words don’t 
have meanings in isolation. Words are defined relative to a conceptual system” (Page 
29).  
For this reason my research project is focussed on the way asylum seekers, arriving 
by boat are talked about in Australian politics (policy responses). And indeed “one of 
the most fundamental results in cognitive science, one that comes from the study of 
common-sense reasoning, is that most of our thought is unconscious - not unconscious 
in the Freudian sense of being repressed but unconscious simply in that we are not 
aware of it. We think and talk too fast at a rate and at too deep a level to have conscious 
awareness and control over everything we think and say” (Lakoff 2002). 
To do this in this research project, I will examine the use of metaphor in the policy-
making process, which led to the development of policies like the “Pacific Solution”“ 
but more importantly the 2010 “East Timor Solution”, the 2011 “Malaysian Solution”, 
the 2013 “PNG solution” - from the Rudd Labor government’s Regional Resettlement 
Agreement with the Papua New Guinea and more recently, the Liberal Coalition’s 
“turning back the boats policy” known as the Operation Sovereign Borders from 
September 2013. The examination of the use of metaphors is also extended to analyse 
the asylum seeker bills presented, debated or passed in the two levels of the Australian 
Federal Parliament from 2007-2015. I will do this in order to highlight how the issue 
was problematised and provide some insight into why these policies were adopted.  
Metaphors are commonly used by humans to make tangible, intangible or less tangible 
concepts by using those things that humans easily think about, such as aspects of our 
bodies or social relationships, and transposing them in relation to those things that 
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are more complex or remote, such as the day-to-day experiences in our social worlds 
(Lakoff and Johnston, 1980). 
Research approach 
In investigating the evolution of Australian asylum seeker policy especially in the 
years 2007-2015, I decided to employ a particular kind of qualitative research method 
which relies on the version of policy discourse analysis developed by Bacchi (Bacchi 
2009). It is usually referred to as the “What’s the problem represented to be” analytic.  
Bacchi (Bacchi 2009) has developed a distinctive approach to understanding the 
policy making process by way of a systematic inquiry into a number of dimensions. 
This is an interpretative and analytic framework that encourages the researcher to 
identify implied problem representations in specific policies or policy proposals and 
thus guide in identifying the problem representations or perhaps the dominant theme 
in each policy proposal. Bacchi’s interpretative approach leads us to identify and 
examine the presuppositions or assumptions underlying the representation of the 
problems that the policies seek to address, in this case-Australian government(s) 
policies on asylum seekers arriving by boat since 2007.  
In terms of method, my thesis offers a qualitative content analysis that involves 
analysis and interpretation of documents drawing on the analytic framework of the 
“What’s the problem represented to be” approach. I employed a systematic analysis 
of selected key asylum seeker policy documents generated by successive Australian 
governments for the period under study (2007-2015).  
A variety of written and published documents were employed in this study. I sought 
to identify key government documentation that directly targeted asylum seekers for 
the period under study. These documents are distinguished between primary and 
secondary documents/sources. Primary sources are materials produced first hand 
regarding asylum seekers by successive Australian governments between 2007 and 
2015. These consist of parliamentary records, speeches by government leaders, 
reports, policy statements, government action plans and policies on asylum seekers 
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at federal level. Policy statements and strategies on asylum seekers by the DIAC now 
DIBP during the period of study were considered for analysis as primary sources. 
Alongside the primary sources were the secondary sources. Documents that provide 
commentaries and analysis on the original/primary sources were considered 
secondary sources. Secondary sources are further be categorised into public or 
private documents. Public documents consist of media sources such as newspaper 
articles while private sources are commentaries made by individuals or organisations 
at the forefront of asylum seeker advocacy and service provision in Australia. 
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Below is the flow-chart illustration of how final documents to be analysed were 
selected. 
 
Using this approach, I treated Australian asylum seeker policies from 2007-2015 as 
the sum of the words, language and talk selectively describing circumstances in 
ideologically informed ways. My assumption in this interpretative framework is that 
social actors in the policy process have their own assumptions, knowledge and 
understandings of policy issues. This mix of value-based interpretations means that 
the policy process can be described as a struggle over ideas.  
Selected documents for
asylum seeker 
policy analysis
Primary Sources
- parliamentary records, 
policy speeches by 
government leaders, reports
Secondary Sources
- research and  commentaries in 
the public domain
Public Sources
- media such as newspapers, TV 
coverage
Private Sources
- commentaries by individuals or 
organisations
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Conclusion 
In this introduction, I have provided a background to my research topic, defined the 
purpose of the research and the questions it seeks to answer. I have also outlined the 
research approach and provided an overview of the current and recent literature. 
In the next chapter, I will provide a more detailed assessment and review of recent 
and current academic literature. Subsequent chapters will encompass a detailed 
explanation of the techniques or social science methods used in the design, selection 
and analysis of documents in this research, based on the key objective and research 
questions outlined above. There are also chapters to detail the contemporary 
Australian asylum seeker policy over the years, a presentation of analysis and findings 
and the final chapter on conclusions and recommendations for further study. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this chapter, I provide a detailed review of the recent and current literature on the 
subject of asylum seekers. It is paramount to acknowledge that there is a large body 
of work that is focused on asylum seekers and refugees in general. There are a number 
of scholars who have contributed to this subject from the different disciplines and 
perspectives including policy discourse analysis, human right abuses or state crime 
framework, race and intercultural perspectives and ethnography. I also want to 
highlight some of the problems with the literature. 
Migration history in Australia 
The history of Australia’s immigration policy in the twentieth and twenty first 
centuries is generally acknowledged to be full of paradox. On the one hand the general 
shape of that history especially since 1901 has been characterised by the overt 
expression of “white racist” sentiment. From the time when the modern Australian 
Constitution was being developed in the 1890s, the regulation of migration into 
Australia proved to be a chronic site of national anxiety and later of deep political 
controversy fuelled by fear that Australia’s British identity was threatened by its 
proximity to Asia. That anxiety was on full display between 1901 and 1974 when 
Australia introduced and defended a bi-partisan “White Australia” policy (Kelly, 
1994). This was a policy designed to maintain a “racially” homogenous white society.  
Yet paradoxically, it could also be argued that Australia earned a well-deserved 
reputation for its long and creditable history of offering protection to refugees after 
1945. In the decades after the Second World War Australia assisted international 
efforts to address the global problem of “displaced persons” (as refuges were then 
referred to), by resettling at least 600,000 refugees (Hugo 2002a): other scholars like 
Bowen (Bowen 2011) suggest a larger number closer to 750,000 refugees. Into the 
early 1980s the Fraser Coalition government (1975-83) treated refugees with 
exemplary generosity (Colebatch 2010). 
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Then as I indicated in the introduction, there was a dramatic reversal of policy. Since 
the late 1980s the controversial character of Australia’s immigration policy was once 
more accentuated. It was then that Australia, like so many other developed societies, 
was again required to deal with the expansion in the numbers of refugees and asylum 
seekers. The Hawke Labor government introduced mandatory detention for all 
asylum seekers in 1989. This was the precursor to moves adopted since 2001 to deter 
asylum seekers by making any attempt to arrive on the mainland of Australia 
increasingly onerous if not impossible. After 1989 migration became the excruciating 
site of profound tensions between the exercise of executive power used to promote 
national sovereignty and to uphold the rule of law. This tension has since come to be 
one of the most defining features of modern Australian politics. That tension sits 
alongside a bi-partisan consensus between the two major parties about the necessity 
of making asylum seekers a security problem. How Australia reached the point where 
both major political parties got caught up in a “race to the bottom” to ensure that 
Australia ceased to be understood as place for refuge for people who take to the sea 
is a major question that has puzzled, even baffled, some scholars (Manne 2013; 
Markus 2010; Mcadam and Purcell 2008).  
The Puzzle Outlined 
What is very clear in the literature is a concern shared here that recent and current 
Australian current policies and practices addressing the problem of asylum seekers, 
like the use of mandatory detention, temporary protection and offshore processing is 
so clearly at odds with a human rights perspective.23 This is said in recognition that 
although the Executive Committee of the UNHCR recommends “temporary detention” 
as a minimum protection an asylum seeker should receive, it is only to be applied in 
situations and contexts of “mass influx” pending the resolution of such causes of 
movement of people (Edwards 2012). Scholars who have addressed Australia’s 
Immigration history point to the fact that immigration detention has become an 
increasingly routine practice and process of handling asylum seekers especially in the 
developed world. (Bashford and Strange 2002). Indeed it has been pointed out that 
                                                          
23 It is for this reason that these scholars have argued that Australia and its regional initiatives need to focus 
more on protection of those seeking asylum and not on deterrence Sara  Davies, 'Protect or Deter? The Expert 
Panel on Asylum Seekers in Australia', Social Alternatives 32/3 (2013), 26-33.. 
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Australia may be the only signatory of the 1951 Convention on Refugees that has a 
policy and practice of indefinite mandatory detention of asylum seekers (Flohm 
2014). And although this does not necessarily explain why Australia has taken hard-
line stance on asylum seekers (Eltham 2011), the issue of people arriving by boats in 
Australia cannot be taken or treated in the contexts of influx of very large numbers of 
asylum seekers as has been be the case of Congolese and Sudanese refugees in Uganda 
or Sudanese and Somali refugees in Kenya.  
International human rights law clearly spells out the obligation of state signatories to 
human rights covenants to protect persons from arbitrary arrest and detention 
(Costello 2012). That said, scholars also acknowledge the tensions between universal 
human rights to liberty and the state’s sovereignty and border protection 
prerogatives. Others have questioned the scope of protections offered to persons 
seeking asylum in the 1951 Convention relating to the status of Refugees in the light 
of the increasingly restrictive and hard-line policies and practices of deterrence and 
detention of those seeking asylum by various governments (Edwards 2005). 
Whereas it is true that hard-line and restrictive asylum seeker policies and practices 
of mandatory detention call into question the scope of protections offered to asylum 
seekers in the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol to which the Australian 
government is a signatory (Edwards 2005), it falls short of explaining why these hard-
line policies have become the Australian norm.  
Since the Hawke government (1983-91), successive governments have championed 
the proposition that Australia has the right to shape its population profile as it sees 
fit. Prime Minister Howard claimed famously in 2001 to exemplify this position when 
he said, “we will decide who comes to this country and the circumstances in which 
they come”. That proposition was framed by heightened anxiety about national 
security. The aftermath of the 2001 Federal election saw the birth of the “Pacific 
Solution” as a new and central feature of Australia’s asylum seeker policy as a number 
of Pacific islands were excised from Australia’s immigration zone and asylum seekers 
were removed to third countries in order to determine their refugee status. The 
Howard government also introduced a system of temporary protection visas for boat 
arrivals and a policy of turning back boats where possible. This was followed by a raft 
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of legislation introduced into parliament. One bill provided the Australian 
government with the powers to remove any ship in its territorial waters and 
guaranteed that no applications for asylum could be made by people on board these 
boats. The other bill reinforced the practice of mandatory detention, providing for the 
indefinite detention of those seeking asylum in Australia. Immigration detainees were 
held in the many immigration detention facilities in Australia or on Manus Island or 
Nauru as part of the pacific solution. 
To date no leader of an Australian government has articulated an equivalent regard 
for upholding Australia’s international human rights obligations. Indeed the most 
recent variations of these policies adopted under the Rudd and Gillard governments 
(2006-13) and now the Abbott government (2013-) has led many international 
observers to argue that Australia is now in breach of its international legal obligations. 
This was the burden, for example, of findings of the UN Special Rapporteur who found 
that various aspects of Australia’s asylum seeker policies violate the Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(Anonymous 2015a). 
Here it seems is a puzzle: how are we best to explain the reversal of what had once 
been a policy characterised by a regard for the protection of basic human rights 
claimed by those seeking asylum informing a policy accepting asylum seekers which 
after 1989 became a punitive policy involving mandatory detention that turned into 
one of deterrence? In this chapter I review recent and current research to establish 
what light, if any, this literature sheds on this puzzle. 
As I indicated in the introduction, much of the current body of academic work in 
relation to asylum seeker policy appears to be concerned to document the treatment 
of asylum seekers rather than explain the evolution of asylum seeker policy, especially 
since the late 1980s and early 1990s. Much of the recent and current scholarship is 
preoccupied with documenting the problems experienced by asylum seekers after 
they have arrived in Australia (or more recently after they have been housed in 
offshore detention centres (like human rights abuses, the lack of adequate housing, or 
inadequate access to services or income support, as well as seeking or offering 
solutions to address these and other problems which are a consequence of on 
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Australia’s asylum seeker policies. These studies have documented how harmful 
indefinite mandatory detention is to the lives of those seeking asylum (Dudley 2003). 
In Search of Explanations 
There does not seem to be a lot of work which directly addresses the problem of 
explaining how it was that into the 1980s Australia had a good reputation for its 
generous response to asylum seekers which then turned after the late 1980s into a 
punitive policy involving detention and other elements emphasising the need for 
deterrence.  
Certainly there is some research literature while truly depicting that there a 
resentment to asylum seekers and refugees in Australia from the perspective of 
discourse analysis; yet it does not dig deep to the root as why there is asylum seeker 
or refugee sentiment. One early yet influential examination of media discourse about 
asylum seekers and refugees in the Australian press by Pickering (Pickering 2001) for 
example, showed that refugees were viewed not just as a "problem" but as a "deviant" 
population representing a threat to the integrity of the nation-state and the Australian 
community.  
 Some research has documented patterns of negative attitudes in the Australian 
community to asylum seekers. Pedersen et al (Pedersen et al. 2006) discussed the 
character of community’s beliefs. Other work has confirmed the scale of prejudice 
directed at asylum seekers by sections of the Australian community (Pedersen and 
Thomas 2013). Other research has tried to show that public debate about asylum 
seekers often minimises the humanity of those involved (Gilchrist 2013). The issue 
here is what best explains this pattern of negative sentiment.  
Some of this research proposes that negative public opinion reflects the role played 
by federal government policies in reinforcing negative sentiment directed at asylum 
seekers in Australia. This research has, for example, examined the role played by the 
representation by governments of asylum seekers as “queue jumpers”, “illegal”, 
“criminals”, “terrorists”, and “economic refugees”. However this research does not say 
why governments have adopted this style of negative representation in the first 
instance (Pedersen et al. 2006). 
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This difficulty is further enhanced by research relying on discourse analysis on the 
two major political parties drawing on parliamentary debates. As Every and 
Augoustinos (Every and Augoustinos 2008) show, constructions of national identity 
were operating in the language of those both opposed to the entry of asylum seekers 
into Australia or those supporting the rights of entry to asylum seekers. For some the 
construction of a nation’s identity is traced through the application of migration laws 
exemplifying a humanitarian framework (Dauvergne and Ramsarran 2005). Every 
(2008) has explored the concept of humanitarianism in a discourse analysis of asylum 
seeker debate in Australia. Her paradoxical conclusion is that the very ambiguity of 
the concept of humanitarianism when framed in terms of liberal binaries (like reason 
versus emotion or costs versus duty have tended to justify exclusion rather than 
inclusion of asylum seekers (Every 2008). Again however this does not shed much 
explanatory light on the puzzle.  
In other research (Briskman 2013) has analysed critical events in Australia’s 
approach to asylum seekers. She has documented the discursive and policy trajectory 
with regard to critical events in the recent past that have shaped policy and discourse 
on asylum seekers in Australia. She argues that increases in the number of arrivals of 
people by boat to Australia after 2010, and the losses of lives at sea due to boat 
capsizes resulted in heightened attention politically which assisted in building a 
foundation for harsher policies. As she points out ironically  
“ … compassion for asylum seekers can be used opportunistically to portray the 
tragedy of death at sea as a justification for stricter policies against people trying 
hard to seek sanctuary in Australia” (Briskman 2013).  
This undoubtedly reflects the way both Coalition and Labor politicians have 
represented the deaths of asylum seekers at sea as a reason for adopting a policy of 
“stopping the boats” at sea was warranted. This trajectory was evident when Prime 
Minister Julia Gillard in June 2012 appointed an expert panel on Asylum Seekers to 
“provide advice on policy options to prevent asylum seekers from risking their lives 
on dangerous boat journey’s to Australia”. Some pundits (Bagaric 2010) argued the 
only humanitarian solution to the boat people crisis was to double Australia’s annual 
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refugee intake 24  and stop all onshore assessment of those without pre-existing 
refugee status (asylum seekers coming to Australia by boat). Others argued that the 
1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was now outdated (Fletcher 
2013). In effect, says Briskman, wearing the mask of compassion, concern about the 
deaths by drowning at sea fuelled a manufactured “crisis” followed up by the adoption 
of even more stringent policies designed to deter asylum seekers rather than 
protecting the human rights of those seeking asylum. 
Yet this argument is puzzling for a number of reasons. For one thing the evidence 
suggests that up to 97% of those coming to Australia by boat have been found to be 
genuine refugees after the verification process (Phillips 2011). Secondly we are still 
left with a puzzle about the way a “normal” degree of compassion that might be 
expected in response, for example, to the reports of the way some asylum seekers 
were dying at sea could be trumped by a concern to “protect” Australia’s borders. 
(This idea of a “normal” compassion refers for example to the way Australians 
generally support expensive operations involving naval and air personnel saving the 
lives of mariners in some kind of trouble). Finally Briskman’s analysis of critical 
events that have occurred through the course of Australia’s evolving asylum seeker 
policy ultimately seems to explain the government’s policy of overlooking the 
humanitarian and human rights aspect of the asylum seeker problem by suggesting 
that this is all about the politicians doing this for political gain. Yet this does not quite 
resolve the puzzle. Why would politicians gain political capital from adopting the 
kinds of harsh policies on asylum seekers they have clearly shown some preference 
for doing? What is still not being addressed is why politicians who have adopted the 
deterrence frame, believe this would be popular with the Australian electorate, or 
why that electorate might favour that position in the first instance.  
Other scholars have adopted different kinds of explanatory strategies. Some 
researchers have tried to use economic factors to explain the shape taken by the 
policies adopted over the last 20 to 30 years. This has involved pointing to increased 
                                                          
24 Each year the government sets the number of visas that may be granted under the programme. The 
2013–14 programme has 13 750 places comprising:  
 a minimum of 11 000 places offshore (including up to 1000 places for women at risk), and  
 the balance of places for permanent Protection visas granted onshore, since September 2013, for people 
who have arrived in Australia legally. http://www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/refugee/ref-hum-
issues/pdf/humanitarian-program-information-paper-14-15.pdf 
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feelings of economic vulnerability sentiments conducive to the growth and popularity 
of “conservative” or “populist” that are unfavourable to ”foreigners” (McNevin 2007). 
McNevin argues that conservative politics gained increased support from those 
Australians adversely affected by the radical program of economic reforms of the 
1980s and 1990s and of factors like a decline in mineral exports, increased rates of 
inflation and increased unemployment. The result was a growing resentment directed 
at immigrants and refugees who were perceived as taking away a diminishing supply 
of jobs or who were primarily interested in getting economic benefits at the expense 
of Australians. While asylum seekers may be portrayed as people pursuing economic 
opportunities as some have argued in the negative rhetoric directed at those seeking 
asylum, studies conducted elsewhere have shown that the belief that asylum seekers 
are primarily seeking economic benefits is at odds with the fact that many of those 
seeking asylum were both highly skilled and had previously enjoyed a higher 
standard of living in their countries (Burnett and Peel 2001). This notwithstanding, it 
is clear that this kind of economic argument led to the increasing popularity of Pauline 
Hansen’s One Nation Party after 1996 promoting “protectionist” policies. This 
economic insecurity allowed for the mobilisation of support based on a mix of implicit 
and explicit racial and ethnic criteria. McNevin adds that some of the tenets of One 
Nation Party were silently adopted by the Liberal-National Party Coalition 
government since 1996. 
Conversely others have argued there is a macro-political context that is shaping 
contemporary electoral politics in much of the developed world. This context is 
shaped by a confluence between the mass media and public opinion that then 
influences the development of policy problems related to non-economic issues. In an 
exploration of parliamentary politics in two European democracies, scholars like 
Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup have pointed to the diversification of political debates 
as non-economic issues such environmental protection, sustainability, immigration 
and refugees have become central to party politics (Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 
2008). They argue that victory for major parties is now tied to a role played by 
immigration issues in the political party agenda - something that has been seen in 
Australia (Duncanson 2003). Subsequently immigration issues become a dominant 
feature of the political landscape and protracted efforts of governments to deter entry 
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become engrained in policy agendas. In Australia pundits have often castigated 
government for resorting to providing “privative clauses” through amendments in the 
Migration Act laws largely to stymie asylum claims (Hocking and Guy 2010). They 
argue that the human rights of those seeking asylum are obstructed by the arrows and 
slings of outraged public opinion. Hocking and Guy (2010) point to the case of Canada 
which has accepted more refugees per capita in the world than any other country, to 
argue that rights-based politics grounded in the quest for due process and equal rights 
for all people (asylum seekers included), have shaped Canada’s migration policy 
(Anderson 2007). 
Some have pointed to the role played by a deeply engrained racist ethos in Australian 
culture. Some writers have pointed out for example, that race-based exclusionary 
laws were in place in Australia for the better part of the twentieth century. Equally 
racially practices like quarantining, internment and incarceration existed in Australia 
for a longer time and can be traced back to the nineteenth century. It is argued that 
dating way back to the closure of the 1800s, non-criminal and non-citizen populations 
like the Chinese entering Australia were held in detention en masse without trial 
(Bashford and Strange 2002). This, they argue, was linked the ideas of territory, 
national security and citizenship. Other writers have tried to explain the development 
of asylum seeker policy after 1992 as a consequence of racialized xenophobia and 
“moral panics” (Lobo 2013).  
Hyndman and Mountz (2008, p245) rely on a Foucauldian kind of explanation when 
they start by arguing that the issue of how to deal with asylum seekers is increasingly 
characterized as a security issue, rather than one of protection for refugees as 
inscribed in international law. And they add this:  
“…continuous act of defining asylum in security terms has a performative 
element, in the Foucauldian sense: “it produces the effect that it names. Its 
categories, codes, and conventions shape a cultural ethos. Hyndman and 
Mountz for example, have argued that boat loads of asylum seekers arriving on 
Australian shorelines have evoked “xenophobic, racialized, well-rehearsed 
fears and moral panics about the “other”, linked to a desire to control borders 
and protect one’s territory”.  
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As they argue, asylum seekers arriving by boat have been treated differently from 
other people arriving in Australia, something embellished by the rise of Pauline 
Hansen’s One Nation Party in 1996 or by the “war on terror” after 2001, both 
contributing to a progressive hardening of policy, like a comprehensive detention 
regime or moves to process asylum seekers’ claims off-shore. As they argue, 
governments went to some lengths to create misleading portraits of those arriving 
seeking asylum:  
By not releasing the identities of detainees for several years, the Australian 
government conflated persons, histories, countries of origin and legal status. 
Through such homogenization emerged the figure of the bogus, criminalized, 
racialized asylum seeker (Hyndman and Mountz 2008)43, (2, pp. 249–269).  
Yet this argument still does not explain why governments felt they were warranted in 
creating or using misleading representations of asylum seekers.  
What then of claims made by some scholars who have argued that the development 
of migration policy as an arm of national security was heightened in the wake of the 
11 September terrorist attacks in the United States? It seems clear that in 2001 
governments everywhere began to see refugee and asylum seeker issues through the 
lens of security. The September 11 terrorist attacks in America and the subsequent 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan increased the rates at which boat arrivals came from 
countries like Iraq and Afghanistan. Refugees and asylum seekers were increasingly 
represented as a security threat to those countries they sought to enter (Dünnwald 
2011). The so-called “war on terror” was quickly conflated with the issue of asylum 
seekers, many of them Moslems, who were fleeing for safety at a time when 
“terrorism” was globally associated with Islam. This meant that security and integrity 
of state became hard-line issues both in Australia and elsewhere in the developed 
world (Boulus et al. 2013). Australia aligned itself to the US in response to the 
September 11 attacks (Beeson 2002). Post-September 11 saw a toughening in an 
already hard line policy in Australia.  
Here we confront a further puzzle. Granting that the asylum seekers were victims of 
war and terror within their own homelands why were they able to be redefined as 
security threats?  
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Here some scholars have drawn on the concept of moral panics. As Cohen who did 
much to popularise the use of this concept argued, “Societies appear to be subject, 
every now and then to periods of moral panics” (Cohen 2002). Cohen defined a moral 
panic as “a condition, episode, person or group of persons that emerges to be defined 
as a threat to social values and interests”. Although his work was especially directed 
at the emergence of youth (sub) cultures in 1960s Britain (especially groups like the 
Mods and Rockers, his real interest was in exploring the nature of society’s reaction 
to particular forms of deviance. This entailed looking at ways in which certain groups 
or kinds of behaviour were perceived and conceptualised by the media, experts and 
policy makers.  
As Cohen (Cohen 2002) argued, the nature of the threat central to a moral panic was 
typically presented first in a stylised and stereotypical fashion by the mass media. The 
moral barricades were then manned by the editors, bishops, politicians and other 
“right-thinking people”. Socially accredited experts then pronounced their diagnoses 
and solutions. The condition, person or group of persons might then submerge, 
disappear, or become more visible. Sometimes the object of the panic is new or at 
other times it may be something that has existed before. Sometimes the panic passes 
and it is forgotten except in folklore and collective memory. Other times it has more 
serious and lasting significance producing long term changes in the legal and social 
policy dimensions or in the way that society regards itself. 
One example of the way some researchers have addressed the issue of asylum seeker 
policy through the lens of the “moral panic” model is offered by Manderson 
(Manderson 2013). He has likened moral panics and their role in shaping illicit drug 
policy debate in Australia to the debate about asylum seekers.  
Manderson recalls that the “zero tolerance” policy to drug use in the 1970s was 
framed in language that exaggerated the crisis posed by the threat of a “deluge of 
drugs” which was at odds with the actual social harm posed by drug use. Zero 
tolerance drug policy gave rise to hugely expensive law enforcement strategies based 
on the underlying assumption that enhancing the severity of the laws would deter 
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people from using illicit drugs.25 There could well be some kind of affinity between 
the arguments made about the development of “moral panics” and the way other 
scholars have attempted to explain the policy shifts that took place after 1989 by 
arguing that policy-making institutions are “information-processing” mechanisms. In 
discussing the politics of attention to explain why some issues take centre stage in 
policy debates, scholars have argued that political organisations have to interpret 
signals from their environment in order to create policy outputs (Robinson 2006). 
Presumably this means paying attention to the way policy makers interprets the 
discourses and language being used to describe particular problems that become the 
object of their policy making.  
Manderson concludes that Australia does not have an asylum seeker problem so much 
as an “asylum seeker problem” caused by an unwarranted exaggeration in the way 
language has been used to create a perception or framework of anxiety and threat. 
However it is noteworthy that apropos the asylum seeker debate, Manderson avoids 
explaining why this misrepresentation was able to take place. In this respect he seems 
content to describe the moral panics leading to the adoption of strong deterrence laws 
in Australia’s asylum seeker policy. This is a problem too in the original development 
of the “moral panic” model by Cohen.  
Cohen relied on the interactionist tradition in sociology to understanding moral panics 
and social typing. This approach stresses the role of social processes like stereotyping 
that enables some people to successfully label others as “rule breakers” or as belonging 
to certain “deviant” groups. This approach has led to a useful reorientation or 
rethinking in sociological studies of delinquency, deviance, crime, and drug-taking. Its 
chief value lies in encouraging social science to question and not take-for-granted the 
labelling by some powerful groups of other groups or behaviours as deviant or 
problematic.  
However the interactionist approach simply reinstates a sociological truism that the 
judgment of a deviance is ultimately one that is relevant to a particular group and 
                                                          
25  Although the relation between deterrence in Australian drug policy and its counterproductive 
consequences is more complicated in relation to the subject of asylum seekers, Manderson seems to be implying 
that harsh laws do not eliminate but merely complicate the whole issue.  
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spelling out the implication of this labelling. It fails to say why particular groups like 
teenagers in the 1960s or asylum seekers in the twenty first century come to be 
identified as “deviant” or as a threat. This approach also fails to say whether there is 
any rational basis to this process or some kind of economic or political logic or 
rationality at paly in this process of creating a “moral panic”. There is here a personal 
reflection on the recent Australian history where Gilchrist (Gilchrist 2013) has 
observed “demonstrates, subtle differences in wording or tone that can generate and 
reflect very different attitudes that in turn influence the quality of public discourse 
surrounding refugees”. However, to what extent this public discourse has influenced 
asylum seeker policy cannot particularly be determined. It is that problem that I think 
begins to be resolved in the work of Bacchi (Bacchi 2009) which I will turn to in the 
next chapter. 
Conclusion 
What this brief overview of recent and current research suggests is that we need to 
understand better why contemporary asylum seeker policy is more about a policy 
aimed at deterring asylum seekers from coming to Australia rather than finding ways 
of discharging Australia’s obligations to asylum seekers under international law by 
protecting those seeking asylum. While there is a considerable body of research that 
focuses on the plight of people seeking asylum in Australia, there is little or limited 
specific focus on why Australia has adopted the increasingly punitive and deterrent 
framework that now characterises its asylum seeker policy. What I have shown is that 
there is a good deal of descriptive work pointing to the role of racist ideology, 
economic insecurity, the use of misrepresentations of asylum seekers or even moral 
panics. What I also suggested was that much of this work was strong in its capacity to 
describe certain phenomena but was not so strong when it came to generating 
satisfying explanations. That deficiency I want to begin to rectify in the next chapter 
when I turn to the work of Bacchi (Bacchi 2009).  
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHOD 
In this chapter, I outline something of the approach to my key research questions as 
well as detailing the social science methods and procedures used in the design, 
selection and analysis of data in this study. Based on the key objectives and research 
questions or this study outlined in the introduction, the procedures outlined in this 
chapter will have a bearing on the value of the findings outlined in subsequent 
chapters.  
Bacchi and “What’s the problem is represented to be”  
This study relies on an interpretative approach to research based heavily on the work 
of Bacchi (2009) and the analysis of metaphors as guided by the work of Lakoff and 
Johnston (1980; also Lakoff 1999) who were arguably among the first scholars to 
investigate the fundamentally metaphorical nature of our conceptual system. The 
combination of these two will be the basis for this qualitative research design.  
I begin by outlining the nature of Bacchi’s framework.  
Bacchi’s is a post-positivist approach. It requires that we focus on the role of language, 
metaphors and discourse in constituting a given policy problem and the policy to 
which it gives rise. This approach to policy analysis thus suggests that language, 
metaphors and discourse “give a particular shape” to the way in which problems and 
issues are talked about. A recent and very vivid example of these problem 
representations in policy, or at least in shaping of policy can be seen on how the terms 
of reference of the Expert Panel on asylum seekers were constituted by the Gillard 
Labor government in 201226. It was framed to provide advice on policy options to 
prevent asylum seekers from “risking their lives on dangerous boat journeys to 
Australia”. In essence, the language and discourse focused more on people risking 
their lives on ill-fated and dangerous and less on those that the government would 
                                                          
26 See http://apo.org.au/research/report-expert-panel-asylum-seekers for details- accessed 
15/04/15 
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later detain or deport those who survived through the “dangerous boat journeys” at 
sea.  
Bacchi tells us that “problems are created or given shape in the very policy proposals 
that are offered as “responses”. A critical analysis of “prescribed policy solutions” 
offers a way of making visible the different assumptions and worldviews determining 
policy outcomes. She further encourages the researcher to bear in mind and recognise 
that policy “is a set of shifting, diverse, and contradictory responses to a spectrum of 
political interests”. To demonstrate her approach Bacchi uses the example of 
drunkenness to highlight the range of possible interpretations of the concept of 
drunkenness: as health, law and order, family violence, and/or welfare issues. 
Bacchi’s point is that if drunkenness is viewed as a problem of law and order, policy 
responses will advocate restricting access to alcohol, licensing regulations and other 
legal responses. Where drunkenness is viewed as a health issue then responses will 
include education strategies to make explicit the health impact of drinking, and so on. 
Importantly, how the issue is framed shapes who has policy responsibility and 
resource. It is argued that the dominant paradigm around public policy making is 
focused on discovering what works to “solving problems” i.e. evidence-based policy. 
This WTP (What’s the problem?) approach to public policy analysis is different in that 
it seeks to unearth how particular proposals in policy imply certain understanding of 
problems. 
This approach breaks the grounding premise in most conventional policy analysis 
approaches that policy is purposed at “solving social problems”. Rather it directs our 
attention to the ways in which particular representations of a “problem” creates a 
problem itself.  The WTP approach in essence is a critical mode of analysis that turns 
the other sides of the coin, assuming that coins has more than two sides, by 
interrogating (problematizing) the problem representations. It provides a systematic 
methodology for looking at the coin the different way hence creating the opportunity 
to question often taken for granted assumptions that lodge within policy 
proposals/programs. We need to probe deeply into the rationales for and in asylum 
seeker policies over the years to unearth the deep seated presuppositions 
underpinning the proposed change. What possible silences exist in the understanding 
of what needs to change? What effects are likely to accompany the understanding of 
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the “problem” in question? Bacchi in her What’s the problem represented to be 
approach to policy analysis urges that, it is important that we explain the particular 
understanding of the certain words in policy such as “problem of the boats” because 
of the many ways this is referred to in speech/writing as it can have different 
meanings. Example “problem child” may refer to a child that is very difficult to deal 
with while a “problem” can also refer to something puzzling, something that presents 
a challenge that needs to be “cracked”.  
In this approach, “problem” refers to something else. It refers to the kind of change 
implied or intended in the particular policy proposal. An example to elucidate this 
could be, say, if a policy proposal is made to train girls in martial arts in order to 
defend themselves from rape, it means the problem is being represented as lack of 
training on the part girls that is responsible for their being sexually violated. So in this 
case of people arriving in Australia by boat and then ending up being referred as the 
“boat people”, what really is the problem? What needs to be change? And why the 
change? How are boat people thought as problems? And is it possible that “boat 
people” are managed (the way government designs its programs) through the 
problematisations that are resident in policy proposals. In order to flesh out the 
problematisations (analysing the asylum seekers policy), we will need to open up for 
scrutiny what the implied “problem” of asylum seekers is and what government has 
deemed as “needing to be fixed “in subsequent asylum seeker policies over the years 
especially from 2007 as earlier pointed out, by reading off from the policy itself. We 
need to understand government’s characterisation of the problem in order to explain 
how the issue is being understood. 
It is these implied problem representations in recent and current Australian asylum 
seeker policy that this research focuses the spotlight at, with intent to reveal some of 
the motivations at play in the development of Australian asylum seeker policy.  
To unearth how particular proposals in policy imply certain understanding of 
problems, researchers are encouraged to put that understanding into scrutiny using 
the following six questions that will form the analysis of key and selected Australian 
government policies on asylum seekers, especially since 2007.  
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However, for this research, I will only put emphasis on the Bacchi’s first question in 
triangulation with Lakoff and Johnstone’s work on metaphors in analysing Australia’s 
asylum seeker policy. Bacchi’s questions are worth of stating and are as follows:- 
1. What’s the problem of asylum seekers arriving in Australia by boat 
represented to be in specific policy/legislative documents and 
pronouncements?  
The goal of this question is to identify implied problem representations in specific 
asylum seeker policies or policy proposals over the years. We need to identify the 
problem representations or perhaps the dominant proposals in each policy proposal. 
We will need to understand what is assumed? What is taken for granted? What is not 
questioned? 
2. What presuppositions or assumptions underlie this representation of 
the asylum seeking people arriving by boat in Australia? What effects have been 
produced by this representation of the “boat people” problem?   
The meaning for presuppositions here will refer to the background “knowledge” that 
is sort of taken for granted. It will include all the epistemological and entomological 
assumptions. It is important that we critically analyse some categorizations of people 
in the policy proposals. We must understand the techniques associated with the 
creation of people categories such as censuses and surveys that form part of the non-
discursive practices that allow certain problem representations to gain dominance 
and hence get policy representation. It is through the examination of these 
presuppositions that that we are able to understand the conceptual logic that 
underpin some specific problem representations in the alcohol policy or proposal 
representations.  
3. What effects are produced by this representation of the asylum seekers 
problem in Australia?  
The goal is to identify the effects of specific problem representations so that they can 
critically be assessed. WTP approach generally starts with the presumption that some 
problem representations create difficulties and sometimes forms of harm for 
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members of some social groups more than others. This is the very reason we need to 
scrutinise the “problematisations” on offer in asylum seeker policies, laws and 
proposals on offer by the various Australian governments to see where and how they 
function to benefit some and harm others and what can be done about this. In order 
to perform this assessment, we will need to direct our attention to the effects that 
accompany specific problem representations. Again it is worth noting that this form 
of analysis will not necessarily refer to the conventional standard policy approach to 
evaluation with a focus on “outcomes”. The WTP approach identifies three 
interconnected and often overlapping effects that need to be weighed up. 
4. What’s left unproblematic in the Australian asylum seekers policy 
problem presentation? Where are the silences? Can the Australian asylum 
seekers problem be thought about differently?  
The objective is to advance for our reflection and consideration, issues and 
perspectives silenced in identified problem representations. The purpose here is to 
problematize the “problematisations” on offer in specific policy proposals by 
subjecting the problem representations they contain to critical scrutiny in the various 
policy proposals regarding people arriving by boat and seeking asylum in Australia. 
The key consideration here is to find out what has failed to be problematized. An 
example to help us understand this can be drawn from other representations of other 
social problems like alcohol. We can take for example; the failure to present the 
aggressive advertisement by the alcohol industry to the “problem” of alcohol than 
blaming the alcohol problem on people who drink too much simply helps us 
understand that there is another way to think about the “asylum seekers arriving by 
boat” which may not be presented in specific policies. The objective therefore is to 
identify and bring into discussion those issues and perspectives that are silenced in 
identified problem representations. This kind of analysis will draw our attention to 
tensions and contradictions in problem representations and helps to highlight the 
inadequacies and limitations in the way the problem is being represented. We also 
need to draw our attention to competing problem representations that were not 
considered in specific policy proposals as they assist us in identifying silences in those 
problem representations that gain institutional endorsement. Here we also draw 
cross cultural comparisons to assist us in realising that certain ways of thinking about 
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problems reflect specific institutional and cultural contexts and hence that problem 
representations are contingent upon these contexts.  
5. How and where has this representation of the asylum seekers arriving 
by boat problem been produced, disseminated and defended?  
The purpose of this question in the WTP approach is to highlight the conditions that 
allow a particular problem representation to take shape and assume dominance. Here 
we will need to trace the history of the current problem representation. We need to 
follow the twists and turns to the asylum seeker policy/problem in Australia. We need 
to look at the genealogy of asylum seekers policy by identifying specific points in time 
when key decisions were made; hence we will be able to see that the problem 
presentation under scrutiny is continent and hence susceptible to change.  
Scrutiny of genealogy of asylum seekers policy problem representation over the years 
has a destabilising effect on problem representations that are often taken for granted. 
We will need to dig deep in to the power relations that have affected the success of 
some problem representations and the failure of others. An example is why the John 
Howard 2001 “Pacific Solution” was not taken up by the Labor Government in 2007 
yet they seemed to run something akin to it in 2012? Tracing the genealogy helps us 
to identify how a “problem” took on a particular shape, with specific emphasis on the 
process (es). This could be thought differently and we can as well identify some of the 
influences behind its creation as a “boat people problem”. We will also need to pay 
attention to the differential power relations where some groups have more influence 
than others in ensuring that a particular problem representation “sticks” and others 
get left out along the way. We will direct our attention to arrange of often 
unmentioned practices or politics, e.g. rules that give some groups institutional 
authority in some aspects. 
6. How can the current asylum seekers arriving by boat problem 
representation be disrupted or replaced to bring about a practical solution to 
the boat people problem in Australia?  
The goal here is to pay attention to both the means through which some problem 
representations become dominant, and the possibility of challenging problem 
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representations that are judged to be harmful. We must therefore direct our attention 
to practices and processes that allow certain problem representations to dominate 
with an emphasis on the analysis of means through which particular problem 
representations reach their target audience and achieve legitimacy. In this respect we 
must also consider the role of media in disseminating and supporting some problem 
representations. 
On Metaphors 
The use of metaphor is much more than a figure of speech we employ in everyday 
conversation, or read in poetry and novels. Metaphors are used widely and often 
unconsciously in language, action and thought to help us make sense of the world. As 
pointed earlier, Lakoff and Johnston (1980) were among the first scholars to 
investigate the fundamentally metaphorical nature of our conceptual system, and 
others such as Fauconnier (1985), Turner (1987) and Hofstadter and Sander (2013) 
have since helped develop it. From the cognitive linguistic tradition, these scholars 
argue that our conceptual system is very much metaphorically structured because 
most concepts are partially understood in terms of other concepts (Lakoff and 
Johnston, 1980, p. 56). In other words, metaphors provide a way of conceiving of one 
thing in terms of another. For example, it is argued that the mind is often thought of 
in terms of being a machine (Lakoff & Johnston, 1980, p. 27).  
Metaphors have traditionally been viewed as “mere” rhetoric, rather than the very 
means whereby we construct our conceptual system and both construct our social 
world and make sense of it (Hostadter and Sander 2013). However, as Lakoff and 
Johnston (1980, p. 145-146) argue, the idea that metaphor is merely a linguistic tool 
used to explain objective reality ignores the human aspects of reality. From a social 
constructionist approach, our understanding of the world, often independent of the 
physical world, is based on our conceptual system which “affects how we perceive the 
world and act upon those perceptions” (Lakoff and Johnston, 1980, p. 146). Thus, 
“since most of our reality is experienced in metaphorical terms… metaphor plays a 
very significant role in determining what is real for us” (Lakoff and Johnston, 1980, p. 
146). In fact, as Lakoff and Johnston (1980, p. 157) argue, metaphors have the power 
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to define reality. By highlighting certain aspects, and hiding others, the acceptance of 
a particular metaphor “which forces us to focus only on those aspects of our experience 
that it highlights, leads us to view the entailments of the metaphor as being true” 
(Lakoff & Johnston, 1980, p. 157).  
Since metaphors have the potential to dictate how we understand or make sense of 
particular issues, they play a very important role in the way issues are problematized, 
that is, how something is represented as a problem (Bacchi, 2009, p. 25). In this respect 
Bacchi (2009) has made a major contribution to policy analysis. Rather than treating 
the policy-making process as the “rational” action of a government responding 
“objectively” to determinate and “real” problems, Bacchi suggests that problems are in 
fact constituted by the various actors in the policy community.  
Governments, as organisations charged with the arrangement of the common good do 
not simply formulate policy as a reaction to already existing problems, but construct 
them through language, and particularly metaphor. Policy is based on a government’s 
understanding of a perceived problem, and how it perceives a problem has profound 
implications for how it is represented, how it is defined, how we think about it, how 
we name it, and whose interests are involved. Thus, the policy process is endogenous 
and what is produced (representations in word) is the outcome of what we think about 
(define a problem). My research project examines the extent to which actors in the 
policy community employed metaphors to problematise the “asylum seeker problem”, 
drawing on frames of reference that can be easily understood in order to represent the 
issue in a certain way.  
A Note on Research Methods  
My thesis offers a qualitative content analysis that will involve analysis and critical 
interpretation of documents drawing on the analytic framework of the “What’s the 
problem represented to be” approach. However I will put emphasis on question one 
of Bacchi’s work in this research. 
The use of documentary sources in social research is also known as documentary 
research analysis, this technique has been employed to study, categorise, interpret 
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and identify problem representations of asylum seekers in the Australian 
government.  
I employ a systematic analysis of key asylum seekers policy documents generated by 
successive Australian governments for the period under study (2010-2015) as 
primary documents. Combining Bacchi’s WTP interpretative approach and Lakoff and 
Johnston’s metaphors that we live by, I treat the Australian asylum seeker policies 
from 2010-2015 as the sum of the words, language and talk selectively describing 
circumstances in ideologically informed ways. My assumption in this interpretative 
framework is that social actors in the policy process have their own assumptions, 
knowledge and understandings of policy issues. This mix of value-based 
interpretations means that the policy process can be described as a struggle over 
ideas. It is these ideas (metaphors) that are interpreted and analysed in this study on 
Australia’s asylum seeker policy 2007-2015.  
Sampling Techniques 
This research takes a critical incident sampling, a one form theoretical sampling 
(Glaser and Strauss 1970) that is here given its own name as the “turning point 
sampling”. This is to say that the sample takes the key turning points which show 
significant shifts in Australian government policy on asylum seekers from 2007-2015. 
Although there were many legislations and policies made by the government in the 
period under study, the key policies for analysis have been purposively selected based 
on the major “turning points” that occurred. How controversial a shift was in 
legislative discourse, media commentary or ordinary public debate determined the 
selection and quality of documents in light of the purpose they were to be for - analysis 
of the Australian government asylum seeker policy. The choice to employ a 
combination of turning point selection and purposive sampling criteria was taken for 
a number of reasons. Firstly to broaden the sampling space/frame so the analytical 
perspective is not limited or skewed to a limited number of documents (cases) to be 
used for the generalisability of results from the study; and secondly, the combination 
of sampling techniques would result in the acquisition of broad and in depth 
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information that would assist the researcher to get the surface of what is being 
investigated.  
In employing the “turning point sampling” technique, I used the cases/documents that 
have the requisite kind of information with respect to the objectives of this study. My 
“turning point sampling” technique almost shares the same characteristics as 
purposive sampling, that is to say, a form of non-probability sampling in which the 
choice and decision of objects used in the study have been purposively selected. The 
only simple but important aspect to consider is that the documents used in this study 
have been purposely chosen based on how events critically unfolded. 
The events covering the period of study were purposively selected, based on the 
turning point that their introduction brought to the asylum seeker policy and 
legislative framework. Also specifically considered for attention under the purposive 
sampling criteria was the stakeholder sampling in which the Australian Federal 
Parliament (or the business thereof of making national laws) on asylum seekers have 
been purposely selected. This distinction for the choice of critical points in the asylum 
seeker policy environment in Australia for example, can be traced back to 2007 when 
the Rudd Labor Government abolished offshore asylum seeker processing policy, only 
for the successive governments, even the Prime Minister Kevin Rudd himself later 
back slipping by 2013 upon his second return as Prime Minister. It is the changes from 
what was lauded as a positive policy shift in 2007/2008 to the present deterrence 
approach that are treated as turning points in the context of the research which is the 
policy situation in relation to asylum seekers in Australia.  
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Some Chronological Turning Points in the asylum seeker legislative/policy framework 2007-2015 
Date Turning point Major Policy/Legislation introduced 
December 
2007 
Pacific Solution disbanded 
The newly elected Rudd Labor government fulfilled their election 
promise to disband the stringent policies of the previous Coalition 
government.  
Offshore detention facilities in Nauru and 
PNG”s Manus Island are closed. 
 
Migration Amendment (Immigration 
Detention Reform) Bill 2009. May 13, 2008 
Sept  8, 2009 
Temporary Protection Visas are also abolished. 
Immigration detention fees also abolished. 
July 6, 2010 Towards a Regional Protection Framework - The Gillard 
government announces the establishment of the regional 
processing centre for asylum seekers in Timor-Leste.  
Australia had also on April 9 2010 temporarily suspended 
processing of asylum seeker applications from persons from Sri 
Lanka and Afghanistan 
The East Timor Solution 
Deterring People Smuggling Bill 2011  
 
11 October, 
2010 
An announcement that Children or Unaccompanied Minors (UAMs) 
and vulnerable families will be moved out of detention facilities to 
Community based accommodation 
Community Detention Program 
April 2011 Protests and Hunger strikes in Immigration Detention Centres. 
Immigration Minister introduces new legislative changes in which 
detainees found to have damaged Commonwealth property during 
riots are denied permanent protection on grounds of failure of 
character test. 
Migration Amendment (Strengthening 
Character Test and Other Provisions) Bill 
2011 is later introduced. 
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Date Turning point Major Policy/Legislation introduced 
May 7, 2011 An arrangement with Malaysia in which Australia would swap 800 
asylum seeker boat arrivals with 4000 UNHCR assessed refugees 
out of Malaysia in the four year period. 
The Malaysian Solution is born 
This was however overturned by the High 
Court ruling of 31/08/2011 
August 19, 
2011 
A memorandum is signed with PNG 
The Australian government signed a memorandum of 
understanding with Papua New Guinea to re-establish an 
assessment centre for asylum seekers on Manus Island 
This was a start of the return to Offshore 
Processing 
12 September, 
2011 
 
Owing to the August 31/08/2011 High Court ruling against the 
Malaysia Solution, the government introduces new laws to allow for 
offshore processing 
Migration Legislation Amendment 
(Offshore Processing and Other Measures 
Bill) 2011 
September 19, 
2011 
Complementary Protection Bill introduced. The new law is aimed at 
offering and improving the protection for people who do not fit the 
1951 United Nations Conventions Relating to the status of Refugees 
but are still found to be at risk of grave persecution, torture or death 
if returned to their countries  
Migration Amendment (Complementary 
Protection) Bill 2011. 
This was a positive move. 
28 June, 2012 
 
As a result of many asylum seekers drowning at sea 
The Prime Minister Julia Gillard appointed an Expert panel to 
provide a report on the best way forward for Australia to prevent 
asylum seekers from risking their lives on dangerous boat journeys 
to Australia”. 
The Expert Panel on asylum seekers  
13 August, 
2012 
Expert panel report released. 
The report contained 22 recommendations which included: 
Only one of the 18 recommendations of 
the Expert Panel (Offshore Processing) 
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Date Turning point Major Policy/Legislation introduced 
working towards the development a Pacific regional cooperative 
framework for improving protections; increasing Australia’s 
Refugee and Humanitarian Program from 13750 to 20,000 places 
annually; the reintroduction of off-shore processing of asylum 
seekers in Nauru and the Papua New Guinean Manus Island; the 
changing of the Australian family reunion program to make it stiffer 
for asylum seeker boat arrivals to reunite with or sponsor their 
families in Australia. 
were swiftly implemented by the 
government  
“No Advantage test” also introduced - a 
requirement or policy stipulating that no 
asylum seeker arriving by boat in 
Australia will have no advantage to 
receive speedy assessment of their 
asylum seeker claim over the refugees or 
asylum seekers awaiting resettlement in 
from their country of origin or lodged in 
transit countries like Indonesia or 
Malaysia. 
August 14, 
2012 
Legislation to allow for offshore processing of asylum seekers in 
Nauru and Manus Island.  
Asylum seekers that would have arrived on or after August 13, 2012 
would now be processed off shore. The same category would also 
be ineligible to sponsor their family members to reunite in 
Australia. 
Migration Legislation Amendment 
(Regional Processing and Other 
Measures) Bill 2012. 
16 May, 2013  Excision of Mainland Australia  
Legislation to extend excision policy into Australia’s mainland to 
ensure that no one arriving in Australia by boat can lodge any 
protection claim in Australia except at the discretion or invitation of 
the Immigration Minister 
Asylum seekers arriving in mainland 
Australia can now be transferred 
Offshore for Processing 
19 July, 2013 A few days after Kevin Rudd returned to be Prime Minister Regional PNG Solution 
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Date Turning point Major Policy/Legislation introduced 
Resettlement Agreement (RRA) also referred to as the “PNG 
Solution” is introduced. 
Another such memorandum, similar to the PNG Solution was signed 
with the government of Nauru where asylum seekers would be 
transferred from Australia to Nauru on August 3, 2013 
All those arriving by boat in Australia 
would never be assessed or resettled in 
Australia but would be quickly moved, 
processed and resettled in Papua New 
Guinea. 
18 September, 
2013 
 
Liberal Coalition Government in power. 
Operation Sovereign Borders, the hallmark of the Liberal-National 
government’s stop the boats policy was birthed a few days after 
securing a Federal government election victory in September 2013. 
Operation Sovereign Borders 
commences. It is now government policy 
to turn away asylum seeker boats at sea 
in a military-style operation focused on 
“border security” 
October 18, 
2013 
Temporary Protection Visas reintroduced. 
In a return to the Prime Minister Howard era when Temporary 
Protection policy existed between 1999 and 2007, the Liberal 
Coalition government under Prime Minister Abbott introduced 
legislation to grant Temporary Protection Visas. These had 
previously been abolished by the Rudd Labor government in 2008. 
Under the proposals, TPV holders will not be allowed to sponsor 
their family members to Australia and cannot return to Australia if 
they travelled overseas. However, the Australian senate disallowed 
to pass this bill on December 2, 2013. This resulted in the then 
Immigration Minister Scott Morrison in response to the Senate’s 
disallowance of TPVs immediately put a freeze on granting of 
permanent protection visas leaving thousands of asylum seekers to 
languish in the community.  
Immigration Amendment (Temporary 
Protection Visas) Regulation 2013 to re-
introduce the system of Temporary 
protection.  
 
TPV holders unlike in the previous 
Howard arrangement will need to 
reapply for another TPV at the expiry of 
their TPV and are totally barred from 
applying for any other visa in Australia.  
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Date Turning point Major Policy/Legislation introduced 
December 12, 
2013 
Permanent protection is removed.  
Legislation is introduced to remove permanent protection for 
people who arrive in Australia by boat and seek asylum. This was a 
move to deny any boat arrival any opportunity of being granted a 
protection visa 
Migration Amendment (Unauthorised 
Maritime Arrivals and Other Measures) 
Bill and later Act 2013 were passed.  
December 4, 
2013 
A bill to abolish complementary protection is proposed. It is now at 
the discretion of the Immigration minister whether to grant 
protection in circumstances where a person is at significant risk of 
torture, persecution or death. This was a move away from the 
Migration Amendment (Complementary Protection) Act 2011 
which aimed to offer protection for people who do not fit the 1951 
United Nations Conventions Relating to the status of Refugees but 
are still found to be at risk of grave persecution, torture or death if 
returned to their countries. 
Migration Amendment (Regaining 
Control Over Australia’s Protection 
Obligations) Bill 2013. 
 
March 25, 
2014. 
New Legislation introduced. Asylum seekers without valid 
documents and cannot provide reasonable explanations will have 
their applications for asylum rejected.  
There is also a requirement for early disclosure, as later in the 
application process, any information initially left out in the 
application will be disallowable for seeking protection. 
Migration Amendment (Protection and 
other measures) Bill 2014  
December 5, 
2014 
New Legislation is introduced that removes most references to the 
Refugee Convention in the Migration Act 1958. The government has 
ultimately defined what they will consider as a refugee. The 
minister has powers to return boats accorded to him. The minister 
is allowed to place a cap on the number of protection visa grants 
The Migration and Maritime Powers 
Legislation Amendment (Resolving the 
Asylum Seeker Caseload) Bill 2014  
The minister has now earned unchecked, 
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Date Turning point Major Policy/Legislation introduced 
annually. Asylum seekers who have arrived by boat will never be 
able to apply for permanent protection visas. Also introduced are 
the Safe Haven Enterprise Visa (SHEV) which along with the TPVs 
will be the only visas issued.  
arbitrary powers to deny anyone seeking 
asylum in Australia. 
March 25, 
2015 
Migration Amendment (Protection and other Measures) 
Regulations 2015 is passed  
Although this was later repealed, it was 
passed rather to “operationalise” the  
Migration Amendment (Protection and 
other Measures) Act 2015 which resulted 
from the (Protection and other Measures) 
Bill 2014 
May 14, 2015 Australian Border Force Bill 2015  
The roles of Customs (border policing) and Immigration 
(facilitation and service delivery) now mixed. The Immigration 
Department is now more of a criminal law enforcer than a facilitator 
of Immigration Services. 
This was to cement the Operations 
Sovereign Borders structurally and 
administratively.  
June 25, 2015 Migration Amendment (Regional Processing Arrangements) Bill 
2015 
The laws confer express powers to the 
minister to take asylum seekers to any 
country he or she may designate. 
Note: This chronology of “Turning Points” is partly adapted with permission from the Refugee Council of Australia’s factsheet "Timeline 
of major events in the history of Australia’s Refugee and Humanitarian Program" available on the link 
http://www.refugeecouncil.org.au/fact-sheets/australias-refugee-and-humanitarian-program/timeline/.  
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More on Sampling 
Maximum variation sampling in which cases or individuals who cover the spectrum 
of positions and perspectives in relation to the subject under study (asylum seeker 
rhetoric and discourse) is what has been applied in the selection of sections of the 
media commentary by politicians (Prime Ministers and Ministers for Immigration) on 
asylum seekers. 
Intensity sampling technique was also employed. I have selected documents that 
offered in-depth information and were also deemed less extreme. Only those 
documents that manifest the phenomenon of interest intensively were selected with 
prior information and exploratory work. 
Primary sources consisted materials produced first hand regarding asylum seekers 
by successive Australian governments between 2007 and 2015. These consist of 
parliamentary records, speeches by government leaders, reports, policy statements, 
government action plans and policies on asylum seekers at both federal and state 
level. Policy statements and strategies on asylum seekers by the DIAC (now DIBP or 
border27) during the period of study were considered for analysis as primary sources. 
Alongside the primary sources were a range of secondary sources. I draw on 
documents that provide commentaries and analysis on the original/primary sources 
as secondary sources. Secondary sources are further categorised into public or 
private documents. Public documents consist of media sources such as newspaper 
articles while private sources are commentaries made by individuals or organisations 
at the forefront of asylum seeker advocacy and service provision in Australia. 
While the “accuracy” of the selected primary and secondary documents is not an 
important issue I will nonetheless evaluate this material using a checklist established 
                                                          
27 http://www.border.gov.au/- accessed 24/08/15 
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for use in history, anthropology and sociology as postulated by (Gottschalk 1945). 
This is intended to clear authenticity, selection, sampling and presentation issues. 
i. Was the ultimate source of detail (primary witness) able to tell the truth? 
ii. Was the primary witness willing to tell the truth? 
iii. Is the primary witness accurately reported with regard to the detail under 
examination? 
iv. Is there any external corroboration of the details under examination? 
This research has relied on purposive sampling and intensity sampling techniques. 
These have determined the selection of documents obtained and analysed in this 
research. The choice to employ a combination of two sampling criteria has been taken 
for a number of reasons. The intention is to broaden the sampling space/frame so the 
analytical perspective is not limited or skewed a limited number of documents (cases) 
used in the generalizability of results from the study. The hope is that this 
combination of sampling techniques also results in the acquisition of broad and in 
depth information that will assist the researcher to get beyond the surface of what is 
being investigated.  
In the purposive technique, the researcher will use the cases that have the required 
information with respect to the objectives of this study.  Maximum variation sampling 
in which cases or individuals who cover the spectrum of positions and perspectives 
in relation to the subject under study (asylum seeker rhetoric and discourse) is what 
has been applied in the selection of sections of the media commentary on asylum 
seekers. 
The sampling of documents for this study has been selectively confined to two 
categories: 
 
 
Primary Documents  
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The relevant bills and laws passed by Australian federal parliament.  
For the purpose of this study, government policy will be taken as a whole of 
government’s officially documented speeches and publications of the federal 
parliament in relation the asylum seekers. These documents will be classified into 
primary and secondary documents/sources. Primary sources will be materials 
produced first hand regarding asylum seekers by successive Australian governments. 
These may consist of parliamentary records, speeches by government leaders, 
reports, policy statements, government action plans and policies on asylum seekers 
at federal level. These may include first, second and third readings of parliamentary 
bills, specifically those by the designated Minister for Immigration as well as any 
speech by the designated Australian Prime Minister in this period together with bills 
and acts of parliament in relation to asylum seekers that have been passed in to law 
or amended. These documents will be obtained in soft copy from the federal 
parliamentary library in Canberra. As this is a qualitative content analysis, policy 
documents will be systematically analysed using the WTP approach.  
Secondary Documents/Sources 
Alongside the primary sources will be the secondary sources. Documents that provide 
commentaries and analysis on the original/primary sources will be considered as 
secondary sources. Secondary sources will further be categorised in to public or 
private documents. Public documents will consist of media sources such as 
newspaper articles while private sources will be commentaries made by individuals 
or organisations at the forefront of asylum seeker advocacy and service provision in 
Australia. 
Selected Policies/Bills 
In summary, below are the key government policies and proposed or passed 
legislation have been drawn for analysis in this research in addition to some the 
speeches of the Australian Prime Ministers and Immigration ministers for the period 
between 2007 and 2015. It is important to note that no one policy or legislation is 
singularly analysed. This is because of the overlapping nature between the asylum 
seeker policies and legislations (bills) as they were set in place. In some instances, the 
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policy followed the legislation or vice versa. Below is the list of selected government 
policies and bills on asylum seekers that informed the analysis: 
Labor Government Policy 2007-2013 
1. The East Timor Solution 2010  
2. Community Detention- October 11, 2010 
3. Migration Amendment (Strengthening the Character Test and 
Other Provisions) Bill 2011 
4. Migration Amendment (Complementary Protection) Bill 2011 
5. Deterring People Smuggling Bill 2011 
6. The Malaysian Solution 2011  
7. Migration Legislation Amendment (Regional Processing and 
Other Measures) Bill 2011 
8. The Expert Panel Report, 2012 
9. Migration Amendment (Unauthorised Maritime Arrivals and 
Other Measures) Act 2013  
10. Rudd’s PNG “solution” 2013 
The Abbott government 2013 
11. Immigration Amendment (Temporary Protection Visas) 
Regulation 2013  
12. Migration Amendment (Unauthorised Maritime Arrivals and 
Other Measures) Bill 2013 
13. Migration Amendment (Regaining Control over Australia’s Protection 
Obligations) Bill 2013 
14. Migration Amendment Bill 2013 
15. Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1) 2014 
16. Migration Amendment (Protection and other measures) Bill 
2014  
17. The Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment 
(Resolving the Asylum Seeker Caseload) Bill 2014  
18. Migration Amendment (Protection and other Measures) 
Regulations 2015  
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19. Migration Amendment (Regional Processing Arrangements) Bill 
2015 
Process of Obtaining Parliamentary Documents 
Primary documents used for analysis in this study were obtained from the Australian 
parliamentary library. With the guidance of a senior parliamentary library staff, the 
researcher was guided through browsing the parliamentary website in order to 
obtain the relevant policy documents for use in this study. The Policy Section of the 
parliamentary library has produced a number of publications on asylum seeker 
policies that were very helpful in guiding this study. 
The relevant bills and laws passed by Australian federal parliament for the period 
2010-2015. This study goes back only to 2010 because it was from this year that 
changes began to be made in the Australian government policy on asylum seekers that 
saw a shift what the 2007 Kevin Rudd Labor government had done by dismantling the 
mandatory detention and offshore processing policies. This was a key change with the 
coming in of the new Labor Government under Prime Minister Kevin Rudd. The new 
Labor Government in 2007 announced the decision to dismantle the asylum seeker 
offshore processing system. Chris Evans, Immigration Minister then, said it was a time 
for a change. 
Another significant turning point is the changes to the asylum seeker policies that 
came with the changes in leadership of the Australian Labor Party. It is worth noting 
that there were subsequent changes that occurred after the change of policy in 2007 
through to 2013 while the Australian Labor party was in government. One significant 
change was that Kevin Rudd was replaced by Julia Gillard as Prime Minister on 24th 
June 201028 while Kevin Rudd again returned as Prime Minister 27th June 201329.  
The coming in of the new Liberal Coalition Government under the leadership of Prime 
Minister Tony Abbott on 18th September 201330 resulted in further drastic changes in 
                                                          
28 http://primeministers.naa.gov.au/primeministers/gillard/- accessed 25/10/2014 
29 http://primeministers.naa.gov.au/primeministers/rudd/- accessed 25/10/2014 
30 http://www.liberal.org.au/member/tony-abbott- accessed 25/10/2014 
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asylum seeker policy. It is these changes in the asylum seeker policies that will be 
assessed in the subsequent chapters.  
I also used “ParlInfo” to search for relevant documents. Primary documents used for 
analysis in this study were obtained from the Australian parliamentary library. These 
usually provided links to relevant Bills as a starting point for the research (Phillips 
2014; Karlsen and Phillips 2014). 
There are different ways to find relevant Bills: each parliamentary chamber produces 
a Bills List for each calendar year, for example: Final Senate Bills List for 2013. 
 Another way was to search ParlInfo – with the link to Bills of the current Parliament. 
Here are the results when I use ParlInfo to search for Bills of the current Parliament 
using the search term “asylum seeker”. There were six bills before the Parliament at 
the point the search was conducted. Here are the results for the Bills of previous 
Parliaments. Once I knew the name of the Bill I wanted, I used ParlInfo to find the 
second reading speeches and debates in the House of Representatives Hansard 
collection.  
Conclusion 
This is a qualitative research which has relied on the analysis of selected documents 
that contain information under study. The purpose is to solve a specific and 
immediate problem in regard to the asylum seeker policy in Australia. In the 
subsequent chapters, the focus is on a) narration of the major asylum seeker policies 
in Australia, and b) the analysis of these policies within the prism of Bacchi’s “What’s 
the problem represented to be” approach and identification and analysis of 
metaphors guided by the work of Lakoff and Johnston (1980).  
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CHAPTER FOUR: AUSTRALIAN ASYLUM SEEKER POLICY, 2007-2015 
In this chapter I provide a clear historical narrative outlining how successive 
Australian governments between 2007 and 2015 set about making asylum seeker 
policy. For this purpose, I have purposively selected the key legislation between 2007 
and 2015 that touches directly on the subject of asylum seekers.31 These bills have 
resulted in many amendments in the Migration Act 1958, arguably the most amended 
piece of legislation in Australia’s recent history. In the next chapter, I will identify the 
problem representations relied on to justify the policies adopted to address the 
asylum seeker problem.  
Plainly the time frame offered here is arbitrary. As with so many other important 
social and political processes, any decision to focus on one period in time necessarily 
ignores the historicity of human deliberation, choice and action. Historical time and 
the way we humans experience it, is inevitably caught up in an ineluctable web linking 
past, present and future (Herzfeld 2009: 108-11). Like all life choices, our decision to 
start and finish an inquiry like this one is almost always arbitrary and reliant on a mix 
of pragmatism and opportunism: in this case my choice of when to start is shaped by 
the happenstance that in December 2007 Kevin Rudd led the Australian Labor Party 
to a significant victory over the Howard Coalition government (1996-2007) with a 23-
seat swing in its favour in the Federal elections. However far from heralding a new 
period of political stability, Rudd’s accession to the office of Prime Minister marked 
the start of one of the more tumultuous periods in Australia’s political history. After 
months of mounting internal criticism of Rudd, he was replaced in June 2010 by his 
deputy Julia Gillard in an internal Labor Party ballot for the leadership. Gillard was in 
turn replaced by Rudd in June 2013 after months of political tension. In September 
2013 the voters plainly dissatisfied with this turbulence, elected an Abbott-led 
Coalition government.  
From December 2007 on Australia’s asylum seeker policy was marked by ongoing and 
increasingly heated debate and controversy. The Rudd government came to office 
                                                          
31 For this study, I rely on a mixture of explanatory memoranda, and bills either in their first, 
second or last reading, irrespective of subsequent amendments before they were passed in to law. 
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promising change. It was not surprising that this policy was also marked by a 
succession of major changes to Australia’s asylum seeker policy (Mares 2011). Many 
commentators have seen this turbulence as linked as much to the dramatic changes 
of leadership in the ALP government (2010-13) as it was shaped by persistent 
concern about the spate of arrivals of the “boat people manifesting in a populist “stop 
the boats” rhetoric (Billings 2013) (Douglas et al. 2013) (Fletcher 2013)(Bartlett 
2012) (Douglas and Graham 2013).  
Australian Migration Policy 
The history of Australia’s immigration policy has been evolving since it originated 
with the Immigration Restriction Act of 190132, which is popularly referred to as the 
White Australia Policy adopted at Federation (when the different colonies agreed to 
form a single nation). This policy restricted the migration of people from non-white 
and non-European background to allow for the creation of an only White Australia. 
This was implemented through the administration of the English dictation tests as a 
direct exclusion of non-English speakers from China and the Pacific Islands. This was 
driven by a number of fears; that the migrants were taking over the jobs from other 
Australians by working cheaply (in the case of Chinese migrant gold diggers), to the 
fears that migrants would alter the white race identity and European culture. 
However occurrence of key events through the years; for example, the economic 
depression of the 1930s, the first and second world wars interfaced with the Jewish 
holocaust, and other events in post-World war Europe result in the white Australia 
policy metamorphosing through the years. Even so, Australia continued to legislate 
and entrench a preference for admitting migrants of the white race, not until the 
passing of the Racial Discrimination Act in 1975 that saw the “end” of the White 
Australia Policy to the accept people from other races to what popularly became to be 
known as Multiculturalism. This subsequently saw a significant increase in the 
numbers of migrants to Australia from non-European background. The Vietnamese 
war saw the arrival of many Vietnamese fleeing instability as well as other migrants 
                                                          
32 See- http://www.foundingdocs.gov.au/resources/transcripts/cth4ii_doc_1901a.pdf- Accessed 
22/11/15 
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from Laos and Cambodia. However, the increase of Vietnamese arrivals also lead to 
the creation of the sentiment from the public and some sections of politics, that 
Australia was being swamped with boat people, who represented a threat. These 
“outbursts” soon saw a change in the Australian general migration policy. And 
whereas the White Australia Policy “ended” in the 1970s, traces or elements of this 
policy would soon continue to linger in some sections of the overall Australian 
migration policy, especially in relation to people who arrive into Australia or its island 
territories by boats and seeking asylum in Australia.  
Asylum seeker policy, 1990-2007 
It will be recalled that the Hawke Labor government developed the policy of 
mandatory detention of all asylum seekers arriving in Australia from 1990/199233. 
This occurred initially in response to the arrival of Vietnamese, Chinese and 
Cambodian asylum seekers while their claim for asylum was assessed. While the 
commencement of this policy passed almost without notice this did not last. In 1990, 
a number of asylum seekers also arrived from Somalia without documentation. They 
were detained at Villawood Immigration Detention centre for eighteen months. In 
response to this failure to progress their application the Somalis began a hunger 
strike. Through the 1990s Chinese and Sino-Vietnamese refugees who arrived were 
subjected to mandatory detention. In the late 1990s refugees from Afghanistan, Iran 
and Iraq began arriving.  
People arriving to Australia by boat are generally subjected to mandatory detention 
or confinement in the various Immigration detention centres across the country. And 
because Mandatory detention was popular with sections of the Australian electorate, 
John Howard Liberal Government in 2001 radically changed the policy as he placed 
asylum seekers as top priority in his campaign. 
In 2001 Australia changed its asylum seeker policy in response to what the Howard 
government claimed was a crisis in its ability to determine who came to Australia. 
That crisis centred on what became known as the “Tampa Affair”. In August 2001, a 
                                                          
33 See- 
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BN/
2012-2013/Detention- accessed 22/11/15 
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Norwegian tanker, the MV Tampa, picked up 438 Afghan asylum seekers whose vessel 
was sinking off the coast of Indonesia. According to the captain of the Tampa, he tried 
to return the Afghan refugees to Indonesia, but they threatened to throw themselves 
overboard if he did this. Consequently, he agreed to take them to Christmas Island. 
Howard’s government refused to allow MV Tampa  to land, saying it was a matter for 
Norway and Indonesia to work out amongst themselves. Neither Norway nor 
Indonesia agreed to fix the problem, creating a three way diplomatic stand-off 
(Beeson 2002, Billings 2011).  
The Howard government was determined to stop the Tampa from entering Australian 
waters when it became an international issue (Beeson 2002). Australia seized control 
of the Tampa drawing international criticism but strong support from Australian 
electors. After ten days, Australia struck a deal with New Zealand and Nauru to have 
those nations temporarily host the refugees while Australia processed their asylum 
claims. At the time Howard made his position clear:  
This campaign more than any other that I have involved in, is very much about 
the future of Australia we love so much. It is also about having the 
uncompromising view about the fundamental right of the country to protect 
its borders. It’s about a nation saying to the world we are a generous open-
hearted people taking refugees on a per capita basis than any country except 
Canada. We have a proud record of welcoming people from 140 different 
nations. But we will decide who comes in this country and the circumstances 
in which they come34. 
The Tampa affair radically transformed Australian asylum seeker politics. It 
introduced an unprecedented hard-line policy approach, which continues to have 
profound implications for those asylum seekers reaching Australia’s shores by boat 
even in 2015. Some writers insist the Tampa affair set in motion a period of “policy 
making on the run” (Taylor, 2005, p. 5), which took the shape of the ”Pacific Solution” 
a series of Coalition Government and Labor government policies.  
                                                          
34 See- http://australianpolitics.com/2001/10/28/john-howard-election-policy-speech.html- accessed 
22/11/15 
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The Howard government’s “Pacific Solution” legislation comprised three key 
elements introduced in six pieces of legislation (Betts, 2003, p. 186). The collective 
effect of this policy was to make it virtually impossible for asylum seekers to lodge a 
claim for asylum claim. Thousands of Australian islands were excised from the 
migration zone, creating “excised offshore places” for the purpose of rendering 
Australian asylum claims invalid (Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 5(1)). The Howard 
government also created a new class of “offshore entry person” established so as to 
define a person without a valid visa who had entered Australia at an excised offshore 
place (Migration Act, s 5(1)). Finally the “Pacific Solution” enabled asylum seekers 
entering Australia to be taken to a declared third country (Migration Act, s 198A). 
Instead, they were to be redirected to Papua New Guinea or Nauru. In these places, 
asylum seekers had to undergo a lengthy asylum claims processing before they could 
be allowed into Australia (Mathew 2002). Essentially, the Pacific solution enabled “the 
deflection of asylum seekers before they reach[ed] Australian soil. It also allow[ed] 
Australia to expel asylum seekers even when they… [had] reached Australian 
territory and would ordinarily be subject to Australian law ((Penovic and Dastyari 
2007), 2007, p. 36).  
The Opposition Australian Labor Party signalled its disapproval of the policy. In 2003, 
its spokesperson Julia Gillard promised that Labor would end the “Pacific Solution 
because “it is costly, unsustainable and wrong as a matter of principle” (Wright, 2010). 
 Labor Government Policy 2007-2013 
The newly elected Rudd Labor government moved quickly to give effect to its 
principled opposition to the “Pacific Solution”. In a move that was welcomed loudly 
by human rights activists, the Labor Government discontinued the policy and practice 
of temporary protection and closed the offshore processing centres of Nauru and 
Manus island (Essex 2013). As Chris Evans, the then Immigration Minister said it was 
a time for a change: 
… In our view the critical and harsh aspect of the Howard government’s 
mandatory detention policy was not the initial detention phase but the 
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continued and indefinite detention that occurred while lengthy immigration 
processes and  appeals were completed”. 
On another instance he was quoted as saying: 
….I believe these reforms will fundamentally change the premise underlying 
detention policy. Currently persons who are unlawful may be detained even 
though the departmental assessment is that they pose no risk to the 
community. That detention may be prolonged. Currently detention is too often 
the first option not the last”35 
However as many writers have noted, while the Rudd Government formally ended the 
“Pacific Solution” in 2007, some of its key elements remained intact (Kneebone 2014) 
(Kneebone, 2011, p. 433). Most importantly the 4,891 excised islands remain separate 
from the migration zone. So it is that all asylum seeker applications for boat entry 
arrivals, now carried out on Christmas Island, are still undertaken outside Australia’s 
borders. 
Since no single policy strategy seems to have worked over the years, the observation 
that I simply state here is that there has been vivid policy experimentation, with the 
difference approaches yielding almost no good outcomes, resulting oftentimes to a 
return to the past. This experimentation has been largely a result of debate in the 
wider Australia. This debate on asylum seekers is brought about by the confluence of 
contentious public perception and political debate provoked by the media. The result 
has been that opinion is sharply divided. There are vivid two camps: those pro and 
against asylum seekers or boat people. And when this divide stepped into the 
corridors of power at federal government levels, it resulted in the introduction of the 
different policy approaches to asylum seekers. 
Here is a chronological presentation of the different asylum seeker legislation and 
government policy to back up my assertion on asylum seeker policy experimentalism: 
The East Timor Solution 2010  
                                                          
35 http://www.safecom.org.au/detention-changes.htm - accessed 10/08/2014 
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When the cost of managing asylum seekers coming to Australia began to take a chunk 
of the Federal Government budget in 2010, Labor government was forced to ask 
parliament for an extra budget allocation36. This evoked opposition from the Liberal 
party which proposed a return to the John Howard “Pacific Solution” and this should 
have pushed the Gillard government to propose a new “East Timor solution”. 
The East Timor solution, involved the Australian government entering into an 
agreement with the then new Timor Leste government to accept a number of asylum 
seekers in exchange for the much needed development aid. 
Community Detention Policy - October 11, 2010 
The Australian Labor government at the end of 2010 made some changes to 
Australia’s mandatory detention policy. It made an announcement that children and 
vulnerable family groups would be released from the high security prison-like 
detention facilities to community-based detention in the care of community 
agencies37 - a move that had been welcomed by many refugee agencies, advocates and 
activists38. Although initially seen by pundits (Evans 2008) as a project that rebuilt 
confidence and restored some integrity to Australia’s immigration system. The Labor 
government however reverted to offshore processing introducing what were referred 
to as the “Malaysia Solution” and the “Pacific Solution” (Brennan, 2011), (see page 65 
for details on the Malaysian Solution). 
I turn therefore to the relevant bills and laws passed by Australia’s federal parliament 
for the period 2010-2013 in the last three years of Labor government.  
Migration Amendment (Strengthening the Character Test and Other 
Provisions) Bill 2011 
                                                          
36 Supplementary funding - 
http://www.multicultural.vic.gov.au/images/stories/documents/2013/asylum%20seeker%20supp
ort%20program%20final%20evaluation%20report%2014%20feb%202012.pdf- accessed 28/03/15 
 
37 http://www.chrisbowen.net/media-centre/media-releases.do?newsId=3793- accessed 
9/05/2015 
38 
http://unhcr.org.au/unhcr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=187%3Adetention-
media-release&Itemid=76- accessed 09/05/2015 
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This legislation was introduced to strengthen the consequences of criminal behaviour 
by persons in immigration detention as a disincentive for participation in criminal 
behaviour or disruptive behaviour. 39  This bill ultimately gave powers to the 
Immigration minister to either refuse, cancel a visa on character grounds. Those who 
demonstrated (for their rights) in detention facilities would now be charged in the 
courts.  
 
Migration Amendment (Complementary Protection) Bill 2011 
This was legislation 40 introduced as “…..an amendment to the Migration Act to better 
enhance Australia’s arrangements in meeting non-refoulement obligations and reflect 
Australia’s longstanding commitment to protecting those at risk of the most serious 
forms of human rights abuses”. This bill was purposed at introducing greater 
efficiency, transparency and accountability in to Australia’s arrangements for 
adhering to its non-refoulement obligations under the International Conventions. 
This was protection from return in situations that engaged Australia’s non-
refoulement obligations under such international treaties as: the Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (The Covenant), the Second Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights aiming at the abolition of the Death Penalty, the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Covenant against Torture and other 
cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment or punishment (the CAT). Complementary 
protection was protection to be granted to persons who would be defined under the 
categories of international treaties aforementioned in addition to the protections 
granted to refugees under the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol 
with the purposes of bringing together a single protection visa application process.  
Deterring People Smuggling Bill 2011 
This legislation41  introduced serious crimes for people smuggling and aggravated 
people smuggling has its roots in the Border Protection Legislation Amendment Act 
                                                          
39 https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2011B00071/Download- accessed 23/06/15 
40 https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2011B00022- 23/06/15 
41 https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2011B00213- accessed 23/06/15 
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of 1999 - implying deterrence as a continuous hallmark of Australia’s asylum seeker 
policy even pre 2010. The established people smuggling offences are against any 
person who organises or facilitates to bring or proposes to bring to Australia, a non-
citizen who has no lawful right to come to Australia.  
Simply put, families would be forever separated as this law outlawed anyone who 
tries to reunite with family when family reunions were put on hold. It would now 
become impossible for anyone who came by boat and resettled in Australia to arrange 
to bring members of their families left in their country of origin as this was now 
deemed criminal. 
Alongside these criminal acts, there were amendments to clarify the meaning of 
certain words in the Migration Act 1958 such as “No lawful right to come to Australia”. 
The meaning was that “a non-citizen of Australia has at no particular time, no lawful 
right to come to Australia if that time, the person does not meet the requirements for 
lawfully coming to Australia under domestic law”. This was aimed at “avoiding doubt 
and ensuring that the original intent of parliament was affirmed as the clarification 
for the meaning of these words was retrospectively applied to December 16, 1999. 
This as expounded in the explanatory memorandum would “address the doubts and 
contentions that would be raised for periods prior to the enactment the Deterring 
People Smuggling Act 2011. This is little no wonder that those who come to Australia 
without seeking asylum and often without valid visas end up being detained far away 
from Australia’s mainland or sent in to another country to be processed compared to 
plane arrivals. 
The Malaysian Solution 2011  
However, there was a significant rise in the number of asylum seekers arriving by boat 
to Australia after 2008. This placed increasing pressure on the successive 
governments and opposition to adopt policy directions that were either seen to 
address border security concerns, combat perceived people smuggling or advocate 
for more humane approach to asylum seekers. With the Australian Greens Party 
preferring the former, the two major parties (Labor and the Liberal Coalition) tended 
to trend on the former with slight differences.  
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In a policy that looked a lot like the “Pacific Solution”, the Labor government under 
Prime Minister Julia Gillard mooted a number of policy strategies for asylum seekers 
arriving by boat. It proposed the Malaysia Solution in which case Australia was to send 
800 asylum seekers arriving to its territory by boat in exchange for 4000 UNCHR 
assessed refugees living in Malaysia who would be resettled in Australia. This “deal” 
was highly criticised by many refugee advocates and human rights 
groups/organisations who were very concerned with Malaysia’s record and 
treatment of refugees/asylum seekers. It was argued that refugees returned back to 
Malaysia would “face lengthy status determination times, inhumane detention and 
torture”42. 
This arrangement with Malaysia was soon to be challenged at the Australian High 
Court that eventually struck it down on the grounds that Malaysia was not a signatory 
of the Refugee Convention and would thus not be relied upon to grant safety to people 
seeking asylum (Foster 2012; Wood and McAdam 2012). And although the 
government was determined to pass new laws through parliament to revive the 
Malaysia arrangement, it failed to get the new laws passed by parliament43 (Pastore 
2013). 
Migration Legislation Amendment (Regional Processing and Other Measures) 
Bill 2011 
This legislation was a classic case of Australian government fighting to maintain its 
deterrence policy in the situation where the Australian High Court had pronounced 
otherwise. The Migration Legislation Amendment (Offshore Processing and Other 
Measures) Bill 2011 44  which was introduced sometime after the Australian High 
Court delivered a judgement in the case of Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minister for 
Immigration and Citizenship (2011) HCA 32 in which the High Court annulled the 
decision of the minister to transfer detainees to Malaysia under the government’s 
Malaysia Solution.  
                                                          
42 Amnesty International- http://www.amnesty.org.au/refugees/comments/25692/- accessed 
28/03/15 
43 Australian Financial Review http://www.afr.com/news/politics/national/fedgreens-move-to-
condemn-malaysia-solution-20110509-iescy- accessed 28/03/15  
44 https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2011B00193- accessed 23/06/15 
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This Bill amended the Migration Act 1958 and the Immigration (Guardianship of 
Child) Act 1946 (the IGOC Act) for the purpose of replacing the asylum seeker 
processing framework that existed in the Migration Act to pave way for the taking of 
offshore entrants to another country for the assessment of their asylum seeker claims. 
This bill particularly reinforced the making or the implementation of any decision to 
remove or deport a non-citizen child from Australia –ultimately granting government 
the power to implement offshore processing. 
The Expert Panel Report, 2012 
The Labor government under Julia Gillard in June 2012 appointed and constituted an 
expert panel to advise it on the best way to stop people (asylum seekers) from risking 
their lives at sea. The panel made 22 recommendations, all of which the government 
pledged to adopt, including increasing the annual humanitarian in take to twenty 
thousand refugees/asylum seekers from the current 13,750 people annually to 
20,000 in the coming years under the Humanitarian Program.  
Many pundits and scholars saw this as seemingly aimed at settling the “political 
storm” (Briskman 2013; Davies 2013) even from the point of view of discourse 
analysis as the Gillard (Labor) government in June 2012 established an Expert Panel 
on Asylum Seekers whose major term of reference was to “advice the Australian 
Government with the “best way forward” for Australia to prevent asylum seekers 
from risking their lives on dangerous boat journeys to Australia. Indeed the panel, 
after generating views far and wide, noted that there were no quick or simple 
solutions (Houston 2012).  
In their final report the Expert Panel Report the panel made 22 recommendations in 
the form of short-term and long-term proposals. The short-term recommendations 
included what was perceived as both disincentives and incentives in the asylum 
seeker programs. Incentives included increasing the numbers of people Australia 
would take up annually in its Humanitarian Program while disincentives included the 
re-introduction and indeed what later turned to be the expansion of the offshore 
processing regime. Long-term proposals included the recommendations for the 
Australian government to create better migration pathways and protections 
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opportunities for refugees coordinated within an “enhanced regional cooperation 
framework”, like the existing regional cooperative arrangements such as the Bali 
Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Transnational Crime45 as 
established in 2002. Only one of the 22 recommendations of the Expert Panel 
(Offshore Processing) were swiftly implemented by the government.  
The Gillard Labor Government was only swift to amend the Migration Act 1958 to 
implement recommendation 14 of the Expert Panel Report on Asylum seekers and the 
implementation of other measures to strengthen the regional processing framework 
by introducing the Migration Amendment (Unauthorised Maritime Arrivals and Other 
Measures) Bill 2012 which became an Act of Parliament in 2013.  
Also later introduced was the “No Advantage test” - a requirement or policy 
stipulating that no asylum seeker arriving by boat in Australia will have no advantage 
to receive speedy assessment of their asylum seeker claim over the refugees or 
asylum seekers awaiting resettlement in from their country of origin or lodged in 
transit countries like Indonesia or Malaysia. 
Migration Amendment (Unauthorised Maritime Arrivals and Other Measures) 
Act 2013  
As previously stated in the discussion on Expert Panel on asylum seekers, the 
Migration Amendment (Unauthorised Maritime Arrivals and Other Measures) Bill 
2012 46  which became an Act of Parliament in 2013 47  was an amendment to the 
Migration Act 1958 to implement recommendation 14 of the Expert Panel Report on 
Asylum seekers and the implementation of other measures to strengthen the regional 
processing framework (Offshore processing). The bill also redefined an off shore 
entry person and Unauthorised Maritime Arrival. While long-term proposals included 
the recommendations for the Australian government to create better migration 
pathways and protections opportunities for refugees coordinated within an 
“enhanced regional cooperation framework”, like the existing regional cooperative 
                                                          
45 The Bali Process on People Smugglinig-2002 - http://www.baliprocess.net/- accessed 
04/07/2015 
46 https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2012B00199- accessed 23/06/15 
47 https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2013A00035- accessed 23/06/15 
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arrangements like the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and 
Transnational Crime as established in 2002. 
The Regional Resettlement Agreement/Rudd’s PNG “Solution” 2013 
In a few days after Kevin Rudd returned as Prime Minister in June 2013, he quickly 
announced his Regional Resettlement Agreement (RRA) also referred to as the “PNG 
Solution”, implying all those arriving by boat in Australia would never be assessed or 
resettled in Australia but would be quickly moved, processed and resettled in Papua 
New Guinea. This he (Prime Minister Rudd) “hoped would break the back of people 
smugglers and bring an end to their trade”. However in a move openly seen as political 
deal, the Kevin Rudd Refugee Resettlement Agreement with Papua New Guinea 
suggested that PNG would take the steps to withdraw those UN reservations in regard 
to any asylum seekers sent to PNG from Australia, in a move that many a spectators 
and pundits interpreted as “putting politics over principle” (Murphy 2013; Westmore 
2013). Under this “carrot and stick” arrangement, Papua New Guinea had some things 
to gain. Australia promised to facilitate Papua New Guinea with money to upgrade its 
road infrastructure as well as its naval bases and universities (Welch 2014; Westmore 
2013). As Prime Minister Rudd declared on 19 July 2013:  
…our responsibility as a government is to ensure that we have a robust system 
of border security and orderly migration, on the other hand, as well as fulfilling 
our legal and compassionate obligations under the refugee’s convention on the 
other”. 48  
 
The Abbott Government’s “Turn back the Boats” Policy, 2013 
It was clear that in the months prior to the September 2013 Federal election the 
Coalition Opposition parties in 2013 were putting intense pressure on the Labor 
government when arguing that “its policies to combat people smuggling have failed”, 
and pressed with their policy of “just stop the boats” sold to the Australian electorate 
                                                          
48 See http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/immigration/kevin-rudd-to-unveil-
manus-island-expansion-plan-in-bid-to-stop-boats/story-fn9hm1gu-1226681830019- accessed 
11/05/15 
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as a solution to the spate of boat arrivals. This seemed to elicit support from the 
electorate and became one of the factors that handed victory to the Abbott -led 
Coalition Parties in the September 2013 general elections.  
Operation Sovereign Borders, the hallmark of the Liberal-National government’s 
asylum seeker policy was the fulfilment of election promises spearheaded by the 
Department of Immigration and Border Protection and its Minister Scott Morrison. 
The government adopted a military style approach in the structure, methodology and 
language in which the policy and operations of the Operation Sovereign Borders was 
constituted and undertaken49. This policy was birthed under the premise that: a) the 
previous Labor government had failed to stop “an influx” of boats - people arriving in 
Australia by boat and, b) the “people-smuggling” rackets were profiting or successful 
in their ventures of smuggling and needed to be stopped. “What the people smugglers 
and anyone they are trying to get on a boat need to understand is that this Australian 
government will take the actions necessary to protect Australian sovereignty and stop 
the boats” - Minister Scott Morrison. 
A very senior Australian defence official, Lieutenant General Angus Campbell, was 
drafted to lead the operations of the border security operation in conjunction with 
multiple other government agencies and entities 50 . With this military style 
composition, it was now difficult to monitor and audit the activities of the border 
protection task force as it was operating in secrecy - in true military classified 
definition - as there was an imposed information blankness purposely created and 
defended by the minister which many refugee advocates and activists slammed. This 
information vacuum by General Campbell was designed “so as not to give tactical 
advantage to people smugglers and to “protect” his people (the defence force) in the 
conduct of their duties - military duties. 
The new Abbott government moved quickly to introduce legislation to amend the 
Migration Act 1958 largely with a view to implementing its Operation Sovereign 
                                                          
49 See OSB website for details- http://www.customs.gov.au/site/operation-sovereign-
borders.asp- accessed 27/04/15 
50 See OSB organisational chart 
http://www.customs.gov.au/webdata/resources/files/OSBOrgChartJan2015.pdf- accessed 
27/04/15.  
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Borders policy. Below are a suite of bills that were subsequently introduced and or 
passed following some political manoeuvrings with the support of the minority 
Palmer United Party.51 
Migration Amendment Bill 2013 
The Migration Amendment Bill 2013 was initiated to clarify a statutory bar on making 
a further protection visa after the first protection visa application has been rejected, 
cancelled or revoked irrespective of the grounds for which the initial visa application 
was refused or visa grant was cancelled.52  
Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1) 2014 
This change of law 53  that later became Act (No. 1) 2014 was enacted to clarify 
limitations under Sections 48, 48B and 501E of the Migration Act designed to bar non-
citizens who had previously been refused a visa from re-applying for another visa.  
This bill also specifies that the grant of an Australian bridging visa to an asylum seeker 
does not stop their removal at any time from Australia. 
Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum 
Legacy Caseload) Bill 2014 
Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the asylum legacy 
caseload) Bill 2014, which passed as an Act in the December of the same year, is 
arguably the single most important indication of the commitment to Australia’s 
deterrence measures. 54  It was an amendment to the Migration Act 1958, the 
Migrations Regulations Act 1994, the Maritime Regulations Act 2013, the Immigration 
(Guardianship of Children Act) 1946 (IGOC Act) and the Administrative Decisions 
(Judicial Review) Act 1977, to support “the whole of government’s key strategies for 
combating people smuggling and managing asylum seekers both on shore and off 
                                                          
51 A “new kid in the block” of the Australian Parliamentary politics led by businessman cum 
politician Clive Palmer. 
52 https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2013B00234- accessed 23/06/15 
53 https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2014B00068- accessed 23/06/15 
54 https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2014B00198- accessed 23/06/15 
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shore”. The bill fundamentally changed Australia’s approach to managing asylum 
seekers as snippets from the explanatory memorandum explain thus: 
This legislation grants the government powers to stop people smuggling 
ventures by providing for greater clarity to the ongoing conduct of border 
security and maritime enforcement operations55.  
Further, the bill stated that the exercise of the range of the ministerial powers cannot 
be invalidated by an Australian court even when the court considers that there had 
been failure to consider or comply with Australia’s international obligations or 
domestic law. It also introduced temporary protection only for those who engage 
Australia’s non-refoulement obligations. 
Ultimately, the Immigration minister was granted sweeping powers to detain people 
at sea and transfer them to another country. Also included in this bill is a provision 
that children born to asylum seekers in Australia are deemed “unauthorised maritime 
arrivals” and subject to the same conditions as their asylum seeker parents. The 
minister also has the powers to remove persons or vessels out of Australia and his 
decision will be independent of assessments of Australia’s non-refoulement 
obligations. 
Another component introduced in the assessment of asylum seekers was a new 
concept of rapid or streamlined processing - a new assessment system of fast tracking 
asylum seeker claims with a limited merits review which is largely aimed at deterring 
the making of unmeritorious protection claims as a means to delay an applicant’s 
departure from Australia, so as to allow for the quick removal of those applicants who 
do not engage protection obligations. 
The other even more controversial proposal in this legislation is that it sought to 
clarify Australia’s own code of interpretation of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 
1967 Protocol by establishing Australia’s own interpretation of obligations outside of 
the Refugee Convention with the removal from the Migration Act 1958 of most 
references to the Refugee Convention and a replacement with a statutory framework 
which articulates Australia’s interpretation of its protection obligations under the 
                                                          
55 https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2014B00198- accessed 23/06/15 
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Refugee Convention. The new law has subsequently codified the meaning of a Refugee 
as stated in Article 1A, Subsection 2, of the Refugee Convention which states  
…a refugee as any person “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, is outside their country of nationality and is able or owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who 
not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual 
residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear is unable to 
return to it…..  
The new law in Australia, with the passing of the Migration Legislation Amendment 
(Resolving the asylum caseload) Bill 2014, has ultimately removed most references 
to the Refugee Convention from the Migration Act and replaced them with a new 
statutory framework which represents Australia’s interpretation of its protection 
obligations under the Refugee Convention. The new codification now sets out 
circumstances that must be satisfied for a person to have a well-founded fear of 
persecution, of which the onus of proof is rested on the applicant. Under this new 
code, the person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution in cases where they 
could seek protection from another part of their country or transit country where 
there is no persecution or modify their behaviour to avoid any chance of persecution 
in their home country. 
Introduction of Temporary Protection Visas and not Permanent protection visas for 
any asylum seeker found to engage Australia’s protection obligations but did not have 
a valid visa at the time of entry into Australia while there will be capping of protection 
visas to be granted by the minister and at the Minister’s discretion even those asylum 
seekers who have previously held certain visa types such as the temporary human 
concern or temporary safe haven visas.  
Ultimately all valid and successful permanent protection visas lodged prior to this bill 
are to automatically convert to Temporary Protection Visas (TPVs). However, any 
asylum seekers affected by the onset of the July 2013 Regional Resettlement 
Agreement with PNG and are subject to regional transfer and processing will have no 
change of gaining any kind of visa in Australia but will be detained and processed in 
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offshore country and resettled there or any other country as determined by the 
minister like Cambodia in accordance with the powers vested by the minister by the 
passing of this bill.  
Migration Amendment (Protection and Other Measures) Bill 2014 
This piece of legislation56 which passed an Act in 2015 was generally an overhaul of 
the complementary protection arrangements that were granted in the passing of the 
Migration Amendment (Complementary Protection) Bill 2011. It ultimately defined 
Australia’s risk threshold for assessing protection obligations under the International 
Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Covenant against Torture and 
other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment (CAT). The bill was sought and worded 
as containing….”amendments which contribute to the integrity and improve on the 
efficiency of the onshore status determination process”… yet in detail, the bill had the 
following implications: 
While it not only introduced stiffer measures for protection visa applications, it also 
made requirements that asylum seekers have the responsibility to ensure that 
complete information and documentation for asylum seeking is provided upfront 
regardless of their mode of arrival with the onus of proof solely to rest on the asylum 
seeker. If the applicant proceeded to challenge the primary decision of the 
department at the RRT, they had to be assessed according to the initial claims and 
documentation provided only and not make any amendments or addendums to their 
case. 
There would be no visa grants where the applicant has provided “bogus documents”. 
The grant of protection visas would be refused where the applicant failed to provide 
evidence of identity, nationality or citizenship when requested by the department to 
do so or if they cause their evidence of citizenship to be destroyed or disposed of. 
Additionally, Unauthorised Maritime Arrivals (UMAs) on either bridging or 
temporary visas were barred from making a valid application for a visa unless the 
minister determined it was in the public interest to allow them to do so.  
                                                          
56 https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2014B00154- accessed 23/06/15 
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Processing pathways for asylum seekers 2007-2015 
Australia has generally had two different processing pathways for asylum seekers 
seeking Australia’s protection obligations under international law (Refugee 
Convention). There is a different pathway depending on whether an individual 
arrived in Australia either by boat or aeroplane. It is fair to say that the different 
processing pathways either shape the asylum seeker policy or are shaped by the 
policy and the general perceptions of those seeking asylum as will be later discussed 
and analysed in the subsequent chapter. It is however important to emphasise that 
these pathways are not “set in stone” and have been subject to variations depending 
on the policy (or government) of the day.  
Unauthorised Boat Arrivals or Irregular Maritime Arrivals or Illegal Maritime 
Arrivals- Often used to refer to people who arrived illegally by boat are referred to as 
illegal maritime arrivals (IMAs)57. While the 1951 UN convention does not conceive 
of the possibility of illegal entry as a problem (UNHCR 2007). Australia, like many 
other countries, detains individuals suspected of illegal entry to its territory. Those 
mostly enter by sea by boarding boats in often very risky and dangerous situations. 
They are classified as Irregular Maritime Arrivals (IMA). These categories are 
subjected to mandatory administrative detention in an immigration facilities or 
alternative places of detention while all relevant checks and asylum seeking claims 
alongside security checks are conducted by DIAC or its agents.  
Plane arrivals - refers to people who arrived in Australia by plane and may seek 
asylum in Australia. Many asylum seekers in this category enter Australia by plane 
with valid entry documentation such as student or tourist visas and apply for 
protection once within Australia. While their application for protection is being 
considered by the department of Immigration, They are allowed to reside in the 
general community on bridging visas. Once found to be genuinely refugees, they are 
accorded Refugee protection visa (866)58 which accords them permanent residence 
in Australia with associated rights and benefits. 
                                                          
57 https://www.border.gov.au/Trav/Refu/Illegal-maritime-arrivals- accessed 17/08/15 
58 See http://www.border.gov.au/forms/Documents/866.pdf- accessed 17/08/15 
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Summary of the processing pathways for asylum seekers 2007-2015 
 
Note:  This only serves as a guide. However there were different pathways and these kept changing based on how the policies   
 changed in different years/governments.
 
Asylum seekers
Arrival by plane
("legal entrants")
Onshore processing
Return to country of origin
Temporary or permanent 
protection
Arrival by boat 
("illegal entrants")
Return at sea
Offshore processing
Resettlement in Nauru, 
PNG or Cambodia
Return to country of origin
Onshore processing 
(mandatory detention)
Return to country of origin 
or transfer elsewhere
Temporary or permanent 
protection
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Conclusion 
What I have shown here is an extremely complex and changeful process of policy 
making. It might on a charitable interpretation be treated as a bold process of policy 
experimentation. On a less charitable interpretation it might be treated as a sign of 
deep division both in the Australian community and the policy community showing a 
lack of moral clarity. It is therefore evident that both the Labor and Liberal parties 
which have governed Australia in the recent past seem to take a purely political 
approach to asylum seekers debate and policy. Each side claims to have the solution 
and a better approach to asylum seekers-and then later, there’s little or no difference 
at all. This was aided and abetted by a process involving a good deal of provocative 
mischief making by sections of the Australian media. Australian asylum seeker policy 
in the last two decades has been changing with each successive government.  
In the next chapter, I will be making sense of selected aspects of recent government 
asylum seeker policies that primarily engage with the first question in Bacchi’s 
“What’s the problem represented to be” approach and Lakoff”s work on metaphors.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE CASE OF ASYLUM SEEKERS—“WHAT’S THE PROBLEM 
REPRESENTED TO BE?” 
In the previous chapter, I provided a narrative overview of Australia’s asylum seeker 
policy between 2007 and early 2015. Nothing much has changed at the submission of 
this thesis in November 2015.  As I showed, the development of off-shore processing 
and later of an increasingly determined effort to deter asylum-seekers altogether 
from coming to Australia, has had one major effect: Australia continues in 2015 to 
avoid its responsibility under international law to provide protection to asylum 
seekers (Magner 2004). In this respect both the Labor governments of Rudd, Gillard 
and Rudd (2007-2013) and the Abbott government were able to continue to 
represent the policy problem as either a problem of border security. This basic 
representation was supplemented by the idea that the death toll of asylum seekers 
mainly during 2012 warranted tougher measures by Australia designed to deter 
asylum seekers from contemplating making attempts to reach Australia by sea, a 
representation that sponsored a policy of naval intervention to turn the boats back or 
offshore processing and subsequent resettlement.  
In this chapter I want to investigate the way the problem of asylum-seekers has been 
discursively constituted and represented in the succession of policies adopted by 
Australian governments after 2007. In doing this I am drawing on question one of 
Bacchi’s (2009) “What’s the Problem” analytic. What is the perceived problem posed 
by people arriving by boat and seeking asylum in Australia? How is this problem 
represented to be in specific policy/legislative documents and policy 
pronouncements? These are the questions to be addressed here through critical 
analysis of Australian government policy responses to asylum seekers in successive 
governments from 2007 to early 2015.  
The problem representations presented in this work is a result of identification and 
analysis of the overt or implied problem representations in specific asylum seeker 
policies or policy proposals over the years in question. In particular I ask what role 
was played by the use of a range of metaphors in the development and justification of 
the successive policies.  
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As I also want to show, the use of particular metaphors in Australia’s political 
discourse have played an indispensable role in helping to constitute the problem for 
which the policies are the solution. As Bacchi (2009, p. 262) argues, policies are 
problematisations by their very nature since they make proposals for change based 
on what a government holds to be the problem. A metaphor therefore plays a key 
constitutive role in shaping policy.  
On another note, I explain how the old centuries “Castle Doctrine”, and generally the 
western understanding of a home and privacy, has formed the politicians’ 
(legislators) understanding and use of some of the metaphors in dealing with the issue 
of asylum seekers in Australia. This ties in with the problem representation of asylum 
seekers and will give an insight in understanding deterrence as the hallmark of 
Australia’s asylum seeker policy not only in recent times but in the past as well. 
Let me start by again asking why have successive governments represented the 
problem as a problem of border security? I will then turn in the last part of this chapter 
to some of the consequences of this policy problem representation. 
The role of discourse in policy making 
As writers like Bostock (2002), Magner (2004) and Cooke (2015) have noted, from 
the start of the twenty first century, Australian asylum seeker policy has both ignored 
international law and violated certain fundamental human rights which the frame of 
the Refugee Convention accorded asylum seekers. Critics of Australia’s policies also 
pointed to evidence of considerable harm done to the asylum seekers themselves, 
especially children (for example, UN 2015). That this policy has to a great extent 
become part of a bi-partisan conventional wisdom on both sides of Australian politics, 
even if punctuated by periods of intense controversy, has doubtless helped to cover 
up this uncomfortable knowledge.  
Why then was such a policy approach adopted? One answer put up by successive 
Australian governments is that they are simply facing and responding to a “real 
problem” such that these kinds of policy responses are both appropriate and rational. 
That is there is a long standing tendency on the part of policy studies to treat modern 
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state policy interventions as involving a “discovery” process which uncovers/ed 
“real” social problems as a prelude to policy interventions.    This presumption 
underpins those familiar policy making diagrams which talk about the discovery and 
agenda setting process often based on data about a given policy problem (like the 
representation below). 
 
[Source: www.creating futures.org.nz] 
The privileging of a presumption of a broadly defined “empiricism” leads to an 
inability to conceive the possibility that what governments do when they make policy 
may not either be all that rational at all or possess any firm grounding in what is 
conventionally  referred to as reality. 
At the start of the twentieth century for example, social scientific theorists like Pareto 
argued for a sociology able to deal with the actual role played by what he called 
“residues” and “derivations” in social and political life (Pareto 1935: Vol. 2: 118-78; 
McLure 1997: 34). “Residues” involve basic feelings and instincts involved in the 
defence for example, of a social hierarchy or of a community deemed under attack 
and evident in feelings like patriotism, vengeance, generosity and pity. “Derivations” 
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are the more formal though still pseudo-logical rationalizations derived from those 
residues grounded in feelings and instinct and expressed in explicit scientific, moral 
or philosophical propositions and systems of thought. Pareto argued political ideas 
are seldom successful because of their empirical or scientific character-although, of 
course, every party, politician and policy maker claims those qualities-and more 
because of their enormous power to mobilise popular sentiment. Pareto insisted that 
that the people who make up governments try to preserve both the institutional 
framework of state power and the legitimacy of the state by a posteriori justification 
of their behaviour and policies -a procedure that stands in sharp contrast to the 
original objectives of government. This means as Sunic (1988) puts it, that that 
governments must “sanitise” violent and sometimes criminal behaviour by adopting 
self-rationalising rubrics centred on ideas like “security” “democracy” “pragmatic 
necessity”, or the “struggle for peace.” As Pareto puts it both politicians and ordinary 
people perceive the social world “as if it were reflected in a convex mirror”. 
In an important essay on this theme Rose (1996) likewise put fantasy at the centre of 
modern western politics and especially in foreign policy making. Rose argues 
persuasively that fantasy plays a central and constitutive role in modern states and in 
fields of political interaction like international relations. In this respect fantasy “is not 
therefore antagonistic to social reality; it is its precondition or psychic glue” fuelling 
its “collective will” ((Rose 1996: 3). By bringing fantasy into the political and material 
realm, Rose attempts to show how fantasy becomes collectively appropriated to form 
collectivities and sites of belonging central to a politics better understood in 
psychoanalytic terms for example, of loss, yearning, resistance, in terms of “identities” 
and other “protective fictions”. Rather than being antagonistic to the state, fantasy 
“plays a centre, constitutive role in the modern world of states and nations” (Rose 
1996: 4). 
With the reluctance to treat this possibility seriously has come an equivalent 
reluctance to inquire into the ways policy making is carried out as a discursive 
practice where metaphors play crucial role. This idea is hardly a new idea. Back in the 
1980s Schon was arguing that policies are discursively constituted. He recommended 
paying attention to the use of metaphor when explaining policy as discursive activity. 
For example, Schon noted: 
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When we examine the problem-setting stories told by the analysts and 
practitioners of social policy, it becomes apparent that the framing of the 
problems often depends upon metaphors ... One of the most pervasive stories 
about social services for example diagnoses the problem as “fragmentation” and 
prescribes “co-ordination” as the remedy ... [where under the spell of metaphor, 
it appears obvious that fragmentation is bad and co-ordination [is] good (Schon 
(1980: 255).  
Connolly (1993:1) too has argued that state interventions begin with the naming of 
certain human experiences or relationships as issues or problems embraced by  the 
state’s jurisdictional or administrative gaze.  
Here I make the case that state policy-making is a discursive performative process 
reliant on the production of constructive schemas - or discourses – that have the 
power to constitute reality by naming it and making it mean (Chilton 2004). Kress has 
usefully identified the things discourses do when he writes: 
…they define, describe and delimit what it is possible to say and not to say (and 
by extension — what it is possible to do and not to do), with regard to the area 
of concern of that institution, whether marginally or centrally (Kress 1986: 6)  
Further, as Kress notes, a discourse “works to generate a set of possible statements 
about a given area, and gives structure to the manner in which a particular topic, 
object, or process is to be talked about”. Most importantly, a discourse is not just 
about words or some formal arrangement of them. It bears on behaviour, social action 
and the conduct of social relations in that it provides “descriptions, rules, 
permissions, and prohibitions of social and individual action”.  
Constructive schemes are those interpretative schemas, as well as the underlying 
rules required to produce the research and policy analysis, which confer credibility 
on some knowledge claims and deny it to others. They achieve a taken-for-granted 
status amongst the diverse members of a policy community and are found at their 
most heightened form amongst agents working in and around the state (Jorgensen 
and Phillips, 2002).  
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Bourdieu too has pointed to the importance of the constitutive practices the state is 
involved in when it makes “authorized, public, official speech which is spoken in the 
name of and to everyone”: this is the power to name.  
This constitutive process is closely tied to the performative power of discourse itself 
where the practice of naming, categorising or judging someone brings about real 
actions and changes. The linguistic devices are numerous and include gossip, slander, 
lies, insults, commendations, criticisms, arguments and praises. They have the 
magical property of bringing about the things they name and so play a vital part in 
constructing the social world.  
The authority that underlies the performative efficacy of discourse is a percipi, 
a being-known, which allows a percipere to be imposed, or, more precisely, 
which allows the consensus concerning the meaning of the social world which 
grounds common sense to be imposed officially, i.e. in front of everyone and in 
the name of everyone (Bourdieu 1991 p. 106) 
This means the social sciences need to be able to develop “a theory of the theory 
effect” that is, the consequences of categorising and naming people, actions and 
relationships. Few organizations or institutions possess this capacity to the same 
extent as the state. 
On the power of language to become, as Austin put it “performative” (i.e., to “execute 
an action”), Bourdieu is quite clear this power is not contained within language so 
much as it is an expression of social and symbolic power:  
The naive question of the power of words is logically implicated in the initial 
suppression of the question of the uses of language, and therefore of the social 
conditions in which words are employed. As soon as one treats language as an 
autonomous object, accepting the radical separation which Saussure made 
between internal and external linguistics, between the science of language and 
the science of the social uses of language, one is condemned to looking within 
words for the power of words, that is, looking for it where it is not to be found 
(Bourdieu 1991: 107).  
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Bourdieu insists that if we want to understand the performative or magical nature of 
the use of categories we must find this “magic power” not in the language itself but 
rather in the ways people engaged in the work of entities like “the state” exercise 
symbolic power. One of the ways this is done, and it is by no means the only means, is 
the repeated use of metaphors to construct or represent a policy problem.  
Metaphors and the Asylum Seeker “Problem” 
As I have previously stated, metaphors are often used widely and unconsciously in 
language, action and thought in every day communication. The use of metaphors is 
much more than a figure of speech we employ in everyday conversation, or read in 
poetry and novels. Metaphors help us make sense of the world. Cognitive scientists 
like Lakoff have alluded to the fact that “….Words don’t have meanings in isolation. 
Words are defined relative to a conceptual system…” (Lakoff 2002), Page 29.  
In the case of Australian asylum seeker policy, I have identified five key metaphors 
that explicate what successive Australian governments have treated as the key 
problems and the course of action it took based on its problematisations (For a 
tabular overview presentation see pages 99 et seq.). Before I briefly introduce the five 
key metaphors, it is important to note that these metaphors are not isolated but are 
clustered, imbricated and held in place rather like the tiles on a roof. That is, they are 
overlapping. Each metaphor relies on the existence of the other metaphors for 
support and reinforcement for representing what the problem is and what action is 
required. This also characterises the cognitive, emotional, ethical and rhetorical 
appeals they are expected to make to ordinary Australians. 
1. The “country as home” metaphor. This metaphor represents the problem of 
“illegal” boat arrivals by constructing Australia as a “house” or “home” under 
threat from asylum seekers attempting to break in through the country’s “side 
windows” or “front and back doors”. This metaphor encourages us to associate the 
normal behaviour of entering a home with how people coming to Australia ought 
also to enter a country. This includes considering the good and acceptable non-
citizens as “guests” who as guests normally enter through the “front door” because 
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they have been invited to do so. This metaphor aligns well with the “queue” 
metaphor. 
2. The “queue” metaphor. This metaphor relies on the country being thought of as 
a “home”, because the asylum seeker system is depicted as if it were a queue, which 
has formed out the front of the “Australian home”. The queue consists of people 
who in reality are in refugee camps, waiting patiently for an invitation to enter 
Australia. On the other hand, another group of people jump or bypass the “queue”, 
but in reality arrive in Australia by boat. This group of people disrupt the asylum 
seeker process by violating the key principles associated with queuing viz 
impartiality and fairness. Accordingly, the “queue” jumpers are framed as though 
they are “illegitimate” and “undeserving”. They are also uninvited and they prevent 
“genuine” refugees from receiving an invitation into the home.  
 
3. The third metaphor constitutes the arrival of asylum seeker boats as a “natural 
disaster”. The “asylum seeker as natural disaster” metaphor dehumanises asylum 
seekers and at the same time leads us to believe that like any disaster, they pose a 
serious threat, but in the form of job insecurity, resources such as housing and 
transport, and also issues of identity. The first three metaphors serve to represent 
how and why the Australian “home” is under threat and what it is under threat 
from.  
 
4. The fourth metaphor justifies the government’s chosen course of action. The 
“state as a person” metaphor, in conjunction with the “country as home” metaphor 
locates the government as Australia’s “homeowner” that has rights to take action 
to protect the home and its inhabitants from the “problems” constructed through 
the first three metaphors. Like a person, a state is conceived in terms of having 
inherent dispositions. In this case, the politicians espouse the state’s “generous” 
and “humanitarian” qualities and in doing so argue that the course of action it 
chooses to take in relation to boat arrivals or deaths of asylum seekers at sea is 
justified. Further, the discourse highlights that the state is determined to pursue 
its chosen course of action. 
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5. The fifth and final metaphor is the “war” metaphor. Underlying the previous 
four metaphors, the “war” metaphor comes in two manifestations: the depiction of 
boat arrivals as an “invading army” and “politics as war” by other means. Likening 
the arrival of asylum seeker boats to an invading army was made easy by the use 
of metaphors of war. It also provided the grounds for the government to adopt a 
war-like response without taking into consideration the humanitarian concerns of 
those people the policy affects. The metaphor also helps to increase the supposed 
severity of the problem and increases the entertainment value to retain public 
interest. The latter point was particularly pertinent months preceding September 
2013, given an election was imminent, no little wonder that the rhetoric, especially 
from the opposition Liberal Coalition parties that won the 2013 election focussed 
on “stopping the boats”. 
These five metaphors present a particular representation of the asylum seeker 
problem in policy both before and after 2007. This unfortunately continues to date, 
and there is no sign or hope of abating in the foreseeable future. 
While much of the discourse overtly refers to asylum seekers arriving by boat as 
”unlawful”, ”criminal”, ”illegitimate” and so forth, this is not my key concern. Rather, 
my focus is to highlight the sometimes subtle and sometimes not so subtle use of 
metaphors that problematises the boat arrivals issue in a certain way, giving rise to a 
particular course of action (the Malaysian Solution) over another. The function that 
metaphors play is to represent the “way things are” as well as simultaneously evoke 
feelings and mobilise moral sentiment of a political kind and so serve to factually, 
emotionally and practically justify certain kinds of political action. This helps to clarify 
the kinds of cognitive, emotional, and ethical appeals they make to us. Let me now 
show how these metaphors work.  
The state as a person metaphor 
Metaphors that conceive of the state in terms of a person are not at all unique to the 
development of asylum seeker policy. Chilton and Ilyin (1995: 37) for example, claim 
the metaphor is so embedded within the field of international relations that states are 
mostly conceived as “people” in international relations discourse, and that this 
metaphor prevents us from thinking about the state in terms outside of the categories 
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that it engages. To offer some insight into this, the term “international relations” itself 
assumes that states can engage in relations with each other in the same way human 
beings do. States are also assigned human attributes such as rationality, interests, 
beliefs and even identities (Wendt, 2004, p. 289). Within the realm of world affairs, 
states, in their relationships with each other are seen to have inherent dispositions, or 
identities, and as such can be regarded as being peaceful, aggressive, secretive, 
industrious, and irresponsible and so on. In this sense when as a new Prime Minister 
Abbott was merely rehearsing a well-used metaphor when he declared that: 
…the test of a sovereign country and a sovereign government is its ability to 
control its borders and we will never again tolerate a situation where an 
important part of our immigration programme has been subcontracted out to 
people smugglers (Abbott 2013).  
 In conjunction with the “country as home” metaphor, the land-mass that a state 
occupies is its home; it lives in a neighbourhood and has neighbours (Lakoff, 1999, p. 
3). In conjunction with the “war” metaphor, which I will examine, a state can also have 
friends and enemies, and form allies and coalitions. 
Indeed the “state as a person” metaphor is not just ubiquitous in international 
relations discourse, but also in our thinking about the state more locally as citizens, in 
the media and as I have shown, by politicians in the formation of policy. Wendt (2004, 
p. 289) argues since the eighteenth century, Western international and intra-state 
discourse has primarily presented the state as a person. In my analysis, the discourse 
presents the state as a homeowner who possesses three distinct types of personhood: 
psychological, legal and moral. The homeowner’s psychological attributes are 
supposedly those of generosity and humanitarianism displayed through its refugee 
resettlement program. The homeowner is a legal person in the sense that it has rights 
and obligations under national and international law, including the right to protect its 
sovereignty and promote its interests and that it had no legal obligation to accept the 
uninvited guests aboard a boat travelling to Australia. Morally, the state was eager to 
show strong determination in its handling of the “threat” posed by asylum seekers.  
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Country as a home metaphor 
There has been persistent recourse to the country as home metaphor. Prime Minister 
Rudd invoked this metaphor in 2009 when he said: 
We have been stuck too often with people turning up on our doorstep. They 
have been coming in as uninvited guests … Unless you can come through the 
front door in the way that we want you to, you’re not coming through the 
window. Only thieves and people who want to abuse families living inside come 
through the window… line up and come through the front door, as you should. 
This statement not only invites the reader to visualise a country in the same way one 
visualises a home, but also represents the asylum seeker as a “robber”, or “thief” who 
presents a genuine threat to the Australian country/home. Statements that framed 
boat arrivals as though they were robbers, thieves and criminals attempting to “break 
in” were relatively widespread. Prime Minister Gillard likewise emphasised the 
representation of the problem as the problem of “border protection”. In her first 
major speech as Prime Minister she said: 
Today I am announcing steps to strengthen Australia’s border protection 
arrangements. I am setting out the long-term approach we will take to dealing 
with the pressure of unauthorized arrivals. (Gillard 2010) 
Opposition spokespeople reinforced this metaphor. Opposition spokespeople who 
were drawing a long bow when comparing asylum seekers to paedophiles did so by 
relying on the country is a home metaphor. Scott Morrison for example, suggested 
that “police and communities should be alerted when asylum seekers move into their 
neighbourhood” (Mehrebin 2013). Senator Eric Abetz for example, said that: 
 … if we are to have a cohesive society I would have thought it would be a good 
idea to say that somebody’s moving next door to you that might not be able to 
have all the English language skills that you might normally expect” (Cited 
Mehrebin 2013)  
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Opposition Leader Abbott likewise relied on the country as home metaphor when he 
argued that "I don’t think it’s a very Christian thing to come in by the back door rather 
than the front door” (Nicholson 2012). 
When in government the Abbott Coalition government drew on the “country as a 
home” metaphor. Prime Minister Abbott made his views plain in 2015 when he said,  
"Nope, nope, nope," to any suggestion he might allow resettlement in Australia of 
Rohingyan asylum seekers tossed at sea59. He said the prospect of resettlement in 
Western countries would encourage more people to risk their lives on leaky boats. "If 
you want to start a new life, you come through the front door, not through the back 
door," he said (SBS 2015)  
The Coalition Government in introducing the Migration Amendment (Regaining 
Control of Australia’s Protection Obligations) Bill 2013, reasoned that “it is not 
appropriate for complementary protection to be considered as part of a protection 
visa application and that non-refoulement obligations are a matter for the 
government to attend to in other ways”. This was the classic example of the home 
owner changing the rules of entry to the house. The government now sought to have 
the migration minister exercise his or her non-compellable intervention powers to 
grant protection visas in situations where complementary protection applied in the 
previous legislative arrangements.  
As Immigration Minister, Scott Morrison used the “country as home” metaphor when 
announcing tough new measures to remove resettlement eligibility in Australia by 
likening the option of resettlement to sugar on the table attracting vermin to break 
and enter Australia: "This is designed to stop people flowing into Indonesia and to 
support Indonesia and for them not to become a destination country. It’s taking the 
sugar off the table" (Woodley 2014).  
What is clear here was that with the new policy in place the government was now 
acting out the home owner metaphor, in considering asylum seekers as guests who 
should only gain entry through the front door (approved channels), it changed rules 
                                                          
59 See http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/nope-nope-nope-tony-abbott-
says-australia-will-not-resettle-refugees-in-migrant-crisis-20150521-gh6eew.html- accessed 
08/08/15 
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in effect to ensure that any one entering through the window (coming by boat) would 
ultimately be processed offshore and not even the ruling of the High Court would stop 
this home owner. This also cemented the representation of asylum seekers arriving 
by boat as “intruders” in to the home. And whereas many had hailed the High Court 
ruling as having failed the “Malaysian Solution” (Foster 2012), the government went 
ahead to prove that …..”the government has sufficient power to implement offshore 
processing arrangements” and it explicitly expressed that “….the government of the 
day can determine the border protection policy that it believes is in the national 
interest”60. 
And to further exemplify the “state as a person” metaphor already referred to, the 
government went ahead to qualify and define what it meant by “national interest” 
This was to be understood as broadly referring to Australia’s standing, security and 
interests and went further by giving examples that included “governmental concerns 
that relate to such matters as public safety, border protection, national security, 
defence, Australia’s economic interests et cetera”. It thus not only located and 
reinforced Australia in the “home owner metaphor” but also introduced the “war 
metaphor” when matters of defence and national security were added into the policy 
mix.  
We also see the powerful use of the “Australia as home” metaphor in the advertising 
of the Operation Sovereign Orders policy. Central to that policy frame has been the 
message: “You will not be resettled in Australia if you come by boat”. 
                                                          
60 See Paragraph 3 of the Explanatory Memorandum of the Migration Legislation Amendment 
(Offshore Processing and other Measures) Bill 2011- 
https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2011B00193/Explanatory%20Memorandum/Text- accessed 
20/07/15 
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Source: https://www.border.gov.au/about/operation-sovereign-borders/counter-
people-smuggling-communication 
Under the Regional Resettlement Arrangement with PNG, any unauthorised IMA is to 
be transferred to Manus Island for processing and resettlement for those found to be 
genuine refugees. And detention or deportation for those found not to be refugees as 
determined by PNG. Initial security and health checks were to be undertaken by 
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Australian authorities. The clear message of Operation Sovereign Orders is that you 
are never welcome, and can never make Australia “home” if you come by boat.  
The “queue” metaphor 
Governments have persistently used the “queue” metaphor by contrasting refugees in 
UN camps claiming they are:  
…genuine refugees who fear for their lives and are persecuted, have no money 
to pay people smugglers and have no other options. Their only option is to wait 
and wait and wait, while others who do have the money… can pay people 
smugglers. People who have access to such funds are not those who are 
destitute and without resources. They jump ahead of genuine refugees who 
wait patiently for their opportunity to come”. 
The political discourse represents the asylum seeker system metaphorically as 
though it is a queue and draws on this metaphor to position asylum seekers arriving 
in boats as “illegitimate”, “impatient”, “unfair” and “dishonest”. In contrast, those 
people waiting “in the queue” in refugee camps are “honest”, “fair”, “legitimate” and 
“patient”. Furthermore the illegitimate group disadvantages the genuine group by 
jumping the asylum seeker queue and effectively extending the period of time before 
the genuine group can receive an invitation into the Australian home. In her first 
major speech as Prime Minister Gillard insisted for example, that among the 
principles that mattered was the idea of an orderly queue:  
The rule of law in a just society is part of what attracts so many people to 
Australia. It must be applied properly to those who seek asylum, just as it must 
be applied to all of us; no one should have an unfair advantage and be able to 
subvert orderly migration programs; 
Opposition leader Abbott could not have agreed more strongly:  
I think the people we accept should be coming the right way and not the wrong 
way. If you pay a people-smuggler, if you jump the queue, if you take yourself 
and your family on a leaky boat, that’s doing the wrong thing, not the right thing, 
and we shouldn’t encourage it." (Nicholson 2012) 
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Asylum seekers as a “natural disaster” metaphor  
There has been an urge to treat the arrival of asylum seekers as akin to a natural 
disaster. Since 2007, media outlets have continued to routinely refer to the idea of a 
“flood”, a “tidal wave” or a “tsunami” when characterising the arrivals: The Australian 
in particular has repeatedly talked for example, about the need for an “Asylum tide 
swamping solution”(Australian 2013). This seems to continue to feature to some 
extent and in spite of some research showing a decrease in the use of these kinds of 
metaphors in media outlets. Romano for example, has argued that by the late 2000”s 
that journalists were no longer employing metaphors like “national emergency”, 
“invasion”, “attack”, “assaults on our shores”, “contagious disease”, “floods” or “tidal 
waves” to describe asylum seeker and refugee arrivals. As she notes even metaphors 
like “queue jumpers” used to describe boatpeople is usually used put in inverted 
commas or with the words “so-called” in front of it, to indicate the contentious nature 
of the term (Romano 2007, pp.2007:2-3). 
Both the Labor and Coalition governments have used the undoubted fact that there 
were deaths at sea due to drowning of people on ill-fated boats making the journey to 
Australia, especially between 2011-2013, to embellish and augment the “asylum 
seeker as natural disaster metaphor”. This possibly leads many Australians to think 
that like any disaster, the drownings could be avoided simply if asylum seekers took 
the “right routes” to enter Australia. While this does not only reinforce the “queue 
metaphor” that portrays asylum seekers as illegitimate, it is also responsible for a 
number of other policy focuses of government such as the excisions of Australia’s 
territories and offshore processing. 
As Briskman (2013) has argued “… compassion for asylum seekers can be used 
opportunistically to portray the tragedy of death at sea as a justification for stricter 
policies against people trying hard to seek sanctuary in Australia”. She argues that 
increases in the number of arrivals of people by boat to Australia after 2010, and the 
losses of lives at sea due to boat capsizes resulted in heightened attention politically 
which assisted in building a foundation for harsher policies (Briskman 2013). 
This was evident when Prime Minister Julia Gillard appointed an Expert Panel on 
Asylum Seekers in June 2012 to “provide advice on policy options to prevent asylum 
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seekers from risking their lives on dangerous boat journey’s to Australia”. It was 
framed to provide advice on policy options to prevent asylum seekers from “risking 
their lives on dangerous boat journeys to Australia”. In essence, the language and 
discourse focused more on people risking their lives on ill-fated and dangerous and 
less on those that would later detain or deport those who survived through the 
“dangerous boat journeys” at sea.  
In their final report the Expert Panel Report the panel made 22 recommendations in 
the form of short-term and long-term proposals. Indeed the panel, after generating 
views far and wide, noted that there were no quick or simple solutions (Anonymous 
2012). However, what followed as a consequence was that Government was quick to 
introduce legislation such as the Migration Amendment (Unauthorised Maritime 
Arrivals and Other Measures) Bill 2012 to reinstate offshore processing that passed 
in parliament with the support of the federal opposition. By August 13th, 2012, 
legislation had approved the processing of asylum seekers in both Nauru and Manus 
Island where asylum seekers would be held in detention for unspecified period of 
time. Those already onshore were held on the new “no advantage test” which meant 
that no onshore “boat arrival” (asylum seeker) would be processed in less time than 
those waiting for processing in third countries. 
Policy as “war” metaphor 
As Prime Minister, Abbott has persistently used the policy as war metaphor in 
justifying the turn back the boats policy: "If we were at war, we would not be giving 
out information that is of use to the enemy." Australia was engaged in a "fierce 
contest" with the people smugglers and Australia had to stop the boats because it to 
do so central to the maintenance of national sovereignty (McCallum 2014). 
This stance was justified on all sorts of grounds. Sometimes it simply rested on the 
premise that Australia was being challenged by illegal activities threatening our 
security because asylum seekers were just like “drug runners” as Opposition Leader 
Abbott had promised for example, that:  
Within a week of taking office, I would go to Indonesia to renew our cooperation 
against people smuggling. I would, of course, politely explain to the Indonesian 
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government that we take as dim a view of Indonesian boats disgorging illegal 
arrivals in Australia as they take of Australians importing drugs into Bali. 
(Abbott 2012)  
Once in government the Coalition moved to implement its Operation Sovereign 
Borders. In August 2013 it has indicated what that policy entailed:  
To stop the boats coming to Australia, it’s necessary to work upstream to stop 
the planes coming into the region and disrupt people’s movements through the 
region. If you can stop the planes, you can stop the boats. Once the smugglers 
place their passengers on the boat to Australia, all of Australia’s available 
deterrence measures become more dangerous and more expensive. That is why 
the Coalition’s Operation Sovereign Borders prioritises deterrence to entering 
the region from source countries and the disruption of movement throughout 
the region as well as action on our northern seas.  
As we have seen asylum seekers arriving in Australia by boat have been persistently 
represented as a serious threat to Australia’s security and borders. Numerous policies 
are peppered metaphors reiterating the threat to Australia’s security brought about 
by “the waves of boat arrivals”. This framing proved critical to the formation and 
constitution of the “Operation Sovereign Borders” (OSB). This policy was initiated on 
the premise that previous Labor governments had failed to stop “an influx” of boats - 
people arriving in Australia by boat. So a military style led operation aimed at 
stopping, repulsing and stopping any boat at sea, trying to enter Australian territory 
was needed. At the announcement and formation of the OSB, -Lieutenant General 
Angus Campbell was drafted to lead the operations of the border security operation 
in conjunction with other government agencies and entities61.  
With this military style operation in place it has proved increasingly difficult to 
monitor and audit the activities of the border protection task force as it was operating 
in secrecy - in true military classified definition as there was an imposed information 
blankness purposely created and defended by the minister to which many refugee 
                                                          
61 See OSB organisational chart 
http://www.customs.gov.au/webdata/resources/files/OSBOrgChartJan2015.pdf- accessed 
27/04/15.  
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advocates and activists slammed 62  63 . This information vacuum ordered by the 
government and by General Campbell was designed “so as not to give tactical 
advantage to people smugglers and to “protect” his people (the defence force) in the 
conduct of their military duties. 
The representation of that policy involved repeated use of military and war 
metaphors. The new Immigration Minister Scott Morrison insisted for example, in 
October 2013 that “"I wish to stress that the full arsenal of measures represented in 
the Coalition’s policies to stop the boats remain available to be deployed by the 
government” (Morrison 2013). Prime Minister Tony Abbott himself declared 
elsewhere that 
...we are in a fierce contest with people smugglers. And if we were at war, we 
wouldn’t be giving out information that is of use to the enemy just because we 
have an idle curiosity about it ourselves”.  
The “enemy” here is now the “people smugglers” and the “asylum seekers” linked 
together in a syndicated arrangement to enter Australia. Therefore they are seen as a 
problem-people, simply able to pay themselves on to the boats to Australia and 
thereby fanning the illicit people smuggling syndicates in the South East Asia region. 
The classified information about Operation Sovereign Borders operations and the 
curious people referred to here are the media, refugee advocates, lawyers, activists 
and the general public. Operation Sovereign Borders is a thoroughly military-style 
operation, facilitated by an all-style military capabilities in structure, composition and 
nature with hardware and equipment reminiscent of one employed in country-to-
country border wars. Australia it seems is now engaged in a full-scale war - against 
the asylum seeker (the boat arrival) and people smugglers. As Minister Scott Morrison 
insisted: 
The people smuggling rackets were profiting or successful in their ventures of 
smuggling and needed to be stopped. “What the people smugglers and anyone 
                                                          
62 http://www.asrc.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Operation-Sovereign-Borders-May-
2014.pdf- assessed 08/08/15 
63 http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/tony-abbott-compares-secrecy-over-
asylum-seekers-to-war-time-20140110-30lyt.html- accessed 08/08/15 
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they are trying to get on a boat need to understand is that this Australian 
government will take the actions necessary to protect Australian sovereignty 
and stop the boats (Barlow 2013). 
The very metaphors used seem to have encouraged the government to establish 
Operation Sovereign Borders as a military style operation to turn back asylum seeker 
boats. By October 2013 Australia’s military officials were reinforcing the message. 
Acting Commander of Operation Sovereign Borders, Air Marshall Mark Binskin, for 
example, said: 
 We are not going to give our posture or talk about our tactics or what is 
happening on the water … That gives away key intelligence to the people 
smugglers ... and we don’t want to give those criminals this sort of information 
(Barlow 2013) 
In February 2104, Minister Morrison for example, justified his refusal to supply 
information to the Senate on military security grounds:  
[It] includes but is not limited to on water tactics, training procedures, 
operational instructions, specific incident reports, intelligence, posturing and 
deployment of assets, timing and occurrence of operations, and the 
identification of attempted individual voyages, passenger information, including 
nationalities." (Morrison 2014) 
The “Castle Doctrine” unconsciously invoked.  
We need to go deeper to search out the possible origins of these metaphors. While 
there are limitations, and for the purposes of staying on course to the objectives set 
out in this research, I will not delve too deeply in trying to trace the origins of these 
metaphors. Nonetheless I will go ahead and state the possibility that these metaphors 
are formed out of the unconscious interpretation and application of certain principles. 
It is very possible, and it can indeed be argued that these metaphors originate from 
an unconscious interpretation and application of the major tenet of the “Castle 
Doctrine”.  
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The Castle doctrine emanates from the 17th Century English common law dictum that 
“a man’s house is his castle” (Vickery 2008). It is the concept of the inviolability of the 
home that has been known in much of the western civilisation.  It was/is the 
interpretation that allowed a person to have certain protections and immunities that 
permit(ed) them to use force (in certain circumstances) to defend themselves against 
an intruder and yet remain free from legal responsibility. These set of principles 
became so entrenched in the western civilisation and resulted in the English Common 
law dictum that an “English man’s home is his castle”. These legal or illegal 
interpretations have since been carried forward to mean refer to a person’s absolute 
right to exclude anyone from his home. Indeed “…the notion that our homes are our 
sanctuaries and that we can defend an intruder within them is hardly new….”(Jansen 
and Nugent-Borakove 2007), page 3.  
There is no doubt that the ground and the application of laws to defend oneself from 
an intruder has been built in many components and concepts of law in the modern 
world (Carpenter 2008; Drake 2008) with scholars tracing the history and 
development of certain laws such as the USA’s Fourth Amendment to the to this 
doctrine (Lasson 1970). This doctrine has allowed individuals to use reasonable force, 
including deadly force to protect themselves or others against an intruder in the 
homes (Jansen and Nugent-Borakove 2007). 
If taken from the personal application into the arena of political discourse on Australia 
as a home, this doctrine, it can be argued, has effects on how asylum seekers can been 
represented as the intruders. Whereas the Castle Doctrine is not principally defined 
by law in Australia, it none the less gets expressed in the asylum seeker debate and 
subsequently influences asylum seeker policy, albeit quietly. As has already been 
discussed earlier under metaphors, I will again make reference to the statement 
below from the Prime Minister Tony Abbott commentary on Australian sovereignty 
and asylum seekers. 
…the test of a sovereign country and a sovereign government is its ability to control 
its borders and we will never again tolerate a situation where an important part of 
our immigration programme has been subcontracted out to people smugglers (Abbott 
2013).  
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Some evidences of Metaphors as applied in the Australian asylum seeker legislative/policy framework 2007-2015 
Turning Point Major Policy/Legislation Metaphor 
Pacific Solution disbanded 
The newly elected Rudd Labor 
government fulfilled their election 
promise to disband the stringent policies 
of the previous Coalition government.  
Immigration detention fees also 
abolished- Temporary Protection Visas 
are also abolished. 
Offshore detention facilities in Nauru and 
PNG”s Manus Island are closed. 
 
Migration Amendment (Immigration 
Detention Reform) Bill 2009 
This is Country as a home metaphor being 
applied. The reforms under the Rudd 
government were heralded as a good 
gesture of a compassionate home owner. 
It put Australia as a more “generous and 
welcoming” home owner who is willing to 
accommodate “strangers” as opposed to 
previous Howard government “hostile” 
policy 
Towards a Regional Protection 
Framework - The Gillard government 
announces the establishment of the 
regional processing centre for asylum 
seekers in Timor-Leste.  
Australia had also on April 9 2010 
temporarily suspended processing of 
asylum seeker applications from persons 
from Sri Lanka and Afghanistan 
The East Timor Solution 
Deterring People Smuggling Bill 2011  
 
Country as a home metaphor 
(However this was heralding a shift from 
the Rudd government policy)  
The state as a person metaphor 
The queue metaphor- everyone coming 
(home) to Australia must follow this 
“imaginary queue” 
An announcement that Children or 
Unaccompanied Minors (UAMs) and 
vulnerable families will be moved out of 
detention facilities to Community based 
accommodation 
Community Detention Program Country as a home metaphor 
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Turning Point Major Policy/Legislation Metaphor 
Protests and Hunger strikes in 
Immigration Detention Centres. 
Immigration Minister introduces new 
legislative changes in which detainees 
found to have damaged Commonwealth 
property during riots are denied 
permanent protection on grounds of 
failure of character test. 
Migration Amendment (Strengthening 
Character Test and Other Provisions) Bill 
2011 is later introduced. 
The Bill amended sections 501 and 500A 
of the Migration Act to provide additional 
grounds upon which the Minister or his 
delegate may decide to refuse to grant, or 
to cancel, a visa on character grounds 
upon conviction of an offence by a court. 
“……these changes are, in part, in 
response to the criminal behaviour 
during the recent disturbances at the 
Christmas Island and Villawood 
Immigration Detention Centres, which 
caused substantial damage to 
Commonwealth property.  It is intended 
that these strengthened powers will also 
provide a more significant disincentive 
for people in immigration detention from 
engaging in violent and disruptive 
behaviour, and will deal appropriately 
with those who, by engaging in criminal 
activity in immigration detention, 
demonstrate a fundamental disrespect 
for Australian laws, standards and 
authorities”64….. 
 
State as a person metaphor  
Country as a home metaphor  
The wording in the explanatory 
memorandum was that “…..the 
Government is sending a strong and clear 
message that the kind of unacceptable 
behaviour seen recently in immigration 
detention centres will not be tolerated 
now or in the future”….. 
 
“……these changes are, in part, in 
response to the criminal behaviour 
during the recent disturbances at the 
Christmas Island and Villawood 
Immigration Detention Centres, which 
caused substantial damage to 
Commonwealth property.  It is intended 
that these strengthened powers will also 
provide a more significant disincentive 
for people in immigration detention from 
engaging in violent and disruptive 
behaviour, and will deal appropriately 
with those who, by engaging in criminal 
activity in immigration detention, 
demonstrate a fundamental disrespect 
for Australian laws, standards and 
authorities”….. 
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Turning Point Major Policy/Legislation Metaphor 
An arrangement with Malaysia in which 
Australia would swap 800 asylum seeker 
boat arrivals with 4000 UNHCR assessed 
refugees out of Malaysia in the four year 
period. 
The Malaysian Solution is born 
This was however overturned by the 
High Court ruling of 31/08/2011 
The queue metaphor 
 
A memorandum is signed with PNG 
The Australian government signed a 
memorandum of understanding with 
Papua New Guinea to re-establish an 
assessment centre for asylum seekers on 
Manus Island 
This was a start of the return to Offshore 
Processing 
The queue metaphor 
Country as home metaphor 
Owing to the August 31, 2011 High Court 
ruling against the Malaysia Solution, the 
government introduces new laws to 
allow for offshore processing 
Migration Legislation Amendment 
(Offshore Processing and Other Measures 
Bill) 2011. 
When the High Court of Australia in 
August 31 2011 ruled that it was illegal to 
send asylum seekers to Malaysia in the 
Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minister of 
Immigration and Citizenship (2011) HCA 
32 the government quickly rushed to 
introduce new legislation Migration 
Legislation Amendment (Offshore 
Processing and other Measures) Bill 2011 
State as a person metaphor 
And to further exemplify the “state as a 
person” metaphor, the government went 
ahead to qualify and define what it meant 
by “national interest” as broadly referring 
to Australia’s standing, security and 
interests and went further by giving 
examples that included ‘governmental 
concerns that relate to such matters as 
public safety, border protection, national 
security, defence, Australia’s economic 
interests et cetera” 66 . It thus not only 
                                                          
64 https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2011B00071/Explanatory%20Memorandum/Text- accessed 17/08/15 
66 See Paragraph 3 of the Explanatory Memorandum of the Migration Legislation Amendment (Offshore Processing and other Measures) Bill 2011- 
https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2011B00193/Explanatory%20Memorandum/Text- accessed 20/07/15 
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Turning Point Major Policy/Legislation Metaphor 
to “replace the existing framework in the 
Migration Act for taking offshore entry 
persons to another country for 
assessment of their claims to be refugees 
as defined by the Refugee Convention 
(Wood and McAdam 2012) 
This also cemented the representation of 
asylum seekers arriving by boat as 
“intruders” in to the home.  And whereas 
many had hailed the High Court ruling as 
having failed the ‘Malaysian Solution’ 
(Foster 2012), the government went 
ahead to prove that …..’the government 
has sufficient power to implement 
offshore processing arrangements’ and it 
explicitly expressed that ‘….the 
government of the day can determine the 
border protection policy that it believes 
is in the national interest’65. 
 
located and reinforced Australia in the 
‘home owner metaphor’ but also 
introduced the ‘war metaphor’ when 
matters defence and national security 
and brought into asylum seeker 
legislation. It is no secret that asylum 
seekers arriving in Australia by boat are 
represented as a serious threat.  
What is however clear here was that the 
new legislation was that the government 
was now acting out the home owner 
metaphor, in considering asylum seekers 
as guests who should only gain entry 
through the front door (approved 
channels), it changed rules in effect to 
ensure that any one entering through the 
window (coming by boat) would 
ultimately be processed offshore and not 
even the ruling of the High Court would 
stop this home owner. 
Complementary Protection Bill 
introduced. The new law is aimed at 
offering and improving the protection for 
people who do not fit the 1951 United 
Nations Conventions Relating to the 
Migration Amendment (Complementary 
Protection) Bill 2011. 
This was a positive move. 
Country as a home metaphor 
                                                          
65 See Paragraph 3 of the Explanatory Memorandum of the Migration Legislation Amendment (Offshore Processing and other Measures) Bill 2011- 
https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2011B00193/Explanatory%20Memorandum/Text- accessed 20/07/15 
  
103 
  
Turning Point Major Policy/Legislation Metaphor 
status of Refugees but are still found to be 
at risk of grave persecution, torture or 
death if returned to their countries  
As a result of many asylum seekers 
drowning at sea 
The Prime Minister Julia Gillard 
appointed an Expert panel to provide a 
report “on the best way forward for 
Australia to prevent asylum seekers from 
risking their lives on dangerous boat 
journeys to Australia”. 
The Expert Panel on asylum seekers  The natural disaster metaphor 
“… compassion for asylum seekers can be 
used opportunistically to portray the 
tragedy of death at sea as a justification 
for stricter policies against people trying 
hard to seek sanctuary in Australia” 
(Briskman 2013). 
Expert panel report released  
The report contained 22 
recommendations which included; 
working towards the development a 
Pacific regional cooperative framework 
for improving protections; increasing 
Australia’s Refugee and Humanitarian 
Program from 13750 to 20,000 places 
annually; the reintroduction of off-shore 
processing of asylum seekers in Nauru 
and the Papua New Guinean Manus 
Island; the changing of the Australian 
family reunion program to make it stiffer 
for asylum seeker boat arrivals to reunite 
with or sponsor their families in 
Australia 
Only one of the 18 recommendations of 
the Expert Panel (Offshore Processing) 
were swiftly implemented by the 
government. 
“No Advantage test” also introduced- a 
requirement or policy stipulating that no 
asylum seeker arriving by boat in 
Australia will have no advantage to 
receive speedy assessment of their 
asylum seeker claim over the refugees or 
asylum seekers awaiting resettlement in 
from their country of origin or lodged in 
transit countries like Indonesia or 
Malaysia. 
The natural disaster metaphor 
 
And all the other metaphors 
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Turning Point Major Policy/Legislation Metaphor 
Legislation to allow for offshore 
processing of asylum seekers in Nauru 
and Manus Island.  
Asylum seekers that would have arrived 
on or after August 13, 2012 would now 
be processed off shore. The same 
category would also be ineligible to 
sponsor their family members to reunite 
in Australia. 
Migration Legislation Amendment 
(Regional Processing and Other 
Measures) Bill 2012. 
The country as a home metaphor 
 
The state as a person metaphor 
 
Excision of Mainland Australia  
Legislation to extend excision policy into 
Australia’s mainland to ensure that no 
one arriving in Australia by boat can 
lodge any protection claim in Australia 
except at the discretion or invitation of 
the Immigration Minister 
Asylum seekers arriving in mainland 
Australia can now be transferred 
Offshore for Processing 
The queue metaphor 
 
The country as a home metaphor- (the 
home owner has a right to keep anyone 
out of his place).  
 
The state as a person metaphor 
A few days after Kevin Rudd returned to 
be Prime Minister Regional Resettlement 
Agreement (RRA) also referred to as the 
“PNG Solution” is introduced. 
Another such memorandum, similar to 
the PNG Solution was signed with the 
government of Nauru where asylum 
seekers would be transferred from 
Australia to Nauru on August 3, 2013 
PNG Solution 
All those arriving by boat in Australia 
would never be assessed or resettled in 
Australia but would be quickly moved, 
processed and resettled in Papua New 
Guinea. 
The queue metaphor 
 
The country as a home metaphor 
 
The state as a person metaphor 
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Turning Point Major Policy/Legislation Metaphor 
Liberal Coalition Government in power 
Operation Sovereign Borders, the 
hallmark of the Liberal-National 
government’s stop the boats policy was 
birthed a few days after securing a 
Federal government election victory in 
September 2013. 
Operation Sovereign Borders 
commences. It is now government policy 
to turn away asylum seeker boats at sea 
in a military-style operation focused on 
“border security” 
The war metaphor 
 
 
Temporary Protection Visas 
reintroduced 
In a return to the Prime Minister Howard 
era when Temporary Protection policy 
existed between 1999 and 2007, the 
Liberal Coalition government under 
Prime Minister Abbott introduced 
legislation to grant Temporary 
Protection Visas. These had previously 
been abolished by the Rudd Labor 
government in 2008. Under the 
proposals, TPV holders will not be 
allowed to sponsor their family members 
to Australia and cannot return to 
Australia if they travelled overseas. 
However, the Australian senate 
disallowed to pass this bill on December 
2, 2013. This resulted in the then 
Immigration Amendment (Temporary 
Protection Visas) Regulation 2013 to re-
introduce the system of Temporary 
protection.  
 
TPV holders unlike in the previous 
Howard arrangement will need to 
reapply for another TPV at the expiry of 
their TPV and are totally barred from 
applying for any other visa in Australia.  
The state as a person metaphor 
March 20, 2013, the Minister for 
Immigration was found not to exercise his 
non-compellable public interest powers 
to grant visas to individuals that had 
appealed to the high courts and won 
against the negative decision previously 
handed down by the Immigration 
Department not to grant such individuals 
a visa. This was a discovery in the case of 
the Minister for Immigration and 
Citizenship v SZQRB67. The court did not 
only find that the plaintiff in this case had 
been denied procedural fairness in the 
most fundamental way but even more 
significant was that the International 
Treaty Obligations Assessment68 process 
that had been used by the government to 
                                                          
67 See http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCAFC/2013/33.html- accessed 10/05/15 
68 See https://www.immi.gov.au/visas/humanitarian/_pdf/implementation_of_cp_qa.pdf- 10/05/15 
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Turning Point Major Policy/Legislation Metaphor 
Immigration Minister Scott Morrison in 
response to the Senate’s disallowance of 
TPVs immediately put a freeze on 
granting of permanent protection visas 
leaving thousands of asylum seekers to 
languish in the community.  
access complementary protection needs 
had not been used in accordance with the 
law. The court thus issued an injunction 
preventing the deportation of the plaintiff 
until his claims had been assessed 
according to the law. An as a result, this 
case also prevented the deportation of 
several other asylum seekers in the same 
category. 
Permanent protection is removed.  
Legislation is introduced to remove 
permanent protection for people who 
arrive in Australia by boat and seek 
asylum. This was a move to deny any boat 
arrival any opportunity of being granted 
a protection visa 
Migration Amendment (Unauthorised 
Maritime Arrivals and Other Measures) 
Bill and later Act 2013 were passed.  
 
A bill to abolish complementary 
protection is proposed. It is now at the 
discretion of the Immigration minister 
whether to grant protection in 
circumstances where a person is at 
significant risk of torture, persecution or 
death. This was a move away from the 
Migration Amendment (Complementary 
Protection) Act 2011 which aimed to 
offer protection for people who do not fit 
the 1951 United Nations Conventions 
Migration Amendment (Regaining 
Control Over Australia’s Protection 
Obligations)Bill 2013 
The country as a home metaphor 
This was the classic example of the home 
owner changing the rules of entry to the 
house.  The government now sought to 
have the migration minister exercise his 
or her non-compellable intervention 
powers to grant protection visas in 
situations where complementary 
protection applied in the previous 
legislative arrangements.  
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Turning Point Major Policy/Legislation Metaphor 
Relating to the status of Refugees but are 
still found to be at risk of grave 
persecution, torture or death if returned 
to their countries. 
 
 
New Legislation introduced. Asylum 
seekers without valid documents and 
cannot provide reasonable explanations 
will have their applications for asylum 
rejected.  
There is also a requirement for early 
disclosure, as later in the application 
process, any information initially left out 
in the application will be disallowable for 
seeking protection. 
Migration Amendment (Protection and 
other measures) Bill 2014  
The bill was introduced “to implement a 
range of measures which increase 
efficiency and enhance integrity in the 
onshore protection determination 
process”. In order to maintain both queue 
metaphor and state as a person metaphor 
in which the government as the home 
owner of Australia, the government 
introduced provisions that it was the 
responsibility of the asylum seeker (read 
here as queue jumper) to supply 
subsequent evidence and specify the 
particulars of their claims to be a person 
Australia is obliged to protect. 
The queue metaphor 
 
The country as a home metaphor 
Whereas neither the Article 14 in the 
1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights to which Australia has covenanted 
to that provides for the rights to seek 
asylum in another country and enjoy the 
protection from persecution 69  nor the 
1951 UN Convention and its 1967 
Protocol on Refugees do not make 
mention of evidence or quality of 
documentation for seeking asylum 
New Legislation is introduced that 
removes most references to the Refugee 
Convention in the Migration Act 1958. 
The government has ultimately defined 
what they will consider as a refugee. The 
The Migration and Maritime Powers 
Legislation Amendment (Resolving the 
Asylum Seeker Caseload) Bill 2014  
The minister has now earned unchecked, 
arbitrary powers to deny anyone seeking 
All of the five metaphors 
The explanatory memorandum reads 
thus “the bill was introduced to support 
“the whole of government’s key strategies 
for combating people smuggling and 
                                                          
69 See http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a14- accessed 07/05/2015 
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Turning Point Major Policy/Legislation Metaphor 
minister has powers to return boats 
accorded to him. The minister is allowed 
to place a cap on the number of 
protection visa grants annually. Asylum 
seekers who have arrived by boat will 
never be able to apply for permanent 
protection visas. Also introduced are the 
Safe Haven Enterprise Visa (SHEV) which 
along with the TPVs will be the only visas 
issued.  
asylum in Australia. Australia has now 
granted powers to the minister to remove 
non-citizens from its territory 
irrespective of whether Australia has 
non-refoulement obligations against that 
person or not in complete disregard of 
the protections accorded to such persons 
under the different international treaties 
such as the Refugee Convention, the 
Convention Against Torture (CAT) and 
the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR). Australia’s 
interpretation of the Refugee Convention 
has also gone ahead to disallow courts 
and the due process of the law (appeals 
processes) to impede any decision by the 
minister to remove non-citizens (asylum 
seekers). Removal of non-citizens from 
Australia can be considered even with 
undue consideration of any assessments 
of non-refoulement obligations. 
managing asylum seekers both on shore 
and off shore”. “The bill fundamentally 
changes Australia’s approach to 
managing asylum seekers by”… 70 
 
                                                          
70 Page 1 in the Explanatory Memorandum of the Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the asylum legacy caseload) Bill 2014- 
https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2014B00198/Explanatory%20Memorandum/Text- accessed 22/07/15 
  
109 
  
Turning Point Major Policy/Legislation Metaphor 
Migration Amendment (Protection and 
other Measures) Regulations 2015 is 
passed  
Although this was later repealed, it was 
passed rather to “operationalise” the  
Migration Amendment (Protection and 
other Measures) Act 2015 which resulted 
from the (Protection and other 
Measures) Bill 2014 
Almost all the metaphors 
On March 6, 2015, the UN Rapporteur on 
Torture (UNHCR 2015) condemned 
Australia for violations of  the right to 
seek asylum.   Prime Minister Tony 
Abbott responded  by saying that "I really 
think Australians are sick of being 
lectured to by the United 
Nations"(Anonymous 2015b). 
Australian Border Force Bill 2015  
The roles of Customs (border policing) 
and Immigration (facilitation and service 
delivery) now mixed. The Immigration 
Department is now more of a criminal 
law enforcer than a facilitator of 
Immigration Services. 
This was to cement the Operations 
Sovereign Borders structurally and 
administratively.  
The war metaphor- Australia on full-scale 
war with people smugglers. However this 
war is fought by the process of returning 
at sea, any vessel with asylum seekers 
destined to Australia.  
Migration Amendment (Regional 
Processing Arrangements) Bill 2015 
The laws confer express powers to the 
minister to take asylum seekers to any 
country he or she may designate. 
All of the metaphors 
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Deterrence as a Hallmark of Australian Asylum Seeker Policy 
It will be recalled that the title of my study is derived from an award-winning 
Australian Television documentary series “Go back to where you came from”, 
broadcast in 2011 (Season One), Season Two in 2012 (Douglas and Graham 2013) and 
Season Three in July 2015. This television series documents the experiences of some 
selected Australians brought with them a variety of views about refugees/asylum 
seekers who are then taken through the experience of life in a reverse journey 
through the path that people seeking asylum/refuge in Australia have taken. 71  
This series certainly revealed the strength of anti-asylum seeker sentiment, views that 
resonated deeply with the core idea that has come to define Australia’s asylum seeker 
policy in recent years, the idea that they should be deterred from coming to Australia 
by any means. The question to be addressed here is why has this happened, and has 
it had anything to do with the way the problem of asylum seekers was represented?  
What’s the problem of asylum seekers arriving in Australia by boat represented 
to be in specific policy/legislative documents and pronouncements? What is 
assumed? What is taken for granted? What is not questioned? 
My goal as previously explained in the introductory chapter of this thesis, was to 
identify the effects of specific problem representations so that they can critically be 
assessed.  The assessment of the problem representation was to be undertaken using 
the mix of Bacchi’s “What’s the problem represented to be” approach with Lakoff’s 
work on metaphors.   
One of the attractions and the value of Bacchi’s “What’s the problem represented to 
be?” approach is that it has indeed enabled me to identify some of the important 
representations of the Australian asylum seeker policy problem. With the WTP 
approach, I have probed that the rationales for the whole of Australia’s asylum seeker 
policy (deterrence at sea, mandatory detention, offshore processing and protection 
on a temporary basis) as effects of the understanding of asylum seekers from the 
                                                          
71 SBS One- http://www.sbs.com.au/goback/- accessed 20/06/15 
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prism of threat to security, which stand out as key elements of Australian asylum 
seeker policy.  
In relation to the Australian asylum seeker policy and scrutiny, we are identifying 
effects that have resulted from the problem representations of asylum seekers as 
pointed out previously namely; asylum seekers as a security problem and their 
perceived threat to Australian sovereignty.  
Further to the security mis(representation) is the presentation of Asylum seekers as 
a “Problem” that requires a solution-A number of policy approaches have been named 
or geared towards a solution to the problem of asylum seekers. The Malaysian 
Solution, East Timor Solution, PNG solution and others. “Solution” as an English word 
is defined according to the Merriam-Webster online dictionary is something that is 
used or done to deal with and end a problem- something thing that solves a problem 
or a puzzle. A correct answer to a puzzle. That is precisely how people arriving by boat 
in Australia have been viewed as by successive governments- a complex problem that 
needs to be dealt with through the policies as articulated above. A problem that needs 
solving. A complex problem at that.  
It is no secret that asylum seekers arriving in Australia by boat are represented as a 
serious threat. Numerous policies are peppered with lots of reference and inference 
to the insecurity to the wider Australia as I will explain here below. This threat of 
insecurity is easily picked out from the critical analysis of some or whole of the 
Australian government’s response to asylum seekers.  
Closely related to the asylum seeker security issue is the people smuggling issue 
which has been used as a justification for military like operations of combat and 
secrecy. The opening statement in the supplementary explanatory memorandum of 
the Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum 
Legacy Caseload) Bill 2014 relates to the amendment of the Migration Act 1958 “….to 
support the government’s key strategies for combating people smuggling and 
managing asylum seekers both onshore and offshore”. The bill, which later passed as 
Act of Parliament, was intended for the purposes of granting powers to the 
government to “stop people smuggling ventures at sea”. There is therefore no doubt 
that the mind of policy makers, and especially the Liberal National Coalition 
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Government from 2013, closely link and blanket every asylum seeker to be a result of 
people smuggling.  
“…..The people smuggling rackets were profiting or successful in their ventures of 
smuggling and needed to be stopped. “What the people smugglers and anyone they 
are trying to get on a boat need to understand is that this Australian government will 
take the actions necessary to protect Australian sovereignty and stop the boats” 
- Minister Scott Morrison. 
Unfortunately, the blanketing of the asylum seekers and people smugglers has not 
only been the Liberal Coalition Government but also the position that the Australian 
Labor government has either given bi-partisan support or implemented themselves. 
In a few days after Kevin Rudd returned to be Prime Minister in June 2013, he quickly 
announced that People smuggling was now the target of his new government which 
quickly crafted a Regional Resentment Agreement with Papua New Guinea that 
resulted in the sending of all boat arrivals for processing and resettlement in that 
pacific nation. The Prime Minister Kevin Rudd had declared on 13 July 2013 that he 
hoped this arrangement would break the back of people smugglers and bring an end 
to their trade. 
 “our responsibility as a government is to ensure that we have a robust system 
 of border security and orderly migration, on the other hand, as well as 
 fulfilling our  legal and compassionate obligations under the refugees 
 convention on the other”.72   
People smuggling, itself has come to be treated and not just as a criminal issue but as 
a national security issue. Whereas people smuggling has led to loss of life at sea, there 
is virtually no evidence to indicate that they are per se a threat to Australia’s national 
integrity or security. There has never been a boat intercepted with ammunition or 
drugs to Australia, except helping those “armless” people that seek asylum in 
Australia. There is therefore no justification for a complete military like response to 
                                                          
72 See http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/immigration/kevin-rudd-to-unveil-
manus-island-expansion-plan-in-bid-to-stop-boats/story-fn9hm1gu-1226681830019- accessed 
11/05/15 
  
113 
  
the boat question, let alone linking people smuggling with lengthy jail terms 
equivalent to those meted on murders and terrorists. 
“Protecting Australian Sovereignty” 
Hard line asylum seeker policies have been shaped and defended to be in the interest 
of safeguarding the sovereignty of Australia. But what does this mean? What is not 
being questioned and what is being taken for granted? We might have to first check 
the dictionary meaning of the words sovereignty and integrity in the Merriam-
Webster online dictionary means obsolete supreme excellence or an example of it : 
supreme power especially over a body politic; one that is sovereign; especially : an 
autonomous state. From the Merriam-Webster on line dictionary Integrity is defined 
as either meaning one of the following: firm adherence to a code of especially moral 
or artistic values (incorruptibility); an unimpaired condition (soundness) -the quality 
or state of being complete or undivided (completeness). In 2014, Schedule one of the 
explanatory memorandum in the Migration Amendment (Protection and other 
Measures) Bill 2014 was worded as containing “…….amendments which contribute to 
the integrity and improve on the efficiency of the onshore (processing) status 
determination process …73“  
Effects from the problem representations   
Temporary Protection only - The government has introduced various legislative 
measures to ensure that those who arrive in Australia by boat will not be given the 
opportunity to apply for permanent protection in Australia.  Instead, asylum seekers 
are provided only with the option of applying for a temporary protection visa (TPV), 
which is explicitly the motive of (Unauthorised Maritime Arrivals and Other 
Measures) Act 201374.  This Act restricts the period a TPV can be granted to 3 years 
but in some instances it can be shorter, as it is on a case by case basis and is at the 
discretion of the Minister.   Those who are granted a TPV are only able to seek to have 
their TPV extended on expiry and are prohibited from applying for any other visa or 
for Australian citizenship.  The consequence of this legislation is that asylum seekers 
are subject to much uncertainty concerning their future which is further exacerbated 
                                                          
73 http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2014B00154- accessed 31/05/15 
74 https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2013A00035- assessed 09/08/2015 
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by the fact that they are indefinitely separated from their families who remain 
overseas.  Under a TPV, asylum seekers cannot leave Australia and re-enter without 
it invalidating their claim for asylum nor can they apply for their spouses and children 
to come to Australia for the purpose of reunification.  This policy is in direct contrast 
with the expectations and guidelines of the UN Refugee Convention as it has 
significant negative implications on the health and emotional wellbeing of those 
seeking asylum as they are unable to rebuild a meaningful life and face a considerably 
extensive and limitless future of uncertainty and separation. This has negative 
implications in regard to building of meaningful life and existence and goes against 
the expectations and guidelines envisaged in the UN Refugee Convention. 
Forced return at sea and off shore processing - Australia can now return people 
seeking asylum with no regard to the guidelines to the state parties (UNHCR 2007) It 
is therefore now obvious the turn back at sea of asylum seeker boats or the 
repatriation of those who had previously reached the Australian mainland, and even 
those who have been processed or resettled off shore in third countries reached is as 
a result the perceived threat.  
It is quite evident that Australian governments now do not want any asylum seeker 
arriving in the mainland or Australian territories. Subsequently, it has either 
continued or expanded the excision policies that existed in the Howard era in the early 
2000s. On May 16, 2013, the government in passing legislation, Migration 
Amendment (Unauthorised Maritime Arrivals and Other Measures) Act 2013 
ultimately extended the excision policy to mainland Australia. This policy was only 
previously introduced for boat arrivals at excised territories like Christmas Island but 
it was now extended to mainland Australia. Although initially opposed by the 
Australian Labor Party in the Howard era in 2001, this policy of excising the 
Australian mainland, was passed with bi-partisan support of the two major parties75. 
The implication is that any boat arrival and seeking asylum in Australia cannot lodge 
a valid protection in Australia except at the discretion of the Immigration minister and 
will be at the risk of being transferred off shore for processing.  
                                                          
75 See http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-05-16/parliament-excises-mainland-from-migration-
zone/4693940- accessed 11/05/15 
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The practice of transfer and processing of asylum seeker claimants in third party 
countries, whether it was attempted or it occurred in countries such as Papua New 
Guinea, Nauru, Malaysia, East Timor or Cambodia is what Australian governments 
since 2010 have done or attempted to do.  Here are some vivid examples: 
 July 6, 2010- towards a Regional Protection Framework- the Gillard 
government announces the establishment of the regional processing centre for 
asylum seekers in Timor-Leste76 
 May 7, 2011, the Malaysian solution is born- An arrangement in which 
Australia would swap 800 asylum seeker boat arrivals with 4000 UNHCR 
assessed refugees out of Malaysia in the four year period77. 
 August 19, 2011, The Australian government signed a memorandum of 
understanding with Papua New Guinea to re-establish an assessment centre 
for asylum seekers on Manus Island- This was definitely the Pacific Solution 
revisited78. 
 The Australian government also signed an agreement with Cambodia 
to resettle asylum seekers there. The agreement on May 19, 2014 would 
facilitate the resettlement of all those found to be refugees from Nauru to 
Cambodia79.  
This is literally to send away refuges as far away as possible from Australia! 
The striking of other agreements with pacific countries like Papua New Guinea and 
Nauru for processing and resettlement of asylum seekers represents the 
externalisation of the asylum seeker problem. On July 19, 2013, Prime Minister Kevin 
Rudd announced the Regional Resettlement Arrangement with Papua New Guinea, 
                                                          
76 http://www.theaustralian.com.au/archive/politics/julia-gillards-speech-to-the-lowy-institute-
on-labors-new-asylum-seeker-policy-for-australia/story-e6frgczf-1225888445622- accessed 
09/08/2015 
77 http://www.smh.com.au/national/gillard-announces-malaysian-solution-20110507-
1ed0h.html- accessed 09/08/2015 
78 http://www.smh.com.au/national/australia-png-sign-agreement-on-manus-detention-
20110819-1j23u.html- accessed 09/08/2015 
79 http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-05-20/morrison-says-australia-briefed-unhcr-on-
cambodia-deal/5464554- accessed 09/08/15 
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which came to be referenced as the PNG Solution. Subsequently, any boat arrivals in 
Australia as of July 19, 2013 would end up being processed (Off shore) in Manus Island 
(Mandatory Detention) and would not be resettled in Australia even if found refugees. 
They would be permanently resettled in Papua New Guinea and those not found 
refugees will be returned back to their country. This Regional Resettlement 
Agreement (RRA) also referred to as the “PNG Solution” announced by the Kevin Rudd 
Labor government was a vivid example of this externalisation where the government 
blankly declared that all those arriving by boat in Australia would never be assessed 
or resettled in Australia but would be quickly transferred, processed and resettled in 
Papua New Guinea.  
Where is the silence? 
Of course sceptics would want us believe that there are very concrete explanations to 
the harsh immigration policy - as “blatantly clear” of terror threats and or bombings 
to Australians both on and offshore. This does not imply that there are may be no 
“wrong elements” in the asylum seeker chain. But the proverbial one egg spoils it all 
should not be applied as a blanket in dealing with the asylum seeker situation. 
Obligations to International Treaties - Article 14 in the 1948 Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights to which Australia has covenanted to provides for the rights to seek 
asylum in another country and enjoy the protection from persecution80. Australia has 
now granted powers to the minister to remove non-citizens from its territory 
irrespective of whether Australia has non-refoulement obligations against that 
person or not in complete disregard of the protections accorded to such persons 
under the different international treaties such as the Refugee Convention, the 
Convention Against Torture (CAT) and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR). Australia’s interpretation of the Refugee Convention has also 
gone ahead to disallow coats and the due process of the law to impede any decision 
by the minister to remove non-citizens. Removal of non-citizens from Australia can 
be considered even with undue consideration of any assessments of non-refoulement 
obligations. 
                                                          
80 See http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a14- accessed 07/05/2015 
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Addressing push factors - Many places such as Afghanistan are still unsafe 
(Taleban). There are reasons that force people into boats, those risky journeys that 
need to be addressed. Or at least Australia is positioned to address. Australia has an 
upper edge in the Pacific region. Australia is an aid provider to a host of countries in 
the region. Australia is best positioned to help advocate for other countries to improve 
the conditions for asylum seeking. Australia can lobby Indonesia and Malaysia to sign 
the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol. Australia can indeed diplomatically 
convince its pacific neighbours to improve human rights records. Australia is 
currently building the capacity of the Indonesian police, can it be willing to also build 
their capacity to take refugees? It undoubted has the ability to make some significant 
change or cause change. It is the question of will?  
Asylum seekers are assumed to have valid documents from the time they set out to 
leave their countries and seek asylum. According to the new law, (bill) If asylum 
claims have been rejected on the basis that the applicant submitted a document that 
was deemed “bogus” by the department, they will have no access to be referred to the 
newly created Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) that sits under the Refugee 
Review Tribunal (RRT). 
Human Rights abuses in Pacific Countries - There are many countries in the Asia 
Pacific that are not signatories to the 1951 UN Convention and thus do not recognise 
or provide protection to people seeking asylum. Even PNG is a signatory with some 
reservations. With no access to education, no work rights, possible refoulement with 
almost no possibilities of permanent resettlement.  
What is taken for granted? What is not questioned? 
Boat Asylum seekers are genuine - A large number of those who have come to 
Australia in recent years by boat have been found to be genuine asylum seekers at the 
end of their assessment process. According to the Department’s annual report 81 , 
between 90- 95 percent of asylum seeker claims assessed in the onshore but remote 
Christmas Island resulted in the granting of protection visa. Similarly, commentators 
have argued that a large number of asylum seekers generally detained in the small 
                                                          
81 http://www.immi.gov.au/about/reports/annual/2008-09/html/outcome1/output1-2-2.htm- 
accessed 06/06/15 
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island nation of Nauru under the Pacific Solution between 2001 and 2008 were found 
to be genuine refugees and later resettled in Australia and other countries like New 
Zealand82. 
Communication campaign to counter people smugglers 83  - Although it is 
obviously an expensive undertaking, the government seems to be unbothered by how 
many millions of tax payers” dollars will be injected in this venture at the moment. 
The end, in the end, will justify the means-just to stop the boats coming in loaded with 
people claiming to seek asylum, and as a former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd once 
stated “to break the backbone of the people smuggling business-deterrence at its best! 
And as for those intercepted within the waters of Australia, they are either 
immediately sent back “to where they came from” or transferred to the offshore 
processing facilities in Manus Island of Papua New Guinea or Nauru, never to be 
resettled in Australia. 
And what’s the message to those contemplating of coming to Australia- “You will never 
make Australia home”. 
You will not be resettled in Australia if you come by boat. Under the Regional 
Resettlement Arrangement with PNG, any unauthorised IMA was subjected to be 
transferred to Manus Island for processing and resettlement for those found to be 
genuine refugees. And detention or deportation for those found not to be refugees as 
determined by PNG. Initial security and health checks were to be undertaken by 
Australian authorities. 
What is assumed? 
Asylum seekers have no values - The government has set higher and sticker 
standards for asylum seekers living in the community to live by. The standard is 
incomparable to those expected of other Australians. In January 30, 2014, the 
government introduced and implemented a Code of Behaviour84 for asylum seekers 
                                                          
82 http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-03-14/menadue-the-pacific-solution-didn27t-work-
before-and-it-won27/3886792- accessed 6/6/15 
83 http://www.customs.gov.au/site/offshore-communication-campaign-people-smuggling.asp -
accessed 15/04/2015 
84 http://www.asrc.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Code-of-Behaviour-Draft-
29.01.14.pdf- assessed 09/08/2015 
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living in the Australian community in which they are subjected to and expected to 
abide by a different set of values compared to ordinary Australians. It is inferred that 
spitting, swearing or simply irritating other people in the wider Australian 
community can lead to deportation85.  This can be interpreted as nothing more but 
‘setting a trap’ for the removal of asylum seekers from Australia hence evidencing the 
governments deterrence agenda. 
Conclusion 
What this brief overview of recent and current research suggests is that we need to 
understand better why contemporary asylum seeker policy is more about a policy 
aimed at deterring asylum seekers from coming to Australia rather than finding ways 
of discharging Australia’s obligations to asylum seekers under international law by 
protecting those seeking asylum. While there is a considerable body of research that 
focuses on the plight of people seeking asylum in Australia, there is little or limited 
specific focus on why Australia has adopted the increasingly punitive and deterrent 
framework that now characterises its asylum seeker policy. What I have shown is that 
there is a good deal of descriptive work pointing to the role of ideology the use of 
misrepresentations of asylum seeker problems. What I also suggested was that much 
of this work was strong in its capacity to describe certain phenomena but was not so 
strong when it came to generating satisfying explanations. That deficiency what I 
sought to rectify using the work of Bacchi (Bacchi 2009) and Lakoff (Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980).  
                                                          
85 See http://www.immi.gov.au/forms/Documents/1443.pdf- accessed 11/05/15.  
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION  
In this research I have analysed the discursive practices of Australian politicians as 
they deliberated in public, made policies or introduced legislation to deal with the 
asylum seeker problem, from 2007 but especially in 2013 and thereafter. Rather than 
compliance with the legal and moral obligations operating in international refugee law 
successive governments have made the deterrence of asylum seekers the central plank 
in Australia’s asylum seeker policy platform. The representation of asylum seeker 
policy as a problem of border security now means that vulnerable asylum seekers who 
were seeking refuge by embarking on long and dangerous journeys across the sea, are 
now being turned back at sea and returned to refugee camps in the region. This policy 
approach of “stopping the boats” depended in part on constructing the “problem” in 
such a way as to justify this treatment.  
The years since 2007 have seen a good deal of chopping and changing in asylum 
seeker policy. This has been largely a result of the confluence of contentious public 
discussion some of it provoked by media preoccupied with a framework stressing that 
“bad news is good news”. Public opinion has been and remains sharply divided. This 
has helped to impart some instability into the policy making process. 
As I have shown, this policy assumed that the focus on deterrence was warranted 
because successive Australian governments had seemingly persuaded themselves that 
Australia had to protect itself from these people even if it meant breaching 
international law protecting the human rights of asylum seekers. As a signatory to the 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (UNHCR, 
2003), Australia has been legally obligated under international law to provide 
protection for people claiming refugee status. Yet Australia's asylum seeker policies 
have increasingly been at odds with the UN Refugee Convention.  
I have also argued that the continued emphasis on deterrence, which is manifested in 
hard line policies perhaps hinges around the conscious or unconscious understanding 
and application of the “Castle Doctrine”- the ideology that “a man’s home is his castle”.  
(Please refer to the narrative in Chapter 5). And whereas the castle ideology is not 
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explicitly expressed in various asylum seeker policies, its tenets remain largely 
implied in policy responses. 
I have also made a case about the role played by emotionally charged metaphors 
employed by politicians between 2007 and 2015. As Bessant et al (2006, p. 333) argue, 
if “we are to be very clear about the politics of policy-makers and politicians, then 
giving attention to the metaphors used is critical.” However this is no easy task. 
Metaphors are so ingrained in our patterns of thought, deliberation and speech that 
they are often difficult to recognise if we do not pay close attention to their use. Indeed 
we are often not aware of the majority of metaphors we use in everyday speech 
(Badstone, 2000, p. 242 – 243). There is good reason to suggest that these factors were 
also at work in the years after 1989 (See Bleasedale 2008; Burke 2002). Because of the 
way this political discourse was shaped, asylum seeker policies were profoundly 
affected by the way the problem was represented.  
Metaphors are vital in terms of how we understand the world, and in this case, how 
particular issues come to be seen as problems. In my account I highlighted the power 
of metaphors in asylum seeker discourse about arrival of asylum seekers after 2007 
and the role they play in constituting issues as problems. It seems clear “that 
“problems” do not exist outside of the ways in which they are thought about or 
conceptualised” (Bacchi, 2009, p. 262). When an issue is represented as a problem it 
has been given shape and boundaries and it often becomes impossible to think about 
it in any other shape, or outside of the boundaries that it has been prescribed. Thus, 
when something has been defined in a certain way, other interpretations about what 
it is, and what needs to be done to address it, are pushed out of sight. 
As Reilly (2014) argued recently, there was probably never any doubt that a wealthy 
developed nation like Australia, “with an expensive and powerful navy, could stop a 
trickle of unseaworthy fishing boats from reaching Australia” if any Australian 
government wanted to do this. The Howard government had created a blueprint for 
doing this and this had been embellished by the Labor government between 2007 and 
2013. And there was indeed a decline in the number of boats arriving in Australia 
especially from late 2013 on. Reilly however notes that “a proper assessment of the 
government's policy must move beyond the simple metric of boat arrivals”.  
  
122 
  
Such an accounting needs to account for the broader costs and benefits of stopping the 
boats especially “in light of the reasons Australia signed up to the UN Convention on 
Refugees back in 1951”. As Reilly (2014) puts it so far it seems, the Abbott government 
has been able to avoid devastating criticism because the costs of its policies are either 
borne by other countries, or by the asylum seekers themselves, or else the costs will 
only become apparent in the future. As Reilly notes firstly there is a cost to those 
asylum seekers to whom Australia has denied entry: 
People are left with no resolution to their claim for protection. Those who have 
been intercepted and pushed back remain in limbo in Indonesia, a transit 
country, with no government assistance, no means to earn a living and no legal 
rights. 
Worse however the condition is forced on other asylum seekers “intercepted under 
Operation Sovereign Borders who currently (as of August 2015) may be held in 
detention either on Christmas Island, Nauru or Manus Island” (Reilly 2014). As has 
become clear courtesy of investigations by the Australian Human Rights Commission, 
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and Amnesty International, the conditions of 
detention are plainly and grossly inadequate.  
Second, there is the cost to Australia’s international reputation:  
Australia is uniquely hard line in its response to asylum seekers arriving by boat. 
No other country has employed as aggressive an interception and tow-back 
policy as Australia, using navy vessels to turn back boats in international waters, 
or transferring asylum seekers to disposable boats and teaching them to steer 
themselves. No other country has utilised connections with small developing 
nations to shoulder the burden of its asylum seeker issue. 
Due to the limitations of both time and expectation, I have limited my inquiry to 
identifying, as Bacchi has recommended, the implied problem representations in 
specific asylum seeker policies or policy proposals over the years.  
Clearly a good deal more research could be conducted to address the asylum seeker 
policy issue by engaging with Bacchi’s other questions: 
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1. What presuppositions or assumptions underlie this representation of 
the asylum seeking people arriving by boat in Australia? What effects have been 
produced by this representation of the “boat people” problem?   
This question requires that we refer to the background “knowledge” that is taken for 
granted. It is important for example, that we critically analyse the categorizations of 
people relied on in the policy proposals. We need to understand better the techniques 
associated with the creation of categories in techniques like censuses and surveys that 
form part of the non-discursive practices that allow certain problem representations 
to gain dominance and hence get policy representation. It is through the examination 
of these presuppositions that we are able to understand the conceptual logic that 
underpin some specific problem representations in the alcohol policy or proposal 
representations.  
2. What effects are produced by this representation of the asylum seekers 
problem in Australia?  
The goal is to identify the effects of specific problem representations so that they can 
critically be assessed. WPR approach generally starts with the presumption that some 
problem representations create difficulties and sometimes forms of harm for 
members of some social groups more than others. This is why we need to scrutinise 
the “problematisations” on offer in asylum seeker policies, laws and proposals on 
offer by the various Australian governments to see where and how they function to 
benefit some and harm others and what can be done about this. In order to perform 
this assessment, we will need to direct our attention to the effects that accompany 
specific problem representations. Again it is worth noting that this form of analysis 
will not necessarily refer to the conventional standard policy approach to evaluation 
with its focus on “outcomes” or “”efficiency”. The WPR approach identifies three 
interconnected and often overlapping effects that need to be weighed up. 
3. What’s left unproblematic in the Australian asylum seekers policy 
problem presentation? Where are the silences? Can the Australian asylum 
seekers problem be thought about differently?  
The objective is to advance for our reflection and consideration, issues and 
perspectives silenced in identified problem representations. The purpose here is to 
problematize the “problematisations” on offer in specific policy proposals by 
  
124 
  
subjecting the problem representations they contain to critical scrutiny in the various 
policy proposals regarding people arriving by boat and seeking asylum in Australia. 
The key consideration here is to find out what has failed to be problematized. The 
objective here is to identify and discuss those issues and perspectives that have been 
silenced. This kind of analysis will draw our attention to tensions and contradictions 
in problem representations and helps to highlight the inadequacies and limitations in 
the way the problem is being represented. We also need to draw our attention to 
competing problem representations that were not considered in specific policy 
proposals as they assist us in identifying silences in those problem representations 
that gain institutional endorsement. Here we also might begin to draw cross cultural 
comparisons to assist us in realising that certain ways of thinking about problems 
reflect specific institutional and cultural contexts and hence that problem 
representations are contingent upon these contexts.  
4. How and where has this representation of the asylum seekers arriving 
by boat problem been produced, disseminated and defended?  
The purpose of this question in Bacchi’s approach is to highlight the conditions that 
allow a particular problem representation to take shape and become dominant. Here 
we will need to trace the history of the current problem representation. We need to 
follow the twists and turns in the evolution of the asylum seeker policy/problem in 
Australia.  
Scrutinizing the genealogy of asylum seekers policy problem representation over the 
years has a destabilising effect on problem representations that are often taken for 
granted. We will need to dig deep in to the power relations that have affected the 
success of some problem representations and the failure of others. An example is why 
Howards 2001 “Pacific Solution” was not taken up by the Labor Government in 2007 
yet by 2012 they had adopted something looking a lot like it. Tracing the genealogy 
helps us to identify how a “problem” took on a particular shape, with specific 
emphasis on the process(es). We will also need to pay attention to the differential 
power relations where some groups have more influence than others in ensuring that 
a particular problem representation “sticks” and others get left out along the way. We 
will direct our attention to arrange of often unmentioned practices or politics, e.g. 
rules that give some groups institutional authority in some aspects. 
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5. How can the current asylum seekers arriving by boat problem 
representation be disrupted or replaced to bring about a practical solution to 
the boat people problem in Australia?  
The goal here is to pay attention to both the means by which some problem 
representations become dominant, and the possibility of challenging problem 
representations that are judged to be harmful. We might for example, direct our 
attention to practices and processes that allow certain problem representations to 
dominate with an emphasis on the analysis of means through which particular 
problem representations reach their target audience and achieve legitimacy. In this 
respect we must also consider the role of media in disseminating and supporting 
some problem representations. 
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